DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 365 591 SO 023 536

AUTHOR Tegnell, Geoffrey; Ladenburg, Thomas
TITLE Revolution and Intervention: U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 20th Century. SSEC American History Series.
INSTITUTION Social Science Education Consortium, Inc., Boulder, Colo.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-89994-362-4
PUB DATE 91
NOTE 165p.
AVAILABLE FROM Social Science Education Consortium, 3300 Mitchell Lane, Suite 240, Boulder, CO 80301-2272.
PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom Use - Instructional Materials (For Learner) (051) -- Guides - Classroom Use - Teaching Guides (For Teacher) (052)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Diplomatic History; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; History Instruction; *International Relations; Intervention; Primary Sources; Revolution; Secondary Education; Teaching Guides; *United States History
IDENTIFIERS Castro (Fidel); *Cuba; *Cuban Missile Crisis; Cuban Revolution; Kennedy (John F)

ABSTRACT

This unit for U.S. history courses examines a number of questions raised by U.S.-Cuban relations beginning with the Spanish-American War of 1898 and ending with the missile crisis 64 years later. These questions are on such topics as the appropriate U.S. stance toward a nationalistic reform movement, a social revolution, and a military build up in Cuba by an extra-hemispheric power. At the unit's center are simulations of two focal events in U.S.-Cuban relations: (1) the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, and (2) the missile crisis 18 months later. Lessons preceding these two simulations trace fundamental U.S. foreign policy making toward Cuba from the 1826 declaration of the Monroe Doctrine on. The unit then offers students the opportunity to apply what they have learned about the questions raised by revolution and intervention in Cuba to the Dominican crisis of 1965. The unit concludes by asking students to review the history of U.S. policy toward Cuba in order to prepare an essay advocating the predominance of one of three underlying motives that notable historians have ascribed to the United States policymakers. This document consists of a summary of chapter activities to serve as a guide for teachers, a section of teacher directions for each chapter with an overview, objectives, materials, and procedure, and a section of student reading for all 10 chapters. The readings include handouts, maps, and primary sources such as government documents, writings by different historians, and the Charter of the Organization of American States. (DK)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****



ED 365 591

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION

U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

by Geoffrey Tegnell
and Thomas Ladenburg

SSEC American History Series

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN OTHER THAN PAPER COPY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
LAUREL R. SINGLETON
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)"

SO 023 536

Social Science Education Consortium
Boulder, Colorado

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION:

U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

by

Geoffrey Tegnell and Thomas Ladenburg

Social Science Education Consortium
Boulder, Colorado
1991

ORDERING INFORMATION

This publication is available from:

Social Science Education Consortium
3300 Mitchell Lane, Suite 240
Boulder, CO 80301-2272

ISBN 0-89994-362-4

© 1991 Geoffrey Tegnell and Thomas Ladenburg

The materials in this volume may be reproduced for classroom use at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher. Reproduction by any means, electronic or mechanical, for any purpose other than classroom use is prohibited without written permission from the authors.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to express their heartfelt thanks to the John F. Kennedy Foundation for granting us the Kennedy Library Teaching Award that got us started on this project; to John Stewart, Sheldon Stern, and Donna Smerlas, who guided us through the rich Kennedy Library archives and provided much appreciated expertise, encouragement, and editing; and to Muriel Ladenburg and Ann Holmes, for putting up with our prolonged research and writing.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

FOREWORD iv

INTRODUCTION 1

Unit Overview 1

Purpose and Rationale 1

Summary of Chapter Activities 2

Components of the Program 4

TEACHER DIRECTIONS

Chapter 1. Was the United States a "Good Neighbor" to Cuba? 5

Chapter 2. Should the United States Support Grau San Martin and the September Revolution? 9

Chapter 3. Should the United States Prevent Castro's Revolution in 1958? 13

Chapter 4. Who Was Primarily Responsible for the Break in U.S.-Cuban Relations? 17

Chapter 5. Should President Kennedy Go Ahead with the Planned Invasion of Cuba by Cuban Exiles? 23

Chapter 6. Should President Kennedy Order Sufficient Air Support to Insure the Success of the Invasion? 27

Chapter 7. Was the Stationing of Soviet Missiles in Cuba Justified? 31

Chapter 8. Which Strategy Should President Kennedy Use to Remove the Soviet Missiles from Cuba? 35

Chapter 9. Should the United States Intervene in Latin America? 39

Chapter 10. What Was the Underlying Reason for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba? 43

REFERENCES 47

STUDENT READINGS 51

FOREWORD

Enthusiasm for learning U.S. history does not just happen. Tom Ladenburg and Geoff Tegnell, history teachers in Massachusetts, are well aware of that fact. To stimulate student interest, Ladenburg and Tegnell have written many of their own materials. Their units examine primary sources as well as writings of historians to help students understand the motives of the people who actually made this country's history. They study the same event from multiple perspectives. They are challenged to integrate divergent perceptions and to emerge with their own views, shaped by the facts and concepts presented. Students learn to write carefully reasoned essays that foreshadow major arguments and use relevant facts to support them.

By completing a course making these demands on them, students emerge with a heightened awareness of political issues, an understanding of how our forebears handled these issues, an idea of what they believe (hopefully with passionate intensity), and the ability and desire to communicate their beliefs as well as understand the positions of others. Most important, their work in U.S. history prepares students to participate in our democratic institutions.

The Social Science Education Consortium has previously published four other units in this American History Series. As we publish additional units, we welcome users' feedback. In fact, we would like nothing better than to be the facilitator for a network of history teachers exchanging ideas and materials that work. We invite your participation.

James R. Giese, Executive Director
Social Science Education Consortium

INTRODUCTION

Unit Overview

When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to install intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, he exposed some essential dynamics of U.S.-Cuban relations. On the one hand, this action by the Soviets underlined the need for a U.S. Cuba policy designed to deny foreign powers the opportunity to establish potentially hostile military bases on the borders of the continental United States. On the other hand, Cuba's decision to allow deployment of Soviet missiles can be viewed as a legitimate response to the threat of invasion by a United States intent on destroying Fidel Castro's revolution. In order to determine responsibility for the nuclear crisis that ensued, the student of history thus must understand the perspectives of U.S., Cuban, and even Society policymakers. It is precisely this opportunity to explore complex policy-making from multiple perspectives that this unit is designed to encourage.

Revolution and Intervention examines a number of questions raised by U.S.-Cuban relations beginning with the Spanish-American War of 1898 and ending with the missile crisis 64 years later. These questions are on such topics as the appropriate U.S. stance toward a nationalistic reform movement, a social revolution, and a military build-up in Cuba by an extra-hemispheric power. At the unit's center are simulations of two focal events in U.S.-Cuban relations – the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and the missile crisis 18 months later. Lessons preceding these two simulations trace fundamental U.S. foreign policy-making toward Cuba from the 1826 declaration of the Monroe Doctrine on. The unit then offers students the opportunity to apply what they have learned about the questions raised by revolution and intervention in Cuba to the Dominican crisis of 1965. The unit concludes by asking students to review the history of U.S. policy toward Cuba in order to prepare an essay advocating the predominance of one of three underlying motives that notable historians have ascribed to U.S. policymakers.

Purpose and Rationale

Revolution and Intervention will afford most students their only in-depth investigation of the turbulent relations between the United States and Cuba. While traditional history texts cover the political and military history of the Spanish-American War, Platt Amendment, and Good Neighbor policy in a page or two, this book-length curriculum unit considers the social, economic, and cultural, as well as political, factors that shaped U.S.-Cuban relations. Students will be given an opportunity to explore U.S. relations with Cuba in the context of a history of interaction spanning a period of 64 years. They will also examine such important events in U.S. history as the repeal of the Platt Amendment, the break in U.S.-Cuban relations, and the missile crisis. In addition, some of the questions that U.S. policymakers had to deal with, such as when the United States can legitimately intervene in the affairs of a neighboring country, have powerful contemporary resonance. Thus, this unit confronts students with issues concerning U.S. relations with Third World countries that are richly detailed, historically significant, and currently relevant.

The unit uses simulations to engage students in stimulating discourse about important issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. In one case, students play the parts of presidential advisors, counseling President John F. Kennedy on whether to proceed with the CIA invasion plan in 1961 and whether to order direct U.S. military intervention so as to reverse the fortunes of the faltering enterprise. Another simulation has students advising President Kennedy concerning how to respond to the news that Soviet missiles capable of reaching most of the continental United States were being installed in Cuba. In a third simulation, students brief President Lyndon B. Johnson concerning whether and how to intervene in the Dominican civil war in 1965. Through these well-focused simulations, students have the opportunity to assume the roles of people who shaped history, an experience that tends to motivate them to learn deeply and with enthusiasm. Of equal importance, the unit's simulations and debates permit students to perceive events from multiple perspectives, a process that facilitates mature and balanced thinking.

The unit leads students through a four-stage learning process. First, they learn about the social, political, economic, cultural, and military contexts in which foreign policy decisions were made. Second, they are asked to make, provide supporting evidence for, and defend specific policy decisions. Third, students are taught what actually happened in each case and are given an opportunity to reflect on their own decisions and consider whether the right resolution to the issue was attained. Lastly, students are called upon to adopt the stance of historian to explore the underlying motives for our foreign policy toward Cuba during the years covered in this unit. This process of researching a question, making an informed decision, reflecting on whether actual policy decisions were right or wrong, and then analyzing the underlying causes for policy decision-making involves students in cognitive exercises that stimulate higher order thinking. Moreover, the writing assignments that accompany each stage of this learning process give students practice in composing prose of graduated complexity and abstraction. Thus, *Revolution and Intervention*, if used as intended, will stimulate students to learn important history, think about crucial issues, and write well-organized analytical essays that express conclusions they have reached through intense inquiry into questions of utmost importance to all Americans, North and South.

Summary of Chapter Activities

The following outline of each chapter may serve as a guide for teachers in preparing their lessons.

Chapter 1: Was the United States a "Good Neighbor" to Cuba?

The unit opens with an examination of the first U.S. intervention in Cuba. Chapter 1 begins by explaining the Monroe Doctrine and the reasons it was promulgated. The remainder of the chapter covers the declaration of War on Spain, the Teller Resolution, the Platt Amendment, the 1906 Magoon governorship, and the 1909 withdrawal of U.S. troops. On the first day, students are asked to undertake a mapping exercise of the Caribbean. On the second day, they are prepared to participate in a discussion on the topic of whether the United States indeed was a "good neighbor" to Cuba.

Chapter 2: Should the United States Support Grau San Martin and the September Revolution?

This chapter looks into the economic and political relations between the United States and Cuba from 1920-33. It centers on the ascent to power of the reformist government of Ramon Grau San Martin, a politician critical of U.S. influence in Cuba, and asks whether President Roosevelt should back him or encourage army sergeant Fulgencio Batista to put forth a more pro-business Cuban government. Instructions are provided for holding a debate involving small teams of students arguing in favor of and against recognition of the Grau government before the rest of the class, which, as a Congressional committee, will vote on the question.

Chapter 3: Should the United States Prevent Castro's Revolution in 1958?

This chapter reviews political, economic, and social history, culminating with a portrait of Cuba in 1958. The narrative focuses on the civil war and ends by asking whether the United States should continue to send arms to Batista or cut off arms shipments. Students argue this issue in a whole-class debate.

Chapter 4: Who Was Primarily Responsible for the Break in U.S.-Cuban Relations?

In this chapter, students read of events from January 1959 to January 1961. Topics covered include the televised trials of Batista supporters, agrarian reform and confiscation of U.S. properties, denial of civil rights in Cuba, the CIA contingency plan to invade Cuba, cut in the sugar quota, and Khrushchev's public embrace of the Castro government. Students can be asked to make a timeline of these events and prepare a case arguing whether the United States or Cuba was responsible for the break in relations.

Chapter 5: Should President Kennedy Go Ahead with the Planned Invasion of Cuba by Cuban Exiles?

This chapter describes the creation of the CIA exile brigade and presents the question of whether President Kennedy should carry out its planned invasion of Cuba in order to overthrow Castro. The chapter provides role-playing cards and documents that prepare students to assume roles of Kennedy's advisors in arguing whether the United States should proceed with the CIA's invasion plans.

Chapter 6: Should President Kennedy Order Sufficient Air Support to Insure the Success of the Invasion?

Students read details of the desperate condition of the exile brigade pinned down on the beach on the second day of the invasion, after nearly all of the CIA plans had gone awry. The chapter asks whether President Kennedy should risk further involvement in the conflict by giving sufficient air support to assure victory. Students work in cooperative groups to complete a decision chart of the pros and cons of committing U.S. forces; they then prepare a group recommendation for the president.

Chapter 7: Was the Stationing of Soviet Missiles in Cuba Justified?

A chronology of events from the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to the October 1962 discovery of Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba is presented in this chapter. Students are asked to find events in the text that tend to support the Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev positions on the Soviet missiles in Cuba. On the second day, some students are given the documents they need to play the parts of U.S., Cuban, and Soviet diplomats to justify or condemn the presence of these missiles in Cuba; other students act as the U.N. General Assembly in deciding the issue.

Chapter 8: Which Strategy Should President Kennedy Use to Remove the Soviet Missiles from Cuba?

This chapter focuses on President Kennedy's response to the discovery of the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The narrative records the convocation of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council and lays out the ExComm's three strategies: an air strike, a blockade, or a negotiated removal of U.S. missiles from Italy and Turkey in exchange for Soviet dismantling of the bases in Cuba. Student members of the ExComm are asked to prepare analyses of each of the strategies, and, in a position paper, advocate one to the president.

Chapter 9: Should the United States Intervene in Latin America?

This chapter provides students with the opportunity to apply some of their learning in this unit to the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic. The narrative tells the history of the Dominican Republic and its relations with the United States from the 1860s to the 1960s, introduces the four groups vying for power upon the death of dictator Rafael Trujillo, and sets the scene for debating whether the United States should employ a political-military, social, or non-interventionist policy in response to this crisis. Students may design such a policy by analyzing the problem, stating reasons for their choice, suggesting two U.S. actions, and predicting the likely outcome of their policy.

Chapter 10: What Was the Underlying Reason for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba?

The concluding chapter outlines three different interpretations of U.S. diplomatic history: the nationalist or democratic ideology, realist or defense as objective, and the New Left or pro-business school. Careful instructions are provided to help students adopt a school, collect data from the unit to support the interpretation of their school, and use this evidence to write an essay reviewing the history of U.S.-Cuban relations to substantiate the interpretation of their chosen school.

Components of the Program

Two kinds of materials are presented to help teachers use the unit. First are the teacher directions, which include the following information for each chapter: an overview of the content and procedures for that chapter, objectives, an estimate of the time required, a list of materials needed, step-by-step procedures for teaching the lesson, and an assignment for students to complete in preparation for the next chapter.

Each chapter also includes student reading material. The student reading material is presented at the end of the book (see page 51). For cost reasons, the material is printed on both sides of the paper. If you do not have a copy machine that can handle this type of original, you will need to copy one side of each page and insert the copies with the originals to form a complete master set for duplication. We regret any inconvenience this may cause.

Note that each student chapter begins with selected interest-stimulating quotations. The quotations are followed by an introduction to the chapter that provides a brief history and an overview of the chapter's central issue, stating various positions on the issue. These introductions were carefully crafted to provide an advance organizer for students. You may find it beneficial to model use of the introductions to the first one or two chapters with the class so students will understand their structure and purpose and thus gain maximum benefit from them.

CHAPTER 1:
WAS THE UNITED STATES A "GOOD NEIGHBOR" TO CUBA?

Overview:

Following quotations and an introductory paragraph that frame the issue of whether the United States was a good neighbor to Cuba in the period 1898-1906, this chapter discusses the situation that caused President Monroe to issue his "Doctrine" in 1823. The chapter goes on to explore the interest of U.S. citizens and politicians in Cuba before and after the Civil War and traces the Cuban independence movement from 1868 to the 1895 uprising that led to the Spanish-American War. The sinking of the *Maine*, the Proctor Report, President McKinley's war message, and the Teller Amendment are described. The war itself is sketched, with mention of the Battle of Manila Bay, Aguinaldo's revolution and suppression, the destruction of the Spanish fleet off Santiago, and the Battle of San Juan Hill. The chapter then describes the U.S. occupation of Cuba, adoption of the Platt Amendment, and the first post-Spanish-American War intervention in 1906. The chapter concludes by asking whether the United States intervened in Cuba because of either generosity and democratic idealism or selfish economic and strategic interests. Documents at the end of the chapter support these two viewpoints.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Explain the historical origins of the Monroe Doctrine.

2. Describe the conditions that prompted U.S. involvement in Cuba in the year 1898-1906.

3. Decide whether the United States has been a "good neighbor" to Cuba, basing their analysis on events from 1898-1906.

Time Required: 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 1 and Handout 1 for all students; enough copies of each document for one-half the class

Procedure:

1. Inform students that they will be learning about the history of relations between the United States and Cuba. In order to start thinking about this topic, they are to complete the handout that you distribute. They are to locate the places listed in the instructions on the map provided in the student reading or another resource and label them on their blank maps. After students have labelled their maps, which they may do in pairs, ask them to respond to the following three-part question: What does this map suggest to you about the United States' attitude toward Cuba, the Cuban attitude toward the United States, and both countries' relationships to the Caribbean region? To prime students for analysis, ask them to think about the proximity and relative sizes of the United States and Cuba, as well as the location of these countries in relationship to shipping channels and the Panama Canal.

Students might observe that Cuba is a close neighbor to the United States, stands on the approaches to our southern coastline, might be a good place to trade, and could be dangerous to U.S. security if occupied by an enemy power. They might observe that the United States is much bigger than Cuba, would have a considerable effect on Cuban affairs because of its proximity, and might be seen by Cubans as either a helpful "big brother" or a potential bully. As to both countries' relationship to the Caribbean region, students might notice that Cuba is one among several island nations close to the United States, that many of the countries in this region have a Hispanic heritage that is somewhat different from the dominant culture of the United States, that there are a limited number of ship passages into the Gulf and the Caribbean, and that Cuba is strategically located between two of these passages and between the United States and the Panama Canal.

Ask students what they know about Cuba and Fidel Castro (for example, why he would be attracted to communism) and why communism has been viewed as such a threat to the United States. Finally, ask students whether they know about the reasons for the souring of U.S.-Cuban relations.

2. Assign students to read Chapter 1, answer the definition/explanation questions and question 2, and write a position paper on whether the United States was a "good neighbor" to Cuba between 1898-1906 (question 3). Have half the class read each document provided with the chapter. The following are summaries of the two documents.

Document 1. Manual Sanguily: The Chains of the Platt Amendment. In this excerpt, Sanguily criticized the United States for imposing the Platt Amendment on the writers of the Cuban constitution. He said that the Amendment actually offered no protection against revolutions because these might legitimately be provoked by oppressive governments. He thought that the United States had flooded Cuba with arrogant foreigners who had acquired Cuban property, in part by force. He felt that the Amendment's provision for intervention to protect "capital" was designed to protect foreign-owned property. Finally, he rankled at the disrespect that he felt the U.S. government showed toward Cubans in forcing them to write the Amendment into their constitution.

Document 2. John Kendrick Bangs: To Nurse the Sickly Child Back to Life. In this document, Bangs praised the United States for its services to Cuba. First among these services mentioned by Bangs was the rescue of Cuba from oppressive Spain. He went on to list the accomplishments of the United States "trusteeship" of Cuba between 1898 and 1902, such as establishment of hospitals, schools, public health services, insane asylums, modern prisons, lighthouses, a coast guard, a civil service, and a rural police force. He concluded by pointing out that the "carpet-baggers" from the United States had not exploited Cuba during the occupation.

3. On the second day, seat students so those who read Document 1 are in one part of the room and those who read Document 2 are in another. Review the assignment from the previous day. Students were to read Chapter 1 and one of the two documents and answer the definition/explanation questions and the two discussion questions. Possible answers to the definition/explanation questions are:

- Monroe Doctrine – the plan of the Holy Alliance to invade Latin America to restore Spain's colonial empire occasioned Monroe's 1823 Congressional message. This message warned European powers that any attempt on their parts to "extend their system" could be used today concerning the Soviet Union as well as the attempt to restore Latin America to Spanish monarchy.
- two rebellions – seeking independence, Cubans twice rebelled against Spanish rule, in the 1860s and again in 1895.
- rebel strategy – destroying cane fields and homes of the wealthy, as well as bridges, railroads, and public buildings, in order to make holding Cuba unprofitable for the Spanish.
- Proctor report – Senator Redfield of Vermont described conditions in the Spanish *reconcentrados*, or stockades, where whole Cuban families lived in 10 x 15 huts and one-half of the people died.
- *U.S.S. Maine* – ship blown up while on a "goodwill mission" to Havana, Cuba, on February 15, 1898; 260 U.S. sailors were killed.
- Spanish report on the *Maine* – Spain claimed the *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion of coal dust. This report did not sway U.S. public opinion, and Spain later agreed to allow an investigation by an independent commission.
- McKinley war message – on April 11, 1898, President McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war, even though Spain had agreed to investigate the *Maine* explosion and declare a cease-fire in the war in Cuba. His reasons were stated as follows: (1) mistreatment of

Cubans, (2) harm to U.S. sailors, citizens, and property, and (3) damage to U.S.-Cuba trade and business.

- Teller Amendment – named after Senator Henry Teller and passed by Congress with the declaration of war on April 19, 1898, this resolution declared the United States had no intention of exercising control over Cuba after the Spanish left.
- Emilio Aguinaldo – Filipino revolutionary who was brought to the Philippines in 1898 to start a revolution to aid the United States in defeating the Spanish; he then fought U.S. troops for three years for control over his homeland.
- Teddy Roosevelt – led Rough Riders up San Juan Hill, enabling U.S. forces to gain highlands above Santiago, Cuba. Cut off from supplies, the Spanish army in Santiago surrendered and Spain sued for peace.
- North America's help to Cuba – included U.S. ending yellow fever epidemics, paying Cuba's revolutionary army, distributing food and clothing, organizing courts, reestablishing city and town governments, and building bridges, highways, and railroads.
- Platt Amendment – sponsored in Congress by Senator Orville Platt and added to the Cuban Constitution of 1902, this amendment required Cubans to limit dealings with foreign countries, give the United States land at Guantánamo Bay for a naval base, and allow the United States to intervene in Cuba if the Cuban government could not protect life, liberty, and property.
- Estrada Palma's agreement with the United States – this agreement reduced tariff from United States to guarantee access to their markets in exchange for the United States cutting its tariff on sugar from Cuba by 20 percent.
- intervention of 1906 – after charges of fraudulent elections led to rioting against his government, President Estrada Palma asked for U.S. intervention. U.S. troops occupied Cuba for three years, with Charles E. Magoon serving as governor. North American forces withdrew from Cuba after a new government was elected.

4. Ask for student answer to question 2. Possible answers include helping Cubans, protecting U.S. lives and property, and protecting U.S. trade and business (per President McKinley's war message); U.S. desire to free Cuba from Spain (per Teller resolution); U.S. wanted a Cuban government that would protect life, liberty, and property, refrain from borrowing large sums of money from other countries (which could lead to their interference in Cuban internal affairs), and give the U.S. a military base at Guantánamo (per Platt Amendment).

Ask students which they think were the real reasons for U.S. intervention in Cuba. Answers may depend on the document read. Limit this discussion to leave time for the last discussion issue.

5. Start discussion on the "good neighbor" question by asking what kind of behavior is expected of a good neighbor; having established these criteria, ask students to relate them to U.S. actions regarding Cuba, 1898-1906. Ask students to assess whether the Platt Amendment was an act of neighborliness and whether the United States had earned the right to have some say over its neighbor's affairs after the help rendered to Cuba. Allow students to report on both documents and to relate their contents to the argument concerning the U.S. role in Cuban affairs. To generate more discussion, you might have students play the roles of Cubans and North Americans speaking in personal terms on the good neighbor issue (that is, was the United States really a good neighbor, or was it a busybody and, perhaps, even an exploiter?).

Some of the following points might be made:

- The case that the United States was a "good neighbor" is supported by the evidence that the United States helped Cubans obtain their freedom from Spain, rebuilt the country, saw to it that the Cuban constitution would keep them free and independent, and pledged to help

Cubans if their government couldn't protect life, liberty, and property. The terrible conditions inside Cuba before U.S. intervention were reason enough to go to war. After winning the war, the United States helped Cubans get back on their feet. In addition to rebuilding their country, the United States paid their revolutionary army and stopped yellow fever. Later, the United States negotiated a favorable trade treaty with Cuba, restored order after rioting broke out due to protests against a fraudulent election, arranged for a new election, and left.

- The case that the United States was not a "good neighbor" starts with McKinley's war message to Congress. He asked Congress to declare war on Spain in order to protect U.S. lives, property, trade, and business. Indeed, there was no need to go to war in the first place because Spain was willing to close the *reconcentrado* camps, declare a cease-fire, and allow a neutral commission to investigate the *Maine* disaster. Furthermore, the United States used the war as an excuse to take over the Philippines and later violated the Teller Resolution there. Cuba was forced to add the Platt Amendment to its constitution before the United States would agree to recognize its independence in 1902. This amendment gave the United States a base in Cuba and the right to intervene, seemingly at will, to protect American lives and property. Shortly afterwards, the United States chose to exercise this right when it appeared that North American property might be damaged.

Preparation for Chapter 2:

Ask students if the United States should allow a radical leader who might hurt U.S. business to take control of Cuba. Tell them that this is the decision they will be asked to make after reading the next chapter. The key question they will discuss during the next class is: Should the United States extend diplomatic relations to Ramón Grau San Martín, a radical leader, or withhold diplomatic recognition and support a more conservative soldier/politician, Fulgencio Batista? Ask students to come to class having answered the definition/explanation questions and developed a position on the issue raised in question 3. You may also want them to respond to question 2.

CHAPTER 2: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT GRAU SAN MARTÍN AND THE SEPTEMBER REVOLUTION?

Overview:

This chapter highlights a little-known but important event in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations – the circumstances under which the Platt Amendment was unilaterally withdrawn by the United States. The narrative describes U.S. intervention from 1906-09; examines Cuban politics under the constitution of 1901; highlights the growth of Cuban trade with the United States under the Platt Amendment; and chronicles the success of the Machado government in Cuba during a period of economic prosperity between 1925-29. During this time, Machado had the complete support and confidence of North American businessmen and others who invested their money in Cuba. With the economic downturn following the stock market crash in the United States, however, Cuba's prosperity ended, and Machado resorted to increasingly tyrannical rule in order to hold onto power and stifle criticism of his high-handed tactics. A general strike, an army rebellion, and the loss of U.S. support finally secured Machado's resignation. After a brief interim, the reins of government fell into the hands of Ramón Grau San Martín. Grau San Martín, a radical leader, was supported by Cubans who complained about U.S. domination of their economy and politics. Workers, farmers, and student leaders demanded a shortened working day, nationalization of U.S.-owned utilities, land redistribution, and suspension of public debt payment to U.S. banks. The United States expressed its dissatisfaction with events in Cuba and considered throwing its support to Fulgencio Batista, the man who led the "sergeants' rebellion" against Cuban army officers. As head of the army, Batista could make or break the Grau government.

The remainder of the chapter presents arguments for and against U.S. recognition of the Grau government. Students are asked whether the United States should withhold recognition of the Ramon Grau San Martín government in order to bring about its collapse and to replace it with leaders more capable of restoring order and supporting U.S. business interests in Cuba. Arguments opposing recognition of Grau point to his inability to maintain order and the danger to interests of U.S.-owned businesses, farms, and banks. Arguments favoring recognition of Grau speak of the need for economic and social reform in Cuba, along with limits on foreign interference in Cuba's affairs. Quotes in the chapter's document section provide testimony from two major protagonists in this controversy, Sumner Welles and Ramón Grau San Martín, concerning the question of U.S. recognition. Teachers might end deliberations on this chapter by raising the question of whether radical reform was necessary in Cuba.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. State how Cuba's politics and economy were shaped by its relationship with the United States.
2. Explain the policies of Gerardo Machado and the reasons for opposition to his rule.
3. Argue for or against U.S. recognition of Grau San Martín's government.

Time Required: 1-2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 2 and accompanying documents for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day. Students were to read chapter 2 and answer the definition/explanation questions. Possible answers are:

   - Ramón Grau San Martín – Cuban president who said he passed beneficial laws and used a "firm hand against big companies."
   - Jefferson Caffery – U.S. ambassador who claimed Grau San Martín was only supported by the army and the ignorant masses.

- Charles Magoon – installed as Cuban governor by the United States in 1906, Magoon modernized the Cuban army and civil service and drew up a body of laws for courts, local government, and elections.
- demoralization – Magoon's actions demoralized Cubans who resented U.S. problem solvers after failure of their own government.
- "preventive intervention" – it was claimed that after 1909, the United States intervened diplomatically in Cuban politics primarily to avoid the necessity for military interventions.
- U.S. investments in Cuba – foreign capital, predominantly from U.S. banks, flowed into Cuban sugar mills, mines, railroads, and power plants.
- Gerardo Machado – elected president in 1925, Machado was popular for his building projects and aid to industry and business, including his ridding the country of union organizers.
- Machado's critics – students, intellectuals, politicians, and labor unionists began to protest Machado's authoritarian rule in the late 1920s. They were at first disunited and ineffective.
- economic difficulties – by 1929 these included a 75 percent drop in sugar prices, lower prices and reduced salaries, reduced lending by U.S. banks, and, finally, closed mills and large-scale unemployment.
- Sumner Welles – new U.S. ambassador to Cuba who was sent to Havana in May 1933 by President Roosevelt to mediate the struggle between Machado and his opponents.
- Grau's decrees – the new Cuban president decreed a program of reform that included the right to strike and an eight-hour day, land redistribution, and abolition of the Platt Amendment.
- opposing political forces – old politicians supported by business interests, middle class revolutionaries, and landowners opposed Grau's policies and government.
- Fulgencio Batista – a former stenographer who, because of intelligence, eloquence, and opportunism, took command of the sergeant's revolt and the Cuban army. He could be encouraged to overthrow Grau.
- social revolution – Sumner Welles feared that Grau's decrees were simply the beginning of a social revolution that would bring chaos to Cuba and harm U.S. interests.
- reasons for recognizing Grau – Grau represented canecutters, tenant farmers, workers, and students; enacted reforms in Cuba that addressed the problems of ordinary Cubans; diminished Cuban dependence on foreign (i.e., U.S.) interests; and gave birth to Cuban democracy.

2. Review with students the role played by the United States in Cuba 1906-30. Beginning with the Magoon mission, the United States made reforms in Cuba's government and economy. After the marines left in 1909, the policy of preventive intervention entailed working behind the scenes in Cuban politics to reduce the need for overt military intervention. Meanwhile, trade with Cuba increased from 27 million dollars in 1902 to 430 million dollars in 1917; total investments by the United States in 1929 amounted to nearly one billion dollars. The United States supported Gerardo Machado's pro-U.S. business government even after it became repressive following the economic decline that began in 1929. It was only when the struggle between Machado and his opponents was reaching its climax that President Roosevelt's emissary, Sumner Welles, negotiated Machado's resignation. The documents by two key figures in this period – Sumner Welles and Ramón Grau San Martín – make the following points:

Document 3. Sumner Welles: Disastrously Incompetent. U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles thought that Grau San Martín's government was not deserving of U.S. recognition. First, properties were being seized by groups of workers, and industries were being shut down. Consequently, opportunities for employment declined, and actual reforms could not be carried out as long as places of employment remained shut. Next, Grau was unable to keep order: sporadic rebellions were taking

place around the country. In addition, no established political parties, businesses, or responsible labor organizations supported this government. The United States would thus be derelict in its duty to the Cuban people if it supported such an incompetent government.

Document 4. Ramón Grau San Martín: To Help My Destitute Countrymen. Ramón Grau San Martín believed that previous governments had not represented the Cuban people because North American capitalism, big sugar, and acts of foreign corporations excluded Cubans from owning the means of production. Furthermore, the masses suffered a lower living standard because of the importation of field workers. U.S. capitalism was contaminating the foundations of national identity. The Grau government differed from other Cuban governments in that it did not abide by the Constitution of 1901, which contained the Platt Amendment, and did not recognize the subservient traditional political parties. Grau's government swore its allegiance to the Cuban people, reduced their cost of living, and made conditions better. His patriotism and humanity led him to help his destitute countrymen.

3. Points that might be made on both sides of the issue raised in question 3 are:

- The United States should withhold recognition because the Grau San Martín government was unable to govern the country. Grau had not been elected to office, but had been appointed by a small group of radical students. So far he had failed to drum up support for his government from traditional politicians who represented the business interests in Cuba. Complete chaos reigned, with workers occupying factories, peasant laborers seizing estates, and political rivals battling in the streets. Grau seemed incapable of reestablishing law and order. Moreover, Grau was supporting policies directly at variance with Cuban and U.S. business interests. Allowing labor agitation, strikes, and an eight-hour day would hurt the economy of the country. Furthermore, it could cause U.S. citizens and banks to stop investing their money in Cuba. U.S. investments had provided the capital that rebuilt Cuba after the Spanish-American war, paved streets, strung telephone lines, and generated the money for public work projects that helped hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, U.S. intervention had prevented a civil war and brought democratic government to Cuba.
- Before Ramón Grau San Martín, Cuban governments had been subservient to U.S. business interests at the expense of the more important needs of Cuban peasant-farmers and urban workers. The Grau San Martín government was the first in Cuban history supporting the interests of the working classes – for whom it urged an eight-hour day and the right to strike; of farmers -- for whom it advocated redistributing land and low interest loans; and of university students – for whom it promised government scholarships. Furthermore, Grau would rid the country of the Platt Amendment and free it from its dependence on U.S. capital and military interventions – in fact, Grau's revolution promised to give the Cuban people the freedom they fought for in 1898, were promised by the United States, but were subsequently forced to sign away because of the humiliating Platt Amendment.

4. Have two or three students who support recognition of Grau's government present their case to the class. They may wish to argue for their cause in the first person, taking on the role of Grau and his staff, contending that the United States was attempting to dominate their country with military intervention and a government that supported U.S. business interests. Two or three students who oppose recognition of Grau may take the roles of Welles and his aides, making the point that Cuba would be nowhere without U.S. help, which they indeed called for in 1906 and needed again in 1933. Moreover, they should point out that it would be irresponsible of the United States to back Grau's government because it lacked broad-based support and could not maintain law and order. The majority of students might act as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, taking notes, asking questions, and writing reaction papers evaluating the debate positions. You may wish to structure the debate as follows:

Side I. Grau and Staff	**Side II. Welles and Aides**
Opening statement – 3 minutes	Opening statement – 3 minutes
Rebuttal – 3 minutes	Rebuttal – 3 minutes
Rebuttal – 3 minutes	Rebuttal – 3 minutes

Question from Audience or Side II to Side I

Answer – 1 minute / rebuttal – 1 minute

Question from Audience or Side I to Side II

Answer – 1 minute / rebuttal – 1 minute

Continue til last 5 minutes

Vote by students

Statement by side that lost vote, followed by one more vote

This format may be changed for any reason, including to allow members of the audience to play a larger part in the debate.

Preparation for Chapter 3:

Tell students that President Roosevelt ultimately decided not to recognize the Grau regime; in January 1934 Grau's presidency was overthrown by Army leader Fulgencio Batista, whom the United States promply recognized. However, the issues raised by Grau did not disappear with his government, for in 1958 another radical, Fidel Castro, demanded similar changes in the Cuban economy and society. The student task in the next chapter is to determine (1) whether Cuba in fact needed a social revolution of the sort Castro was advocating and (2) how the United States ought to respond to the civil war between Batista and Castro over this question. Assign students the definition/explanation questions and question 3. Depending on your lesson plan, you may want to assign question 2 as a bridging exercise.

CHAPTER 3:
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PREVENT CASTRO'S REVOLUTION IN 1958?

Overview:

This chapter raises the question whether the United States should have tried to prevent the social revolution brought about by Fidel Castro. It opens with quotes from Castro and Batista – the former calling for radical socioeconomic change, the latter arguing that the government was already providing for a high standard of living and advanced "social welfare institutions." Next, the term *social revolution* is defined, and students are asked how the United States ought to respond to Castro's revolution in 1958.

The narrative begins by noting that Batista forced Grau San Martín to resign in 1934 and subsequently crushed radical elements that had supported the former president. In the place of social reform, the Batista government provided public works programs and social welfare for urban wórkers. At first, Batista was content to rule Cuba by using his position as head of the Cuban army to manipulate a series of puppet presidents. He then entered politics directly and was elected president in 1940. But in 1944 his hand-picked successor was defeated by Grau San Martín and the Auténticos. Grau and his successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás, ruled Cuba for the next eight years, enacting ameliatory reforms and allowing corruption and fraud. Batista seized political power in 1952 on the pretext of saving the country from civil war. He promised to end corruption and to institute land reform, but failed to deliver significantly on either pledge.

The chapter proceeds to describe the fundamental flaws of the Cuban economy – namely its dependence on sugar, concentration of land in the hands of a relatively small number of plantation owners with the consequent poverty of chronically unemployed rural farm workers, and predominance of foreign investment and thus foreign control. The chapter then focuses on Castro's aborted 26th of July attack on the Moncada army barracks in 1953, his dramatic *History Will Absolve Me* speech at his trial, and his release from prison in 1955. Castro's campaign against Batista is further chronicled from his return to Cuba in December 1956 to lead a relatively small contingent in Oriente Province into an increasingly successful challenge to the U.S.-supported but corrupt and brutal Batista government. The central question posed by the chapter concerns whether the United States should cut off arms and support for Batista and permit Castro's social revolution in 1958. The narrative and accompanying documents provide readers with the views of Batista's as well as Castro's followers.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, student should be able to:

1. Define the term *social revolution* and give examples of the positive and negative consequences of such an event.

2. Review the 25-year history of Fulgencio Batista's political career in Cuba.

3. Argue that a social revolution was needed in Cuba, or state what social progress had been made in Cuba prior to 1959 and why radical restructuring was unnecessary.

Time Required: 1-2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 3 for all students, at least one document for each student

Procedure:

1. Review the definition/explanation questions at the end of the chapter. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- social revolution – when a government rapidly takes money and power from the middle and upper classes of a country and reorganizes the economy and society of the country to benefit the lower class.
- advantages and disadvantages of a social revolution – can help many impoverished people, but it may lead to violence, bloodshed, and a dictatorship.
- Colonel Carlos Mendieta – a pre-Machado era politician who served as president of Cuba from 1934 to 1936 while Batista ruled from behind the scenes.
- Batista's reforms – after forcibly suppressing student revolt and worker strikes in 1934 and 1935, Batista tried to build support through public works programs, worker protection legislation (e.g., unemployment insurance), and construction of schools.
- Constitution of 1940 – encompassed many of the reforms of the 1933 revolution, such as redistribution of large holdings, but these provisions needed to be enacted into law before they could take effect.
- Cuba's dependence – reliance on one export crop (sugar), bound primarily for one market, led to joblessness, business failure, and foreclosure when international prices fell.
- Grau's Auténticos – the opposition party to Batista, in power from 1944 to 1952, made some reforms, such as a national bank to help Cuban business, but was corrupted with political payoffs, embezzlement, and even sale of pardons.
- Eddy Chibás – an ex-1933 revolutionary who vowed to stop corruption; founded the Orthodoxo Party in a split with Grau's Auténticos, but did not seriously attempt radical reforms such as land redistribution.
- election of 1952 – ended with Batista's seizing power on the pretense that the opposing candidate, Prío Socarrás, had been planning to make himself dictator. Batista gained support of business leaders and even the communist party. Opposition parties and student leaders, however, protested and refused to participate in the next election (in 1954).
- sugar, plantations, and U.S. investments – Cuba was very dependent on sugar as its main export, which led to severe economic effects at home when international prices dropped; 8 percent of Cuban farmers controlled 75 percent of the farmland, and poor canecutters could only find work for four months a year. North Americans owned many of Cuba's farms, sugar mills, businesses, and refineries and were tempted to interfere in Cuban politics.
- Cuban Confederation of Workers – Batista claimed that 1 million CCW members enjoyed high wages, an eight-hour day, and the right to strike, which made them quite well off by Latin American standards.
- Fidel Castro – lawyer and Orthodoxo student leader who tried to overthrow Batista government in an unsuccessful attack at the Moncada army barracks in Santiago.
- July 26, 1953 – date of Castro's unsuccessful attempt to trigger a revolution in Cuba. He was defeated, captured, put on trial (where he delivered his *History Will Absolve Me* speech), and imprisoned.
- Sierra Maestra – a mountain range in Cuba's Oriente province to which Castro secretly returned from Mexico with a small band of followers in 1956. From there Castro's guerrillas raided plantations, attacked garrisons, and ambushed army patrols.
- 50 buried alive – Batista's army struck back at suspected supporters of the 26th of July Movement by suspending constitutional guarantees, censoring the press, and arbitrarily arresting them. Some were tortured and allegedly even buried alive by Batista's men.
- undemocratic extremist – Batista accused Castro of being an undemocratic extremist because he assassinated government officials, threatened election candidates, and seemed to be planning to become a dictator by force of arms.

- 2000 rifles – Batista had ordered, among other weapons, 2000 rifles from the United States, which he intended to use in an offensive to destroy Castro's base in the Oriente mountains in the spring of 1958.

2. In answering question 2, students could characterize Batista as dominating Cuban politics from 1934 to 1958. He helped overthrow the Grau San Martín government in 1934 and replaced this revolutionary with Mendieta, over whom he could exert control because he was chief of staff of the army. Batista ruled Cuba from behind the scenes from 1934 to 1940. In a fair election in 1940 he won the presidency, but his hand-picked successor lost in 1944. Claiming he wanted to prevent a dictatorship, Batista seized political power in 1952 in the midst of a presidential campaign in which he was a candidate (running in third place at the time). Unopposed by protesting opposition parties, he ran for president again in 1954 and remained head of Cuba's government for the next four years. While in office or the power behind the scenes, Batista presided over the building of public works and provided benefits and relatively high wages for urban workers. He also formed an alliance with the communist party, ran a corrupt government, and supported the interests of foreign businesses. He never addressed or corrected what some considered to be the underlying problem of the Cuban economy – its dependence on U.S. purchases of sugar, landless canecutters, or the fact that his country was increasingly owned by North American businesses. Rather, he believed that sugar profits and U.S. investment would create jobs, products, and new industries in Cuba and in this way trickle down to the poor.

3. Divide the class into those for and against social revolution. Give each student a document supporting his/her position. Documents 5 and 6 provide support for the case that Cuba needed a social revolution, while Documents 7 and 8 provide information useful to those opposing the revolution.

Document 5. Ruby Hart Phillips: The ABC Colony. Phillips gives the impression that a small class of wealthy foreigners living in Cuba were completely oblivious to the suffering and problems of the average Cuban. They felt that the revolution caused disturbances that were bad for business. During the gala Christmas festival described in the first excerpt, the "prisons were full and the armed forces prowled the streets." In the second excerpt, the Americans, British, and Canadians (ABC) formed a separate colony in Havana, living with many servants in beautiful houses, enjoying numerous country clubs, and supporting Batista, who "represented a degree of security for business and industry."

Document 6. Fidel Castro: Shocking and Tragic Conditions. In his famous *History Will Absolve Me* speech at his trial for the Moncada barracks attack, Castro cited the economic and social problems that inspired his desperate actions. His list included the plight of 200,000 landless peasant families while huge foreign corporations owned and controlled uncultivated but fertile lands; lack of industry and the subsequent need to import manufactured products; the lack of decent housing for 400,000 farm families; 2,200,000 families crowded in urban slums; and the plight of rural children suffering from disease and hunger, whose parents had only four months of work each year. He blamed these conditions on the fact that Cuba produced raw materials and had to buy its manufactured goods from the United States.

Document 7. Nathaniel Weyl: Encouraging Economic Growth. In this excerpt, Weyl, a former communist, sought to dispel as myth the argument that Cuba was an impoverished Third World country whose typical citizen worked on the sugar plantations. He cited a per capita income in Cuba of $361, considerably higher than that of most Latin American countries at $284 and much higher than Japan's at $252. Other statistics showed that an increased share of income in Cuba was going to labor (from roughly 58 percent in 1948 to 63 percent in 1952). Weyl attributed this relative prosperity to foreign investment in sugar production.

Document 8. Edmund Chester: Batista Faced up to Every Problem. The most important problem Chester credited Batista with solving was the crop surplus of the 1952 harvest. Batista resolved this problem by enlisting Cuban banks to underwrite the surplus and then selling this surplus, little by little, on the world market. In addition, Batista in one year completed 33 of the 124 public works projects started by his predecessor, negotiated a tobacco treaty with Spain, imported seed from El Salvador to

improve the coffee crop, established artificial insemination centers to improve cattle, and made farm equipment available to poorer farmers at low rates.

Ask students who have prepared to argue that the Cubans needed a social revolution to spend three minutes stating their arguments in support of this position. Their opening statements should be followed by three minutes worth of arguments against a social revolution from the other side. Students may then rebut each other's arguments in a teacher-monitored debate. Ask students to support their position with facts from the documents section. Note that the basic assumption of one side is that foreign capital basically helps a nation develop its resources and provides jobs for the people. Thus, the wealth of the nation builds up and benefits "trickle down" to the less fortunate. The assumption on the other side is that sugar was inherently a boom and bust crop that especially enmiserated the poor, that land ownership was skewed in favor of the few, and that the United States and its supporters in Cuba protected the class interests of wealthy North Americans and Cubans. Thus, benefits did not "trickle down" to the lower classes, especially in the countryside. Students should finish the debate by making closing statements, summing up why their position is correct.

The case that Cuba needed a social revolution relies heavily on the analysis of the Cuban economy – overdependent on sugar sales to the United States, owned or controlled by foreign businessmen, characterized by an uneven distribution of land and wealth, especially in rural areas where 8 percent of the people controlled 75 percent of the farmland and 200,000 poor canecutters were unemployed eight months of the year. Attempts by Cubans to correct these differences in 1934 led to the overthrow of Ramón Grau San Martín. During the 24 years he practically ran the Cuban government, Fulgencio Batista made no serious efforts to correct these economic problems confronting the Cuban people. Only diversification of the economy away from dependence on sugar exports, redistribution of the land, and limitation of foreign investment, students could argue, would bring economic justice to the Cuban people.

The argument that the United States should continue sending arms to Batista to prevent the social revolution rests on the premise that the Cuban people enjoyed a higher standard of living than most Latin American countries, and Batista built public works and schools, helped businessmen start businesses, and promoted social welfare for urban workers. Batista's policies seemed to be having a beneficial impact because the average Cuban did have one of the highest standards of living in Latin America. Whatever economic problems might still face the Cuban people would be resolved with the continuing economic growth of the Cuban economy, sponsored by sugar profits and investment by U.S., other foreign, and Cuban businessmen.

Preparation for Chapter 4:

Tell students that next class they will be examining the consequences of Castro's revolution in order to determine who – the United States or Cuba – was responsible for the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. They are to prepare by reading Chapter 4, writing responses to the definition/explanation questions, and answering question 2 (optional). They should also come to class prepared to debate, with a position paper based on instructions in question 3 or 4, for U.S. or Cuban responsibility for the break in relations.

CHAPTER 4: WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAK IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS?

Overview:

This chapter covers Cuban history from Castro's triumphant parade through Havana on January 8, 1959, to the formal break in diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961. Both the narrative and the documents at the end of the chapter focus on whether Cuba or the United States was primarily responsible for the break in relations; responsibility is examined in terms of the issues of agrarian reform, Cuban democratic practices, U.S. intervention, and Cuba's ties with the USSR. According to the U.S. viewpoint, the Eisenhower administration thought that Castro had unreasonably violated property rights, subverted the democratic aims of Cuban revolution, unjustly criticized the United States, and turned Cuba into a military dependent and ally of the Soviet Union. According to the Cuban government viewpoint, the United States had resisted necessary social reforms, supported counterrevolution, planned an invasion of Cuba, and isolated Cuba from international support, thereby causing it to rely on the Soviet Union.

The chapter narrative begins by describing how Castro's 26th of July Movement took power and pointing out his grievances against the United States. It then outlines early doubts North Americans had about Castro, caused, for instance, by the circus-like atmosphere at trials of Batista henchmen held in a soccer stadium without concern for due process. The provisions of the basic agrarian reform law are presented, along with the U.S. demand for prompt payment for confiscated property belonging to its citizens. The chapter recounts the growing breach between Castro and his liberal critics over his reform program and the influence of communists in the government.

As the chronology reaches January 1960, the agrarian reform issue is raised once more; the United States demanded that Cuba enter into immediate negotiations on expropriated properties or suffer a 50 percent reduction in its sugar quota. Castro responded by signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and cracking down on internal opponents. While claiming to enforce laws to prevent anti-Castro activists from using Florida as a base for military attacks on Cuba, Eisenhower approved a CIA plan to train exiles for possible guerrilla warfare against the Cuban government. Cuba's ties with the USSR and nationalization of U.S. corporation property provoked economic reprisals on both sides in the summer and fall of 1960. These events led Eisenhower to recall the U.S. ambassador and label Cuba a "communist beachhead" in the Caribbean. The chapter ends with the severance of relations between the two countries in early January 1961, asking which nation was primarily responsible for the break.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Arrange the events leading up to the severing of U.S.-Cuban relations in chronological order.
2. Discuss U.S. and Cuban responsibility for the break in relations based on three major issues.
3. Evaluate documents that give the U.S. and Cuban positions on one major issue of contention.

Time Required: 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 4 for all students; pairs of documents for students assigned to explore issues in depth

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day. Students were to read Chapter 4 and be prepared to argue who was more responsible for the break in diplomatic relations – the United States or Cuba. Review the definition/explanation questions, perhaps in conjunction with debriefing the timeline activity. (Note that the following events are not in chronological order.) Possible answers are:

- threats to end sugar quota – the United States had a treaty with Cuba calling for purchase of 50 percent of the Cuban sugar crop at above the market price. In January 1960, Eisenhower threatened to cut the sugar quota if Castro continued to attack the United States and did not settle up on payment for expropriated properties.
- Khrushchev pledge to defend Cuba – on July 9, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev, premier of the Soviet Union, announced that the USSR would buy the sugar the United States refused to purchase, and that "Soviet artillerymen" would defend Cuba, if necessary, with rockets.
- Ambassador Smith's plan – in December 1958, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Earl Smith, tried to install a new military dictatorship in Cuba to foil Castro's victory.
- U.S. State Department note – the State Department sent a note to the Cuban government on June 11, 1959, asking for "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" for the properties of U.S. citizens.
- invasion of the Dominican Republic – Cuban and Dominican revolutionaries tried to overthrow the Rafael Trujillo government of the Dominican Republic on June 14, 1959. They were defeated, killed, or captured by Trujillo's forces. The United States warned Cuba not to violently interfere with neighboring states.
- Cuba's security measures – initiated in February 1960, these measures included takeover of newspapers, expulsion of anti-communists from the trade unions, and seizure of the bank accounts of opponents.
- break in relations – in January 1961, the U.S. and Cuban governments formally severed diplomatic relations, each accusing the other of responsibility for this rupture.
- resignation of Hubert Matos – this military commander of Camaguey Province, along with 14 of his officers, resigned on October 19, 1959, in protest over growing communist influence over the Revolution. He was immediately arrested by Castro, tried, and convicted of treason that December.
- Castro's parade through Havana – on January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro and his guerrilla soldiers triumphantly entered Havana, having ousted the Batista regime.
- CIA plan approved – on March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved of the CIA plan to arm and train Cuban exiles for possible future use against Castro.
- Sierra Maestra offensive – in May 1958, Batista sent 17 battalions into the Sierra Maestra to defeat Castro's guerrillas. Batista's troops were ambushed and forced to retreat. From then on, Batista was on the defensive.
- seizure of oil refineries – the Cuban government requested that Texaco and Standard Oil refineries in Cuba process Soviet oil. When these U.S. companies refused, their refineries were seized by the Castro government on June 30, 1960.
- Agrarian Reform Law – decreed on May 17, 1959, this law gave the Cuban government power to nationalize large estates (about 40 percent of privately held land in Cuba) to be paid for with 20-year, 4 1/2 percent interest bonds. Much land held by U.S. citizens was expropriated under this legislation.
- televised trials – starting on January 22, 1959, Castro held trials of Batista supporters in a soccer stadium before howling crowds, followed quickly by executions, which shocked many U.S. citizens.
- trade embargo declared – President Eisenhower declared an embargo on virtually all U.S. trade with Cuba on October 13, 1960.

2. Review students' completed timelines by eliciting the appropriate chronology of the events referred to in question 1 and writing out the timeline on the board. The correct order for the events is as follows:

May 1958 – Sierra Maestra offensive
December 1958 – Ambassador Smith's plan
January 8, 1959 – Castro's parade through Havana
January 22, 1959 – Televised trials
May 17, 1959 – Agrarian Reform Law
June 11, 1959 – U.S. State Department note
June 14, 1959 – Invasion of the Dominican Republic
October 19, 1959 – Resignation of Hubert Matos
January 1960 – Threats to end the sugar quota
February 1960 – Cuban security measures
March 17, 1960 – CIA plan approved
June 30, 1960 – Seizure of oil refineries
July 9, 1960 – Khrushchev pledge to defend Cuba
October 13, 1960 – Trade embargo declared
January 1961 – Break in relations

Ask students to analyze the timeline in order to identify the basic issues that the United States and Cuba were arguing about.

3. Students are next to examine the evidence for both U.S. and Cuban responsibility for the break in relations. In addition, they are to evaluate pairs of documents that focus on specific issues of contention between the United States and Cuba: agrarian reform, democratic practices, U.S. intervention, and Cuba's ties with the USSR. In order to prepare for a whole-class discussion on these issues, students are asked, in question 3, to explore the U.S. and Cuban positions on the above issues. The following could constitute useful answers:

Agrarian Reform

- The position of the United States on agrarian reform essentially was that Cuba had the right to expropriate the property of U.S. citizens as long as the INRA offered prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. Thus, U.S. citizens should be paid for seized property as soon as possible, fairly, and in cash. The U.S. ambassador was concerned that properties were being seized without inventory checks, receipts, and commitments to payments. As with other cases of Cuban nationalization, the United States mainly objected to the fact that North American property was being summarily seized without apparent intent to pay those upon whose investment Cuban prosperity was based.
- The position of the Cuban government on agrarian reform was that for years Cuba had suffered because of landlessness, unemployment, and inequitable distribution of wealth in the form of land. When Castro attempted to enact a land reform policy that Cuban progressives had been advocating since 1933, the United States opposed this policy on the behalf of selfish U.S. investors. Since Cuba did not have the money to pay for expropriated property, Castro offered owners 20-year Cuban bonds paying 4 1/2 percent interest. The United States simply refused to compromise on the bonds, so negotiations broke down.

Democratic Practices

- The U.S. position on the topic of democratic practices was that Castro ought to carry through with his promise to hold elections and respect the democratically expressed will of the majority. The Eisenhower administration was troubled by Castro's appointment of communists to government posts and the expulsion of liberals and anti-communists from political office and union leadership. Moreover, the United States thought that Castro's takeover of opposition media, seizure of rightist bank accounts, and trial of Hubert Matos for treason indicated that he was becoming a dictator. Finally, the United States was disturbed by the lack of due process in Castro's televised trials of opponents.

- The position of the Cuban government was that elections had to be postponed because of the disorganization caused by the overthrow of Batista. Next, liberal opponents to agrarian reform and other Castro social programs began to undermine necessary social reforms and had to be removed from government posts where they could do damage. The Castro government had to defend the Revolution from dangerous counterrevolutionaries, some of whom were in military league with the United States. Security measures like closing newspapers were necessary in order to defend the Revolution. Lastly, Castro could justify the televised trials by pointing to the fact that he was punishing torturers and murderers.

U.S. Intervention

- The U.S. position on intervention in Cuba was basically that the United States was not aiding exiles to bomb Cuban canefields or sabotage Cuban shipping. Moreover, U.S. authorities claimed that they were prosecuting anti-Castro exiles who illegally bought arms or made unauthorized flights to Cuba. If indeed the United States was training anti-Castro exiles, it was basically a contingency measure, preparing the United States for any eventuality. Castro was simply using the straw man of U.S. intervention to justify his dictatorial behavior.
- The position of the Cuban government on U.S. intervention was that the United States was aiding and abetting the opponents of the Castro regime, both inside and outside Cuba. Liberal opponents of Castro were receiving encouragement from the United States to plot against social reform. Exile bombing and sabotage raids originated in Florida with U.S. approval and support, and the United States was actively training a brigade of Cuban refugees for infiltration into Cuba to support anti-Castro guerrillas in the mountains.

Cuba's Ties with the USSR

- The United States argued that Cuba's alliance with the USSR threatened the Western Hemisphere. Students might point to Castro's trade agreement with Mikoyan, recognition of the Soviet Union, and public embrace of Premier Nikita Khrushchev as evidence that Cuba was forging a close collaboration with the most powerful communist country in the world. Cuba's strategic position in the Caribbean made it particularly attractive as a site for Soviet military bases. Moreover, the invasions of Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic and the Declaration of Havana indicated that Cuba was eager to subvert surrounding countries by fomenting communist revolution.
- The Cuban government said that it only formed the alliance with the USSR when the United States made arms purchases for the revolutionary militia impossible. In addition, Cuba was forced into a trade agreement with the Soviets when the United States tried to blackmail the Castro government by threatening the sugar quota. The so-called invasions of neighboring countries were only attempts to return exiled revolutionaries who had helped the Cuban people defeat Batista to their homelands. It was hypocritical of the United States to criticize Cuban democracy, while at the same time giving aid and support to dictators like Trujillo.

4. The teacher may wish to assign individual students to explore one of the four issues in greater depth. For this purpose, the document file contains four sets of documents (9-10 for agrarian reform, 11-12 for democratic practices, 13-14 for U.S. intervention, and 15-16 for Cuba's ties with the USSR). On the day before the discussion, give each student a set of documents and assign question 4.

Document 9. Fidel Castro: They Never Asked Us About Our Problems. In this excerpt from a speech at the United Nations on September 26, 1960, the Cuban leader justified the Agrarian Reform Law and disparaged the response of the United States to this legislation. Castro said that land reform was necessary because Cuba had 200,000 peasant families whose landlessness contributed to the problems of unemployment and hunger and inhibited Cuban development. Castro criticized the U.S. response to the Agrarian Reform Law, claiming that the North Americans showed no concern about the problems that land reform was intended to solve, but rather focused on demands that U.S. citizens be paid "right now, in dollars." Cuba did not have these dollars, but Castro offered to pay for the ex-

propriated property with 20-year bonds that earned 4 1/2 percent interest. The United States refused to accept bond payment, but Castro chose to carry out land reform anyway.

Document 10. U.S. Department of State: Ill-Conceived and Drastic Measures. This memorandum submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States on August 2, 1960, made three arguments against Cuba's expropriation of the property of U.S. citizens. First, it was not fair for the Cuban government, without compensation, to take away property that had been acquired "as the result of a lifetime of toil." Second, expropriation of both Cuban and U.S. citizens' property violated international law and practices. Third, Cuban land reform efforts were ill-advised because destruction of existing systems of agriculture has historically led to a decline in food production (this occurred in the Soviet Union, for example).

Document 11. Fidel Castro: Democracy Without Bread Is Not Democracy. In this speech to the 10th Congress of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, Castro attacked opponents whom he claimed were using the Cuban press to undermine the Revolution. These opponents were "national and foreign interests" who were negatively impacted by revolutionary reforms. He specifically cited the big landowners who fought against the Agrarian Reform, but further alleged that they were working in alliance with "war criminals" (Florida-based Batista supporters), the trusts (big U.S. companies), and the "reactionary foreign press." Since these wealthy persons owned the Cuban press, they were able to have their writers attack the revolutionary government by "spreading poisonous and untrue insinuations." The type of democracy they advocated was actually a means of protecting their economic interests and defending foreign business monopolies.

Document 12. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Castro Betrays His Own Revolution. This reading was excerpted from the State Department White Paper *Cuba*, which was largely written by one of President Kennedy's chief advisors and published in April 1961. Schlesinger censured Castro because his anti-democratic policies were transforming Cuba into a communist dictatorship. Kennedy's advisor supported his claim by pointing out that many of Castro's original backers were now opponents of the regime. In addition, the Cuban state, in general, and the Communist Party, in particular, were in control of the nation's judiciary, educational institutions, and trade unions. Moreover, all other political parties had been banned; civic and professional organizations were controlled by the state. Finally, with the government's seizure of the media, communist propaganda now penetrated all aspects of Cuban life.

Document 13. Central Intelligence Agency: A Program of Covert Action. On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved of a contingency plan to recruit, arm, and train anti-Castro exiles. Shortly afterwards, Cuban intelligence agents got wind of this scheme; Castro's foreign minister, Raul Roa, began in the summer of 1960 to accuse the United States of planning to invade Cuba. The actual CIA program called for the United States to "induce, support, and...direct action...by a group of Cubans" in order to bring about Castro's overthrow. The program would (1) create a unified Cuban opposition, (2) set up a radio station to beam its message to Cuba, (3) establish an intelligence and action organization in Cuba under the direction of this opposition, and (4) develop a paramilitary force of exiles that could ultimately lead anti-Castro resistance in Cuba.

Document 14. Henry Cabot Lodge: No Aggressive Purposes Against Cuba. At the United Nations on July 18, 1960, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, delivered this response to accusations of U.S. aggression by Cuba's Foreign Minister Raul Roa. Roa had alleged that the United States was abetting counterrevolutionaries. Lodge responded that (1) Cuba had not tried to extradite any "war criminals," (2) U.S. authorities had expelled certain Cuban opponents of Castro from the Gulf of Mexico region, (3) the United States enforced anti-arms trade laws, and (4) the U.S. government was vigorously attempting to prevent unauthorized flights "in the Caribbean area."

Document 15. Raul Roa: Friendly Countries That Gave Help. In his reply to the U.S. severance of relations, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa gave Cuba's rationale for forming ties with the USSR. He said that the U.S. accusations regarding Cuba's ties to communism were made to set the stage for "direct military aggression" by the United States. Roa claimed that the United States broke relations with Cuba because of its proclivity to think that any country not acting in a subordinate manner must

be a satellite of the USSR. Thus, Cuba's independence provoked the United States to launch a campaign of "harassment, pressure, threats, reprisals, and aggression," first trying to destroy the Revolution "by hunger," next by force. Cuba sought Soviet aid to protect itself from U.S. aggression, both economic and political.

Document 16. Christian Herter: Agency of a Foreign Power. In this speech to the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS at San Jose, Costa Rica, delivered on August 24, 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter assailed Cuba as a threat to the Western Hemisphere. He said that Castro's Cuba had given several indications that it had become the agency of Communist powers. For one, Cuba now voted with the USSR in the United Nations. Next, Cuba's leaders encouraged people in other Latin American countries to mount revolutions on the Cuban model. Last, Cuba welcomed the USSR offer to defend it by attacking the United States with rockets.

5. On the chalkboard, write the question for discussion – Who was responsible, the United States or Cuba, for the break in relations? – along with its four subtopics:

- Was agrarian reform a necessary measure to correct economic injustice, or an unfair attack on property rights?
- Were Cuban security measures required to defend the Revolution's reforms, or was Castro a tyrant who betrayed the democratic aspirations of the Revolution?
- Was the United States intervening unjustly in Cuban affairs, or were U.S. policies toward Cuban exiles reasonable and lawful?
- Were Cuban ties with the USSR appropriate and provoked by U.S. actions, or was Cuba becoming a dangerous "communist beachhead" in the Americas?

6. Have students select the issue they wish to discuss. Then organize them into four small discussion groups, one for each issue. Explain the assignment: to examine their issue in light of the evidence and report back to the large group as to who they think was right on that issue – the United States or Cuba. The group should come up with at least three pieces of evidence to back up their judgment. Each group should appoint a secretary to record their decision. Next, group members ought to look over their documents and share what they know about the issue from the U.S. and Cuban perspectives. Then the group should discuss the issue in order to come to consensus about who was right and why. Lastly, the group should appoint a spokesperson to report to the class.

When groups have completed their deliberations, convene the whole class and have each group report on their findings. Classmates may comment on and discuss the findings of presenting groups. After the groups have reported, ask students what they think the United States should, or would, do about Cuba at this juncture.

Preparation for Chapter 5:

Point out that the next chapter asks students to make one of the most important decisions faced by President Kennedy. Shortly after taking office, he had to decide whether to send the Cuban exiles who had been trained by the CIA to invade Cuba in order to overthrow the Castro government. To complete this exercise, students will be divided into two groups – "doves" (opposed to the invasion) and "hawks" (in favor). Ask students who took the position that the United States was responsible for the break in relations to accept the parts of the anti-invasion members of President Kennedy's inner circle of advisors: Thomas Mann, William Fulbright, Dean Rusk, and Arthur Schlesinger. Assign roles of advisors who wanted to send in the CIA-trained exiles to invade Cuba to students who argued that Cuba caused the break in relations. These "hawks" will play the roles of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Adolph Berle, Richard Bissell, and Colonel Jack Hawkins. Since there are only eight roles, students can share roles.

To prepare for the simulation, students should read the chapter, the appropriate character cards, and the assigned document. In addition, they should complete at least questions 1, 3, and 4.

CHAPTER 5:
SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY GO AHEAD WITH THE PLANNED INVASION OF CUBA BY CUBAN EXILES?

Overview:

This chapter introduces the origins of the March 16, 1960, plan to send an exile brigade to Cuba, describing the development of this policy under the Eisenhower administration. The chapter then turns to an account of how Kennedy and Nixon addressed the issue of Castro's Cuba in the 1960 election. The chapter goes on to chronicle the convening of the National Security Working Committee after Kennedy's inauguration. Within the context of this group's deliberations, the chapter presents the exile invasion plan in sufficient detail to give students an idea of how it would work and to note the assumptions on which the planners counted; namely, air superiority; poorly prepared, trained, and motivated opponents; and a spontaneous uprising by anti-Castro Cubans.

The plan had three parts: (1) a preliminary bombing raid to destroy Castro's air force plus a small-scale diversionary landing; (2) further bombing and the main landing of some 1300 CIA-trained Cuban exiles; and (3) set-up of a provisional government that would hold off counter-attacks, take the offensive against Castro, and, perhaps, request U.S. aid. In the meantime, it was believed, a spontaneous uprising and defections from Castro's army would contribute to Castro's collapse. Students are told of the dramatic, secret April 4, 1961, meeting during which President Kennedy listened to advisors argue for and against this plan in order to decide whether to proceed with the exile invasion. The central question posed by the chapter is twofold: Would the invasion succeed? Is such an action the right thing to do? Students are to be assigned the roles of Kennedy's advisors and given relevant documents to argue for or against proceeding with this covert operation.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the three-staged contingency plan to overthrow the Cuban government.

2. Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA invasion plan.

3. Argue whether the plan would succeed and whether it was a morally justifiable action.

Time Required: 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 5 for all students; copies of character cards describing Kennedy's advisors; copies of the pertinent documents for appropriate "advisors"; signs showing names of characters in the role play to be placed on desks of role players

Procedure:

1. Before beginning this simulation, students should review the arguments as to whether the United States or Cuba was mainly responsible for the break in relations. This should be followed by a quick sharing of answers to questions 1 and 2, reviewing the definitions/explanations and outlining the invasion plan. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- contingency plan – the March 16, 1960, secret CIA plan for the possible overthrow of Fidel Castro's government.
- Special Group – a committee of CIA and other officials headed by Vice-President Richard Nixon; the group supervised the execution of the contingency plan for the Eisenhower administration.
- Brigade 2506 – name given to the 1300-man Cuban exile combat group, from the identification tag number of a recruit who died in training.

- Cuban Revolutionary Council – exile politicians ranging from Batista supporters to anti-Castro socialists who were to act as spokesmen for the invasion effort and later establish a provisional government in Cuba.
- fighters for freedom – on October 19, 1960, in the midst of his race for the presidency, John Kennedy used this term for the Cuban exiles whom he erroneously claimed were getting almost no support from the U.S. government.
- B-26s – an exile bomber squadron slated to knock out Castro's air force two days before the invasion; the CIA planned to give the exile attack the appearance of originating from Cuban air force defectors in order to hide the U.S. government's hand in that operation; on the day of the invasion, the squadron was to provide air cover for the exile brigade, bombing and strafing Castro's forces.
- Zapata Peninsula – landing site for the Brigade, a swampy district on Cuba's southwest coast.
- spontaneous uprising – planners expected such an uprising against the Castro government to occur in Cuba when news of the invasion spread.
- Escambray Mountains – if the invasion failed, the exiles were to "go guerrilla" by escaping to these mountains 70 miles away.
- April 4, 1961 – the date President Kennedy and his chief Cuba advisors met at the State Department to decide whether to go ahead with the U.S.-planned exile invasion of Cuba.
- two questions – President Kennedy and his advisors had two questions to consider at their April 4 meeting: Would the planned invasion succeed? Was such an action the right thing to do?

2. Outline the CIA plan on the chalkboard, including a reference to the expected spontaneous uprising and the B-26 destruction of the Cuban air force. Go over the plan with students, ensuring that they understand the assumptions on which it was based.

3. Conclude the class by having students read their character cards and/or documents and prepare for the next class's simulation. The character cards essentially give students a short biography of each advisor at the April 4, 1961, meeting, plus an indication of whether he was for or against the invasion and on what general grounds. The supporters of the planned invasion (hawks) were Arleigh Burke, Adolph Berle, Richard Bissell, and Jack Hawkins. The opponents (doves) were Thomas Mann, William Fulbright, Dean Rusk, and Arthur Schlesinger. Feel free to assign several students to the same advisor role in order to get everyone involved. The following are summaries of the documents on which students playing these advisors base their arguments.

Document 17. Admiral Arleigh Burke: Military Evaluation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, was a member, reviewed the CIA plan to overthrow Castro by means of an exile invasion. The central assumption of the plan, according to the evaluation, was that exiles could hold the beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government. The ultimate success of the plan would thus depend on either an anti-Castro rebellion or "follow-on forces."

Document 18. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann: List of Conclusions. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann thought the invasion plan would fail because it depended on the questionable assumption that a popular uprising against Castro would take place. Furthermore, Mann held that the plan was in violation of the charter of the United Nations and would actually strengthen support for Castro within Cuba and Latin America. Mann ended by predicting that, left to his own devices, Castro would fail to provide a better life for the Cuban people, which would eventually lead to a decline in his popularity in Latin America.

Document 19. State Department Attorney Adolph Berle: The Communist Totalitarian Government. This document represented the opinion of the State Department in general and State Department

attorney Adolph Berle in particular; this opinion held that Castro had become an "instrument of the international communist movement." Castro had placed Cuba in the communist bloc, had turned the country "into an armed camp" with Soviet weapons, and had imposed a total dictatorship on this island country, complete with an extensive informer system and jails overcrowded with political prisoners. The State Department report concluded that Castro had betrayed the ideals of his revolution and made his country a "serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere."

Document 20. CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell: Proposed Operation Against Cuba. This March 11 version of the CIA's proposed plan to overthrow Castro inventoried exile forces – about 1160 men, 31 planes, 7 ships, and 9 landing craft. Richard Bissell and his planners declared that the exile forces would be ready for action on April 1, 1961, and that their morale was high. Due to the oncoming rainy season, Castro's suppression of opponents, and Soviet military shipments, the invasion would have to be conducted within the next few months in order to have a chance for success.

Document 21. Senator William Fulbright: Memorandum: Cuba Policy. In this lengthy memorandum, Senator Fulbright argued for two possible policies toward Castro's Cuba – overthrow or toleration. The former, Fulbright claimed, would probably both fail and turn public opinion in Latin America against the United States and in favor of Castro. Moreover, such an act would undo "30 years of trying to live down earlier interventions." If the United States tolerated, isolated, and insulated Castro, he would almost certainly fail to deliver a better way of life for the Cuban people, costing the Soviet Union a great deal of money in the process. The United States thus had no reason to fear this "unshaven megalomaniac" and should trust in the eventual triumph of the human values it stands for as a means of providing economic development in Latin America.

Document 22. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles: On Tuesday, April 4th.... In this document, Chester Bowles contended that the United States should not violate the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which prohibited member states from using coercion against or occupying territory of fellow members. This was especially inappropriate at a time when the president was successfully appealing to the rest of the world "on the basis of high principle."

Document 23. Presidential Advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Memorandum for the President. In this memorandum, Arthur Schlesinger counseled the president against the invasion because it was unlikely to trigger uprisings against Castro and probably would lead to direct U.S. military intervention. Direct U.S. intervention would undoubtedly turn worldwide public opinion against the United States and cause its enemies to reap a propaganda windfall.

Document 24. Colonel Jack Hawkins: From.... In this document, Colonel Jack Hawkins argued strongly in favor of the operation because of the equipment, dedication, and ability of the Cuban exile infantry and pilots, whom he compared favorably with U.S. units. He also asserted that, since Cubans tend to support winners, one victory of this force could result in the melting away of Castro's army.

4. On the second day, arrange the classroom so that hawks and doves are able to confront one another. The teacher should play Kennedy, asking each "advisor" (or "advisor" team) to introduce his/her character and present the arguments suggested in text and document as to why the planned invasion would or would not work and was or was not the right thing to do. Alternate between hawks and doves, allowing successive advisors the opportunity to refute the arguments of those who have already spoken. Speakers representing each advisor should take about 2 minutes each to make their presentations. After these presentations, those who have not spoken should be allowed to offer their opinions in favor of or opposing the invasion plan.

5. At the end of this introductory period, encourage advisors from one side to focus on a main reason, practical and/or theoretical, as to why the plan should or should not be implemented. Then ask for rebutting arguments in this topic area from opposing advisors. In order to develop more well-rounded positions, let advisors from the same side make reinforcing/elaborating back-up statements to support an argument that one of them has put forth. Feel free to restate or rephrase student arguments

in order to emphasize or clarify points that you think should be explored. You may then pose this argument to students on the opposing side and challenge them to refute it.

In order to establish the assumptions and tactics of the plan, students should argue about the likelihood of the invasion's success during the first half of the debate. In the second half they ought to focus on the "rightness" of such an enterprise.

6. At the end of the rebuttal period, have students from both sides bring the discourse to a close by telling the president why, in general, the United States ought or ought not to launch the invasion. If these points are not raised in the debate, the teacher may also wish to end by asking students what they think the United States ought to do if (1) air strikes fail to eliminate Castro's air force, (2) the spontaneous uprising does not occur, and/or (3) the exiles cannot retreat to the Escambray Mountains. Allow students to vote for or against the planned invasion at the end of the class period.

Preparation for Chapter 6:

Inform students that by the day after the landing (D + 1), the operation was in serious trouble. Tell them that during the next class they will work in cooperative groups in order to fill out a decision chart. Based on the group chart and discussions, each team will then counsel the president as to whether to order sufficient U.S. air strikes to make the invasion succeed or not risk further U.S. involvement in a misguided and lost cause. Ask students to read the next chapter and the specific document you stipulate. They should complete the questions you assign, read their particular document, and come to class ready to participate in group discussion about whether the United States should commit enough of its own forces to the battle to insure the invasion's success.

CHAPTER 6:
SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY ORDER SUFFICIENT AIR SUPPORT TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE INVASION?

Overview:

Beginning with the D-2 preparatory air raid that failed to destroy the Cuban Air Force, this chapter tells the sorry tale of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Without air cover, the invasion ships were attacked by Castro's remaining planes, and much medical and communications gear was lost. Because exile B-26 bombers were driven off by Castro's jets, the Brigade was unable to call in air strikes on roads leading to the beaches. Thus, the exiles were soon outnumbered 20 to 1 and under fire from Castro's tanks and artillery. Their calls for U.S. air support on April 18 (D + 1) caused President Kennedy to wrestle with a critical decision. This chapter focuses on that dilemma; should the United States send in sufficient air support to insure the success of the invasion; or should the president maintain his commitment not to become directly involved in what was essentially a Cuban struggle?

The chapter turns to an impromptu April 18 meeting at which the Working Committee was briefed by Bissell about the situation on the beaches. Bissell told the president's advisors that (1) exile B-26 pilots refused to fly air cover missions because of Castro's jets, (2) the Brigade was not prepared or able to escape to the mountains, and (3) the Revolutionary Council was threatening suicide in protest of U.S. inaction. He recommended that the president order air support from planes from the *U.S.S. Essex* to destroy Castro's jets, artillery, tanks, oncoming reinforcements, and airfields. The chapter ends by posing the president's alternatives. He could choose to send in U.S. forces to support the invasion because he felt responsible for the lives of the CIA-trained exiles and because he wanted to stop the spread of communism in Latin America. However, air strikes by *Essex* planes violated the president's pledge of no direct U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs, in line with the Charter of the Organization of American States, and could lead to Soviet countermoves in such vulnerable areas as West Berlin.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the position of the Brigade by the second day of the invasion.

2. Account for the failure of the invasion.

3. Contribute to the completion of a decision chart, outlining the pros and cons of U.S. air support for the invasion.

4. Participate in the writing of a group recommendation as to whether President Kennedy ought to provide U.S. air support for the exile invasion.

Time Required: 1 class period

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 6 for all students; one document for each student

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day. Students were to read Chapter 6 and be prepared to answer the definition/explanation questions. Possible definitions/explanations are:

   - failure of air raid – in the April 15 (D-2) air raid against Cuban air fields, B-26s piloted by Cuban exiles only destroyed 5 of 16 Castro planes.
   - Adlai Stevenson – embarrassed that the "cover" story he gave concerning the April 15 air raid was exposed as false, this U.S. ambassador to the United Nations warned the president that

such actions endangered U.S. credibility; Kennedy then called off the April 17 follow-up air raid on Castro's air force.

- *Rio Escondido* – one of two exile ships sunk by Castro's surviving bombers, causing loss of medical and communications gear.
- T-33s – these fast Cuban Air Force jets drove off or shot down exile B-26 air cover over the beachhead; in possession of air superiority, Castro was able to bring up revolutionary militia reinforcements unhindered and rapidly.
- news conference – President Kennedy had pledged at an April 12 new conference that the United States would not become directly involved in Cuban affairs.
- OAS Charter – the Charter of the Organization of American States, which the United States was publicly obliged to abide by, forbade military occupation of land belonging to another member country.
- Premier Khrushchev – the Soviet leader warned Kennedy on April 18 that any "small war can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world."
- D + 1 at Blue Beach (accept any 3 of the following) – forced to retreat to the main landing site; under tank attack; low on ammunition, gasoline, and medical supplies; strafed and shelled; lack of air support; without the option of "going guerrilla."
- umbrella – on April 18, hard-pressed exiles radioed CIA advisors demanding the umbrella of U.S. planes they claimed they had been promised.
- Oval Office – on the evening of April 18, Kennedy's advisors met in the White House Oval Office to hear Bissell's briefing, in which he told them about the lack of air cover, the Brigade's dire military situation, and the impossibility of their either escaping through impassable swamps or being evacuated by U.S. ships without engagement by U.S. Marines; Bissell called for U.S. air strikes from the carrier *Essex* to support the invasion.
- "extreme action" – the Cuban Revolutionary Council threatened suicide as a protest against lack of U.S. support for the Brigade, in which many of them had sons.
- West Berlin – President Kennedy had to balance his concern about the spread of communism in Latin America with U.S. responsibility to protect areas such as West Berlin, vulnerable to Soviet military action.

2. In discussing question 2, refer students to the maps on page 119. Have them note that the planned and the actual dispositions of Brigade forces on D + 1 were quite different. Specifically, the Brigade had failed to secure both Red and Green Beach and had been unable to advance to Covadonga. Students might then offer some of the following information about the military situation of the Brigade on D + 1. Because of the failure of the D-2 air raid and the cancellation of D-day B-26 bombing, Castro's air force only lost 5 of 16 planes. With remaining Sea Fury bombers and T-33 jets, Cuban Air Force pilots attacked and sank two exile supply ships and drove other exile ships out to sea. The jets also shot down exile B-26s flying air cover over the beaches. When exile pilots refused to fly virtually suicidal missions, the Brigade lost the ability to call in air strikes to slow advancing militia reinforcements to knock out Castro's tanks and artillery. By the second day of the invasion (D + 1), the exiles had been prevented from landing on or were driven from the two other beachheads. They consolidated their forces at Blue Beach (Giron) and held off oncoming tanks. They were short on ammunition, gasoline, and medicine, strafed by jets, shelled by artillery, and without escape routes. They radioed their CIA advisors demanding U.S. air support.

3. Create groups of six students, each with a different document. Group members are to work together to fill out the following outline (which you might have one student from each group copy off the board).

U.S. Air Support for the Exile Invasion

Area of Concern	Arguments For	Arguments Against
Brigade		
U.S. Cuba Policy		
U.S. Worldwide Commitments		

Since each student has a different document, the group must hear from everyone in order to fill in the pros and cons for U.S. air support on the decision chart. The documents students employ balance pro and con views for air support in the three given areas of concern.

Document 25. U.S. News and World Report: The Air Will Be Ours. Exile pilots interviewed by *U.S. News* reporters in 1963 said that their CIA trainers had promised on several occasions that the United States would provide air support for the invasion. Colonel Frank told them in February 1961 that they would be backed by U.S. planes, ships, and a landing force of 30,000 Marines. When B-26 pilots complained about removal of their tail guns, advisors said that the United States would control the air over the beaches. An exile ship captain claimed to have seen 22 jets (presumably U.S.) with exile insignia on the day of the invasion. When Kennedy called off the D-Day air raid, an exile pilot was reassured that "Air cover will take care of everything."

Document 26. Richard Bissell: A Hope Transferred into a Belief. Bissell denied that the CIA had promised the exiles U.S. air support for the invasion. Rather, Bissell claimed that a senior planner on his staff, a Marine colonel (Jack Hawkins), was dispatched to the exile training camp, in part, to tell the brigade members not to expect direct U.S. military support. He surmised that, once the invasion started to go badly, exile soldiers simply hoped for U.S. intervention and this wish became transformed into a belief that such intervention had been promised. He further guessed that some CIA trainers might have become so involved with the exile troops that "they gave some impressions they did not intend."

Document 27. José Betancourt: You Can't Go by the Books. In testimony before an investigative panel, Brigade soldier Betancourt gave his opinions on air support and U.S. Cuba policy. As to air support, Betancourt believed the invasion should have been postponed when the D-Day air raids were canceled, because the success of the invasion depended on knocking out Castro's planes. Second, U.S. pilots could easily have flown air support in unmarked planes. Moreover, Betancourt held that the United States was foolish to obey international legal niceties when fighting communism. He said, "There's only one way to fight those people and that's by fighting the way they fight."

Document 28. The Charter of the Organization of American States. The Charter of the Organization of American States was signed in Bogata, Colombia, in 1948 by representatives from 21 Western hemisphere countries, including the United States and Cuba. It specified some of the ideals and prohibitions that signatories felt should guide inter-American relations. Among these ideals or principles were "respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of states," social justice, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Two specific prohibitions were: Article 15 denied the right of signatories to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of any member state, and Article 17 proscribed military occupation of or the use of force against member countries.

Document 29. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Worldwide Defeat for Democracy. On April 18, 1961, as news of the impending failure of the invasion began to reach Washington, along with threats of suicide protests on the part of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, President Kennedy sent Arthur Schlesinger and Adolph Berle to Florida to meet with the Cuban exile leaders. The president's envoys listened in particular to José Miró Cardona, Tony Varona, and Antonio Maceo, who complained of U.S. betrayal, demanded U.S. military intervention, and made dire predictions should U.S. air support not be forthcoming. They said that if the United States did not militarily support the failing invasion, no Cuban

would ever trust the United States again. They argued that the United States could not hope to conceal its involvement in the invasion and its responsibility for the destruction of the Brigade. Moreover, if Washington let Castro defeat U.S. policy in Cuba, all of Latin American might gradually move into his orbit. Thus, "failure on the beaches would mean a worldwide defeat for democracy."

Document 30. Robert F. Kennedy: The Russians Would Move on Berlin. In an interview for the oral history collection at the Kennedy Library, Robert F. Kennedy, attorney general and the president's brother, recalled the discussions at the April 18 meeting. He recounted three basic arguments against sending in U.S. air support. First, Secretary Rusk cautioned the president not to go back on his April 12 public announcement that no U.S. military forces would be used in Cuba, because "he'd be going back on his word." Second, it was not clear that sending in bombers and fighters would save the situation. Since there weren't enough U.S. forces in the area ready to land, air support might simply lengthen the agony of the Brigade without changing the outcome. Third, advisors thought that Khrushchev might "move in Berlin" or create difficulties for U.S.-supported governments in Laos or Vietnam if the president committed U.S. forces to the invasion.

4. After filling in the chart, each group is to use the information to come up with a recommendation for the president, supported by an argument that takes into account the Brigade, U.S. Cuba policy, and U.S. worldwide commitments. Students do not have to be for or against air support in all areas of concern (Brigade, Cuba policy, and worldwide commitments). They should simply take all areas into account, weighing their relative importance, when they make their recommendation. Some possible arguments are summarized below.

- President Kennedy should commit. He had permitted Cuban exiles to invade Cuba without giving them the support needed to succeed. Without further help, the Brigade would be crushed in a few days. The United States would thus have suffered a major defeat because the president sought foolishly to "go by the book" when the fight against Cuban communism must be "all out." Defeat of the invasion would have a negative impact on anti-Castro Cubans who would no longer trust the United States, on Latin America which might be drawn into Castro's orbit, and on worldwide democracy. Moreover, Castro would be left in power in Cuba, where he could provide the Soviet Union with a base in the Western Hemisphere to attack the United States and subvert other Latin American countries.
- President Kennedy should not commit. He had publicly pledged that his government would not intervene directly in Cuba's affairs. Any belief on the part of the exiles that U.S. air support had been promised was a product of their misunderstanding, wishful thinking, and, perhaps, overzealous trainers. If the president sent air support, he would violate the OAS Charter, which was the basis of official U.S. policy toward both Cuba and Latin America. Anyway, the Castro regime did not pose a direct challenge to U.S. security; the issue of Castro's overthrow, as the president had said, was basically to be decided "between Cubans themselves." Indeed, there was no guarantee that direct U.S. military support would be timely and effective enough to cause the invasion to succeed. In addition, a U.S. attack on Cuba might cause the Soviets to attack U.S. allies in Europe or Asia.

5. Have one student from each group present the group's recommendation. Use this opportunity to facilitate whole-class discussion of the issues raised. Toward the end of the discussion, focus attention on the issue of whether Cuba presented a direct military threat to the United States.

Preparation for Chapter 7:

Tell students that the next chapter addresses the theme of whether the Soviet Union, with Castro's concurrence, was justified in placing offensive nuclear missile in Cuba. Inform them that between April 1961 and October 1962 a complex series of events unfolded. Both the USSR and Cuba considered that these events justified the basing of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. The United States, on the other hand, cited events that supported its vigorous opposition to the Cuban-based missiles. Assign students to prepare to examine the USSR, Cuban, and U.S. positions on the missiles in Cuba by doing questions 1 and 2 for homework.

CHAPTER 7:
WAS THE STATIONING OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA JUSTIFIED?

Overview:

This chapter examines the events between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the decision to send missiles to Cuba. The chapter poses the question: Was the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba justified? The Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev positions on the justification for sending the missiles to Cuba are described. Kennedy claimed that the Soviet basing of missiles in Cuba was unjustified: this deceitful action violated the Monroe Doctrine, aggressively spread communism to Latin America, and threatened U.S. security and world peace. Castro held that basing Soviet nuclear missiles in his country was necessary in order to persuade the United States not to launch an imminent invasion. Khrushchev held that the USSR had the same rights internationally as the United States and therefore could arm its Cuban ally with nuclear weapons, just as the United States had done elsewhere.

The rest of the chapter consists of a timeline of events from the establishment of Maxwell Taylor's investigation of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 to the October 1962 detection of missile base construction in Cuba. Among the events covered are the inception of Cuban central planning, the Vienna Summit, the erection of the Berlin Wall, the commencement of the Alliance for Progress, the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split, the revelation that the missile gap favored the United States, and the inauguration of U.S. clandestine warfare against Castro. The timeline also addresses Castro's declaration of his Marxist-Leninist beliefs, Cuba's exclusion from the OAS, the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, the Second Declaration of Havana, large-scale U.S. maneuvers in the Caribbean, Soviet protests about U.S. missiles on its borders, the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuba military aid pact, and messages of reassurance and warning passed between Moscow and Washington about the rumored missiles in Cuba.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. State the U.S., Cuban, and Soviet positions on stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba.

2. List events from the chapter that would serve as evidence supporting Kennedy's, Castro's, and Khrushchev's positions on the construction of Soviet missiles bases in Cuba.

3. Write an argument in favor of the U.S., Cuban, or Soviet position on the Soviet missiles in Cuba, supported by evidence from the chapter.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 7 for all students and one copy of each document

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles – in the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union and Cuba agreed to base these missiles in Cuba.
- General Maxwell Taylor – the general who headed the board of inquiry into the Bay of Pigs invasion, which criticized the CIA and established the Special Group for Counterinsurgency.
- JUCEPLAN – in May 1961, the Cuban Minister of Industry announced that the Cuban economy would begin to be centrally planned by this agency on a yearly basis.
- Berlin Wall – on August 13, 1961, the East German government, with Soviet backing, violated U.S. treaty rights by erecting a wall cutting off the communist sector of the city.

- Alliance for Progress – in August 1961, at Punta del Este, the Organization of American States accepted this U.S. aid program, which pledged $20 billion to finance democratization, development, and social reform in Latin America.
- Mao Zedong – in October 1961, at the 22nd Communist Party conference, Khrushchev stepped up his attacks on this head of the Chinese Communist party in order to establish Soviet leadership of the world communist movement.
- missile gap – on October 21, 1961, U.S. defense official Roswell Gilpatric revealed that, contrary to previous reports, the United States had an advantage over the USSR in ICBMs.
- Operation Mongoose – the code name for a covert campaign against Cuba under General Edward Lansdale, begun in November 1961. Among its operations were assassination attempts on Castro.
- United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution – when Fidel Castro announced that he was a "Marxist-Leninist" in December 1961, he consolidated all political parties into this organization under his direct control.
- trade embargo – on February 3, 1962, the United States announced a total embargo (ban) on all U.S.-Cuban trade and took steps to encourage allies to do likewise.
- Ortsac – Castro spelled backwards, the name of a fictitious dictator U.S. military personnel were pretending to overthrow in training maneuvers.
- Jupiter missiles – in May 1962, Khrushchev complained publicly about the presence of these 45 U.S. nuclear missiles, which had recently become operational near the Soviet Union in Italy and Turkey (U.S. NATO allies).
- meeting in Moscow – on July 3-8, 1962, Raul Castro met with Soviet officials. He negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union to send Soviet arms, planes, and advisors to Cuba, supposedly in response to U.S. invasion threats.
- messages from the USSR and the U.S. – between September 2 and 13, 1962, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he would not send offensive weapons to Cuba and Kennedy warned that the U.S. would do whatever was necessary to protect itself from missiles in Cuba, should they be detected.
- CIA analysts – on October 14, U-2 spy planes took pictures of western Cuba, according to CIA analysts, these photos revealed a missile base under construction.

2. Ask students to share their understanding of the cases for and against basing Soviet missiles in Cuba offered by Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev. Kennedy's critique of the Soviet-Cuba missile agreement would include the contention that the Soviet Union sent missiles to Cuba in order to upset the balance of power with the United States and to further the spread of communism in Latin America and the world. Castro would underline that aggressive U.S. policies toward Cuba indicated that a U.S. invasion was imminent; thus, the missile agreement with the Soviets was justified as a means of convincing Kennedy not to attempt another invasion of Cuba. Lastly, Khrushchev would point out that the Soviet Union had a duty to defend a fellow socialist state against aggression and, given the fact that the United States had missile bases on the borders of the USSR, he had an equal right to place Soviet missiles in Cuba.

3. For homework or in small groups, have students locate and list at least three events that support each of the three cases. They should explain how each event supports the case under which the group lists it. If you think students need more support in carrying out this task, read through a page of the events with the class, asking students to code each event to indicate whose position it supports. Then have individuals share some of their answers, along with their reasoning as to how each event supports the Kennedy, Castro, or Khrushchev position. The Kennedy case, for instance, would be supported by Khrushchev's speech attacking Mao Zedong, because this indicated that the Soviet Union was attempting to aggressively assert itself as the leader in spreading communism in the world. Evidence for the

Castro case might include the U.S. military maneuvers in 1962, which seemed to be rehearsals for an imminent invasion of Cuba. Khrushchev might point to the basing of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy as a justification for the sending of Soviet missiles to Cuba.

4. Select students (or groups) to write United Nations speeches supporting the U.S., Cuban, and Soviet positions. Assign the Kennedy, Castro, or Khrushchev documents to the appropriate students and permit remaining class time to be employed in reading the documents and answering question 4. Students not selected to give speeches will act as United Nations delegates the following day. They are to review the information in question 2 and 3 in order to determine whether the Soviets and Cubans were justified in placing the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Document 31. John F. Kennedy: Deliberate Deception and Offensive Threats. In this speech President Kennedy offered three main reasons why the Soviet missiles in Cuba were unjustifiable. First, he noted that their presence violated numerous international accords and U.S. tradition concerning threats to the hemisphere. Second, the Soviets had deliberately deceived U.S. officials about the missiles and apparently wanted to use the missiles in order to threaten the United States. Third, the missiles constituted a sudden, secret, and thus irresponsible destabilization of the world status quo.

Document 32. Fidel Castro: A Direct Invasion of Cuba Was Being Seriously Considered. Castro held in this 1984 interview that the basing of Soviet missiles in Cuba was both strategically and morally correct. It was strategically correct because he suspected that the United States was planning another invasion of Cuba and he wanted to persuade Kennedy that an attack on Cuba would start a world war with the Soviet Union. Morally, the missile bases were justified because Cuba was a small country being threatened by a big country and because an invasion would cause much loss of life. Moreover, Cuba was a sovereign country and had the right to conclude agreements to make use of any type of arms it wished for its defense.

Document 33. Nikita Khrushchev: A Little of Their Own Medicine. In this memoir, ex-premier Khrushchev justified sending missiles to Cuba three ways. To begin with, he believed that unless the Soviet Union sent the missiles, Cuba might be invaded by the United States and thereby be lost to the socialist camp. Next, Khrushchev thought that Soviet missiles in Cuba might equalize the balance of power, now tilting dangerously toward the United States. Finally, the United States was threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear missiles based in neighboring countries; now the United States would know how the Soviets felt having enemy missiles pointed at them.

5. The next day, begin class by asking students who have prepared to argue for each of the three positions to sit in U.S., Cuba, and Soviet groups. Each group will present its case to the students who were assigned to be U.N. delegates. Permit one representative from each group to give his/her speech; then allow members of each group to rebut the arguments of one or both of the other countries. After about 15 minutes, allow students playing U.N. delegates to give their views on the question. Note some of the points that may be hard for each country's advocates to defend – the U.S. sending sabotage and assassination squads to Cuba; Cuba's economic and political control over its own people; and the Soviet Union's secrecy in deploying nuclear weapons capable of threatening U.S. cities. Make sure these arguments are considered in class discussion. At the end of class, ask students what they think the United States should do about the missiles in Cuba. If time remains, outline the basic dilemma posed by Chapter 8.

Preparation for Chapter 8:

The problem posed by Chapter 8 is what the United States should do to counter the Soviet missile threat from Cuba. Three alternatives are presented: air strike, blockade/quarantine, or negotiations. Students who argue for any of these positions should be prepared to defend it on the basis that it will lead to the removal of the weapons, avoid a world war with the USSR, and not have an adverse effect on U.S. allies, international law, or world opinion. Students are also to be able to point out the weaknesses in the two other positions. It would be a good idea to assign some or all students to answer questions 1 and 2 and to come to class with prepared arguments.

CHAPTER 8: WHICH STRATEGY SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY USE TO REMOVE THE SOVIET MISSILES FROM CUBA?

Overview:

This chapter focuses on the deliberations in Kennedy's ExComm (Executive Committee) to devise strategies for forcing the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. It begins by noting the Soviets' intent to secretly base missiles in Cuba that were capable of threatening much of the United States and then chronicles how U.S. leaders became aware of the Soviet-Cuban plan. The chapter describes the President's reaction when he was shown photographs of the half-completed missile launchers in Cuba. The chapter then turns to the ExComm, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which President Kennedy convened to advise him. After introducing the members of the ExComm and setting the scene for its deliberations from Tuesday, October 16, to Saturday, October 20, the chapter lists the three main alternatives that this committee discussed. The first was a surgical air strike at the missile launchers to be followed by an invasion, if necessary; the second was a naval blockade until the missiles were returned to the Soviet Union; and the third was a trade of the Guantanamo base and obsolete Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey in exchange for demilitarization of Cuba and Soviet withdrawal of the missiles to the USSR. The major arguments of each position are noted.

The air strike option, of course, would do the job quickly and effectively and, in addition, would show our allies that we were ready to come to their defense, if need be. In addition, its violence could be blamed on Cuba and the Soviet Union for ignoring our previous warnings. The blockade, while slower, would give Khrushchev more time to withdraw the missiles, would show the world that the U.S. was reasonable and wanted to avoid a war, and was less likely to lead to escalation. The third alternative, negotiation, would avoid a showdown with the USSR, impress world opinion with its fairness, and create a peaceful precedent for times of future crisis. The chapter ends by asking students to decide upon the best strategy, justify this decision, and give reasons why the president should not select the other two strategies.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe three strategies for removing Soviet missiles from Cuba.

2. Explain how one strategy would remove the missiles, avoid world war, and maintain the support of U.S. allies and world opinion.

3. Argue in favor of one of the strategies and against the other two.

Time Required: 1-2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 8 for all students and enough copies of the documents for one-third of the class to have each

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definition/explanations are:

- McGeorge Bundy – President Kennedy's National Security Advisor who informed the president about the confirmed presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 16, 1961.
- three options – the president's advisors came up with three strategy options for removing the Soviet missiles from Cuba: air strike/invasion, naval blockade, or negotiations.
- 80 nuclear missiles – the Soviet leadership had decided to secretly base 80 medium (1000 miles) and intermediate (2200 miles) range nuclear missiles in Cuba.

- SAMs – CIA director James McCone noticed the installation of SAMs (surface to air missiles) in Cuba in August 1962 and told the president that such defenses indicated the presence of offensive missiles.
- two U-2 missions – on October 14 Director McCone sent two high-flying U-2 planes on flights over western Cuba. The photos they took confirmed the construction of Soviet missile bases there.
- ExComm – the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which advised President Kennedy on his response to the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
- San Cristobal – the town in western Cuba near which the Soviet Union was constructing one of its four missile bases, complete with missile transporters, erector launches, and a motor pool, according to U-2 photos.
- three topic areas – the ExComm investigation of strategies covered three topic areas: (1) whether the strategy would work, (2) the likelihood that the strategy would cause a world war, and (3) the effect of the strategy on U.S. alliances and world opinion.
- fast track – strategy advocated by Dillon and others who favored an air strike and invasion of Cuba as the "most direct, efficient, and prompt" means of getting rid of the Soviet missiles.
- compelling message – Dillon argued that bombing the missile sites would send the Soviets a compelling message as to how the United States dealt with threats to its security.
- slow track – argument by Sorenson, McNamara, and others for a blockade – a slower way of eliminating the missile threat that would give Khrushchev time to consider his response.
- unity of the alliance – McNamara argued that the slow track strategy would preserve the unity of the NATO alliance by letting the Soviets know that offensive missiles were "unacceptable" without immediately escalating the crisis.
- Adlai Stevenson – supported the negotiation strategy, calling for a demilitarization of Cuba, trading the Jupiter missile bases in Turkey and Italy for the Soviet bases in Cuba, and commencement of a series of disarmament conferences with the USSR.
- peaceful precedent – solving the crisis by treaty, Stevenson believed, might establish an important example of how negotiation can settle potentially explosive problems.
- Saturday, October 20 – the day President Kennedy sat in on the ExComm deliberations and heard arguments for and against each of the three proposals.

2. Review each strategy in terms of the three topic areas. The air strike/invasion strategy would (a) remove the Soviet missiles in a direct and quick manner, (b) clearly warn the USSR that the United States dealt firmly with threats to its security (and possibly overthrow Castro, who would then no longer be a threat to the hemisphere), and (c) show allies U.S. determination, assert the Monroe Doctrine, and let the world know that Cuba was responsible for the problem. The quarantine strategy would (a) ultimately squeeze the missiles out of Cuba because of overwhelming U.S. naval superiority, (b) give the Soviet Union time to come to the reasonable policy of peacefully complying with U.S. demands, and (c) reassure allies of U.S. resolve and impress the world with U.S. restraint. Lastly, the negotiations strategy would (a) lead to the willing and peaceful removal of the missiles, (b) neutralize Cuba as a danger to the United States as well as make possible new agreements with the USSR, and (c) prevent crisis-driven break-up of U.S. alliances and establish treaty precedents for international problem solving.

3. Divide the class into thirds, assigning each group to write a policy paper on one of the strategies. Distribute the appropriate document to each group.

Document 34. Douglas Dillon: We Meant Business. Dillon gave three reasons for supporting the air strike/invasion strategy. First, he believed that rapid military action might prevent more costly and dangerous measures later, should the United States delay and the missiles become operational. Second, he thought that an air strike would convince the Soviets to backdown because they would see

that we were very determined. Lastly, he thought that the Soviets could not react decisively to an air strike because of the strategic weakness that led them to base missiles in Cuba in the first place.

Document 35. Theodore Sorenson: A Limited, Low-Level Action. In this excerpt, Sorenson said that the blockade/quarantine strategy had both immediate and longer range consequences to recommend it. Immediately, it would not provoke a Soviet counterattack. Moreover, since it was gradual, a blockade did not humiliate Khrushchev, while firmly persuading him to comply with U.S. wishes. Finally, the carefulness and lack of bloodshed of this strategy would be appealing to U.S. allies.

Document 36. Adlai Stevenson: Negotiation and Sanity Always. In this memo, Stevenson justified his strategy in three ways. First of all, he warned that a U.S. attack on Soviet bases in Cuba might inspire Soviet counterattacks elsewhere. Second, U.S. allies might not understand why the United States was behaving so aggressively about these missiles and withdraw from U.S. alliance systems. Third, Stevenson thought that the United States should always attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution of a problem before resorting to threats and force.

Student policy papers in favor of each strategy should contain arguments found in question 2 and the respective documents. Equally important for the policy debate is criticism for the rival strategies. The obvious problem with the air strike strategy was that it would likely kill both innocent Cuban civilians and Soviet technicians. Also, the United States was very vulnerable to Soviet counterattacks in places like Berlin. A problem with the blockade strategy was that this gradual tightening of the net around Cuba might give the Soviets time to complete the missiles and use them against the United States. Also the United States risked alienating allies who resented interference with trade. The problem with the negotiation strategy was that it gave away U.S. advantages (Guantanamo) in reward for Soviet aggression and might cause lack of trust among NATO allies (Turkey and Italy), who found their defenses bargained away by the United States.

4. Ask each group to appoint a speaker to lay out its policy. Spend the remaining time in discussion, with students critiquing each other's strategies and defending their own.

5. If time permits, assign students to read the section "Aftermath of the Missile Crisis" (page 143). Review relevant events since 1962 and ask students to reflect on President Kennedy's decision to blockade Cuba in order to remove the Soviet missiles.

Preparation for Chapter 9:

Tell students that the following day they will apply what they have learned about U.S.-Cuban relations to a different country, the Dominican Republic. Specifically, they are going to determine whether and how the United States ought to intervene in a civil war in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Assign students at least questions 1 and 2. If you are not planning to commit two days to this chapter, assign questions 3 or 4 as well.

CHAPTER 9: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES INTERVENE IN LATIN AMERICA?

Overview:

This chapter begins by posing the question of how, if at all, the United States ought to intervene in Latin America. Three perspectives on this issue are then described – political/military, social, and non-interventionism. Each is identified through spokespersons whose positions appear in the document section at the end of the chapter: Barry Goldwater, who advocates using any means necessary to prevent communist subversion in Latin America; Hubert Humphrey, who speaks for foreign aid programs that would prevent revolutions by correcting their main cause – poverty; and William Appleman Williams, who recommends letting Latin Americans settle their own affairs.

The chapter then introduces the case of the Dominican Republic, asking which intervention perspectives ought to guide President Johnson's response to the 1965 civil war in Santo Domingo. The chapter outlines the geographic, social, and economic conditions in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Following a historical overview from independence, the narrative describes the four groups that vied for power in the period 1961-65: the army, led by General Eliás Wessín y Wessín; the elite and middle class united by Viriato Fiallo's National Civic Union (UCN); the peasants and workers of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD); and the revolutionary left as embodied in Manuel Tavares' 14th of June Movement. Juan Bosch's tenure in power from his electoral victory in December 1962 to his overthrow by the army and the UCN is recounted, along with his PRD revolutionary left coalition's attempt to violently retake state power on April 24, 1965.

The chapter ends by asking students whether President Johnson ought to (1) send Marines in to the Dominican Republic to help the military and UCN put down the communist-infiltrated revolution, (2) give diplomatic support and foreign aid to the democratically elected Bosch government, or (3) allow Dominicans to settle their dispute without U.S. interference.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the events leading up to the 1965 civil war in the Dominican Republic.

2. Relate three policy perspectives on intervention in Latin America.

3. Advocate and defend a U.S. policy to respond to the Dominican civil war.

Time Required: 1 or 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 9 and accompanying documents for all students.

Procedure:

1. Use the identification questions as a basis of familiarizing the class with the situation in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. Some possible answers are given below:

- three policy perspectives regarding U.S. intervention – (1) political/military interventionism advocated by Barry Goldwater, who called for preventing communist subversion by whatever means will succeed; (b) social interventionism sponsored by Hubert Humphrey, who recommended preventing communist revolutions in Latin America by ending poverty through foreign aid; (c) non-interventionism, whose spokesman, William Appleman Williams, suggested the United States not intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.
- cash crops – the main business of the Dominican Republic was selling such cash crops as sugar, tobacco, rice, and bananas to the United States.

- 100 families – politically powerful families who owned most of the farmland in the Dominican Republic.
- *campesinos* – illiterate and poor landless laborers; most of the people of the Dominican Republic in 1965 were *campesinos*.
- Ramón Cáceres – seized power in 1906, bringing an end to instability that resumed after his assassination in 1911.
- customs duties – because of dictatorship and civil war, the Dominican treasury was too depleted to pay off loans from European bankers; the United States took over the collection of customs duties at Dominican ports, paying the money owed the European investors to prevent foreign intervention.
- national police force – during the 1916-24 occupation, U.S. advisors set up a national police force that became Trujillo's base for seizure of power.
- Rafael Trujillo – Dominican dictator from 1930-61, Trujillo persecuted his enemies, put supporters into key positions, and amassed great wealth.
- Central Intelligence Agency – after Trujillo tried to kill the president of Venezuela, the U.S. government helped to overthrow him by such means as using the CIA to smuggle weapons to potential assassins.
- General Elías Wessín y Wessín – an anti-communist air force general, the leader of a minority of officers in the military who opposed corruption and wanted the army to play a constructive role in Dominican life.
- Dominican military forces – 30,000-man army, air force, and navy that consumed 40 percent of the Dominican budget with the justification that they were protecting the nation from communist revolution; military officers were generally corrupt, self-serving, and accustomed to having considerable political power.
- Viriato Fiallo – an anti-Trujillo politician who spent years in prison for advocating democracy in the Dominican Republic; he headed the National Civic Union.
- National Civic Union – the UCN, a "good government" party backed primarily by the elite and the middle class, called for democracy, firing corrupt Trujillo officers and officials, and free market solutions to Dominican economic problems.
- Juan Bosch – the leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), a socialist professor who spoke for a program of economic reform that would benefit the working classes.
- Dominican Revolutionary Party – the PRD, a reformist party, supported mainly by peasants and urban workers, favored state retention of Trujillo-owned industries, land reform, and renegotiation of government contracts with U.S. companies.
- Manuel Tavares Justo – an anti-Trujillo revolutionary who had been imprisoned and tortured for agitating against the dictatorship; leader of the 14th of June Movement, Tavares Justo thought that the Dominican Republic needed a social revolution on the Cuban model.
- 14th of June Movement – a party of the pro-Castro revolutionary left, named after the date in 1961 when a group of Cubans and Dominicans invaded the Dominican Republic to overthrow Trujillo; this party argued for nationalization of all means of production, opposition to foreign investment, and overthrow of the Dominican elite.
- first free elections – Juan Bosch became president of the Dominican Republic on December 20, 1962, in the first truly free election in Dominican history.
- September 25, 1963 – the date when the army and the elite-backed UCN politicians overthrew Bosch's government, in part because he refused to crack down on communists.

- uprising in Santo Domingo – on Saturday, April 24, 1965, PRD and revolutionary left leaders joined with loyal army officers to launch an uprising to return Bosch to power. By April 28, President Johnson was receiving requests for U.S. support from both sides in the struggle.

2. As an alternative to class recitation of the identification question answers, assume the role of President Johnson on April 28, 1965. Ask individual members of the class to brief you on the Dominican civil war. Start by asking about the geography, resources, social structure, and history of the island nation, recording student responses on the board. Then ask about the four main groups contending for power. Students might mention that the army was large, anti-communist, graft-ridden, and accustomed to wielding political power, but that a minority of officers like General Wessín y Wessín seemed to want to reform the army's role in Dominican life. The student-generated profile of the UCN ought to include their pro-business/foreign investment, anti-corruption, pro-democratic reform platform as well as their elite backing and anti-communism. Questioning students about the PRD should elicit that it was led by Juan Bosch, supported land reform, was mildly critical of the U.S. government and business, and advocated regional development programs with U.S. aid. Discussion of the revolutionary left ought to reveal that parties like the 14th of June Movement were pro-Castro, against foreign investment, for nationalizing large estates and major industries, and favored radical reform of the social class system.

3. Ask students to outline the three U.S. intervention perspectives. If you have not done so already as homework, direct students to the three documents at the end of the chapter. Ask them to relate the views of these political-military, social, and non-interventionists.

Document 37. Barry Goldwater: Removal of Communists from Power. The Republican candidate for president in 1964, Goldwater argued that U.S. foreign policy should be directed at removing communists from power wherever they were to be found, whether in Cuba or Vietnam. He urged that the U.S. employ such diverse methods as intellectual/ideological arguments, legal/organizational tactics, and military force, including nuclear weapons, against communists. He specifically ruled out foreign aid which, he said, would not make enough of a dent in the problem. Rather, he warned, such aid would only diffuse U.S. strength and weaken the assault on communist power.

Document 38. Hubert Humphrey: The Ancient Enemy of Poverty. The vice president to Johnson in 1965, Humphrey contended that it was not communism per se that was causing revolution in Latin America; nor would invoking the Monroe Doctrine prevent communist infiltration of this region. Fundamentally, the enemies of freedom there, he asserted, were poverty, illiteracy, and disease, which drove desperate people to "false prophets" like communists. Humphrey implied that U.S. foreign aid programs such as the Alliance for Progress could tackle Latin America's basic problems and facilitate peaceful change.

Document 40. William Appleman Williams: Internationalism Has Become Intermeddling. This leading scholar/critic of U.S. foreign policy claimed that the main problem in U.S. relations with other countries was the U.S. proclivity to try to control events in other countries. The U.S. idea of internationalism had thus become a process of minding the world's business. He compared the United States to a parent who cannot "let go" of adult offspring, because this would signify giving up an important and meaningful role. Similarly, the United States was afraid to allow the world to develop in a diverse manner. The result, Williams concluded, was that U.S. leaders paid little attention to the state of their own nation, which showed, presumably, in the inequities of the U.S. social system.

4. Individual students might then take over the briefing to present their analysis of the problem; the reasons for advocating political/military, social, or non-intervention; and the outcome they hoped to achieve. Representatives of each of the policy perspectives ought to address the class. After each presentation, listeners should have a chance to ask questions and second or refute the presenter's arguments. The teacher may ask students to imagine they were participating in a meeting similar to the ExComm group that advised President Kennedy during the missile crisis. Then the class should have an opportunity to vote for the intervention policy the majority thinks President Johnson should follow.

5. After students have debated and voted on a policy to respond to the Dominican civil war, tell them what actually happened. President Johnson sent 20,000 troops into Santo Domingo ostensibly to evacuate U.S. citizens. These soldiers imposed a cease fire on the contending forces that enabled the army to regroup and resupply itself. In U.S.-supervised elections in April 1966, Joaquin Balaguer, a former Trujillo backer, was elected president. U.S. forces pulled out in September 1966, but U.S. aid flowed freely to Balaguer's government. Balaguer and the right would dominate Dominican politics for the next 15 years, essentially implementing the free enterprise program of the UCN. Although modest land reform and a regional irrigation program were enacted, this did little to stem the tide of landless migrants to the city slums. Even when the PRD, from which Bosch had resigned, came to power in 1978, few of Bosch's 1962 social reforms were carried out. The elite remains to this day firmly in control of the Dominican agricultural and industrial economy, financed by foreign investment. Ask students whether this information changes their minds regarding what policy Johnson should have followed and why.

Preparation for Chapter 10:

Ask students why Johnson enacted this policy in 1965-66. Students might guess that he was attempting to protect U.S. business interests, foster development of Dominican democratic institutions, or prevent the spread of communism to the Republic. Introduce the topic of the next chapter, the underlying reason for U.S. foreign policy regarding Cuba between 1898-1962. Assign students to read the chapter and complete chapter questions 1 and 2.

CHAPTER 10:
WHAT WAS THE UNDERLYING REASON FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA?

Overview:

This chapter challenges students to reflect on the history of U.S.-Cuban relations from the first intervention in 1898 to the missile crisis of 1962 in order to detect the underlying reason for U.S. policy toward Cuba. The chapter begins by informing students that since the missile crisis, U.S.-Cuban relations have remained in a state of stalemate. Students are asked to review U.S. Cuban policy for the 70-year span covered in this unit in an attempt to find some pattern of motivation that might help policy makers in the future improve decision-making about Cuba and Latin America.

To support this inquiry, three schools of diplomatic history are described – ideological, strategic, and economic. Advocates of the ideological school, called nationalist historians, praise the expansion of U.S. influence in the world because they believe that this process disseminates important U.S. values. Thus, Samuel Flagg Bemis holds that the underlying motive for U.S. Cuban policy was instilling U.S. democratic ideals in Cubans. Proponents of the strategic school, known as realist historians, believe the United States had to be primarily concerned with self-defense in a world governed by power politics. Joseph W. Reidy, a realist Latin American historian, contends that U.S. Cuban policy was basically concerned with maintaining hemispheric defense by such means as supporting friendly governments in Havana and keeping power rivals such as the USSR out of Cuban affairs. Supporters of the economic school, the New Left historians, think that U.S. policy has been driven by the need to expand markets for U.S. goods and investments. Robert F. Smith, a New Left historian, puts forth the case that U.S. Cuban policy was fundamentally aimed at creating a favorable climate for U.S. businesses in Cuba, often at the expense of needed social reforms. The narrative ends by asking students to decide which of these schools best explains the underlying reason for U.S. Cuban policy.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Explain each of the three historical theories on the underlying reason for U.S. Cuban policy.

2. Find information from at least four chapters in this unit to support one of the theories.

3. Write an essay with an introduction, main body, and conclusion using one of the three theories to explain the underlying reason for U.S. Cuban policy.

Time Required: 1 to 2 class periods, plus 2 to 3 afternoons or evenings

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 10 plus accompanying documents for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day, briefly discussing the identification questions. Possible answers include:

- stalemate in relations – since the end of the missile crisis, the United States has not directly intervened in Cuba but has boycotted trade with Cuba, and Castro has established a socialist dictatorship; U.S.-Cuban relations have remained in an unchanging state of antagonism.
- underlying reason – diplomatic historians have developed three different positions on the underlying motivation for U.S. Cuban policy (the nationalist, realist, and New Left schools).
- advantage of knowing underlying reason – knowledge of the basic motivation for past U.S. Cuban policy could improve future decision-making concerning Cuba and Latin America.
- nationalist school – believed that U.S. policy was basically driven by the urge to spread U.S. ideology of democracy and the rule of law.

- origin of nationalist school – the nationalist historians were the first diplomatic historians to use accounts of specific negotiations and treaties to piece together regional studies of U.S. foreign policy.
- Samuel Flagg Bemis – noted nationalist historian who wrote regional studies of U.S. policy toward countries in Latin America.
- reluctant intervention – according to Bemis, the United States intervened in Latin America with great reluctance, mainly to protect countries from aggressors, preserve law and order, or promote democracy.
- realist school – believed that power politics and the need to defend the United States, rather than ideals, guided U.S. policy makers.
- origins of realist school – after World War Two, realist historians rejected the nationalist theory that foreign policy was or ought to be guided by ideals; they thought that the United States should employ policies that maintained the balance of power with rivals such as the USSR.
- Joseph W. Reidy – a realist historian who thought that U.S. policy toward Cuba was motivated by the need to protect U.S. strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere.
- southern approaches – the central contention of realist Joseph Reidy that the U.S. policy toward Cuba was directed at defending the southern approaches to the United Sates.
- New Left school – a group of historians who believed that economic interests, and not ideals or national defense, shaped U.S. Cuban policy.
- origins of New Left school – New Left historians were critical of the manner in which the United States waged the Cold War, neglecting domestic reform; they questioned the sincerity of U.S. ideals as a result of their perception of the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War.
- Robert F. Smith – proponent of the New Left position, who argued that economic interests propelled U.S. diplomats to work toward creating a favorable business climate for U.S. citizens in Cuba.
- markets and sources of raw materials – belief held by New Left historians that U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba was driven by the desire to develop world markets for raw materials, U.S. goods, and investments.

2. Ask students which school they lean toward and why they find that school's position on the underlying cause for U.S. policy toward Cuba particularly convincing. This will allow students to initially explore the positions of the schools. Then refer students to the documents at the end of the chapter. Point out which document supports each position and ask students to take 10-15 minutes of class time to review the documents in order to decide which school of diplomatic history – nationalist, realist, or New Left – most adequately explains the main thrust of U.S. Cuban policy.

Document 40. Samuel Flagg Bemis: The Good Neighbor to the North. Bemis contends that security and ideology are the two driving forces behind U.S. policy toward Cuba. U.S. ideology is based on popular sovereignty, republican government, and a belief in progress. This ideological background impels the United States to save other peoples from political tyranny. Also it fosters a foreign policy that seeks to rescue Latin American countries from political instability, ignorance, disease, and poverty. The United States strives within a framework of pan-American collaboration to strengthen political independence, territorial integrity, and economic/sociological well-being in Latin America.

Document 41. Joseph Reidy: Direct Military Threat to the United States. Reidy holds that the United States has traditionally opposed extra-hemispheric interference in Latin America because U.S. diplomats feel that if a hostile military power was able to gain a base in the Western hemisphere, it could launch attacks on other countries (including the United States), restrict U.S. access to strategic

materials, limit U.S. control of sea lanes, and divert U.S. attention from other areas of the world. Reidy thinks that certain areas of Latin America are particularly important to the United States: Mexico and Cuba, because they constitute a direct military threat; and Central America, Colombia, and Venezuela because of their proximity to the approaches to the Panama Canal and the naval paassages into the Caribbean.

Document 42. Robert F. Smith: The Protection of American Interests. According to Smith, U.S. foreign policy has stressed order and protection of American (business) interests. This has had a negative impact on U.S. relations especially with "backward" countries in Latin America and elsewhere because it has led U.S. diplomats to believe that U.S. interests were synonymous with the interests of other countries. In practice, the emphasis on protection of U.S. business interests abroad makes the United States unsympathetic to nationalistic programs of underdeveloped countries. The United States has opposed economic reforms that conflict with U.S. business practices and has supported the status quo, even if this meant backing dictators.

3. After students have selected one of the three interpretations, they can begin to select evidence to support their chosen thesis. Use the very first topic, the Spanish-American War, as an example of how student advocates of each school of thought might explain the U.S. declaration of war, Teller Resolution, Platt Amendment, and subsequent interventions. Those who speak for the nationalist or idealist school could cite a variety of evidence from topic A to back up their claims. For instance, they could mention some but not all of the following evidence: Spanish tyranny in Cuba and the *reconcentrado* camps as reasons for U.S. entry, U.S. intentions as embodied in McKinley's war message and the Teller Amendment, the work done to rebuild Cuba after the war, U.S. help in writing a democratic constitution, the need for the Platt Amendment to protect Cuba from internal threats to the life, liberty, or property of its citizens, as well as from aggressive foreign nations, and the need for stabilizing U.S. intervention as proved by requests for the same in 1906 and 1909, all as evidence of U.S. efforts to promote Cuban democracy and sovereignty.

Those who support the realist or defense school of thought could also employ some of the following evidence from Chapter 1: U.S. policy since 1823 in opposing outside intervention in the Western hemisphere, the blowing up of the *Maine*, obtaining Guantánamo under the Platt Amendment, protecting Cuba from other countries such as Germany and England based on the pretense of Cuba failing to make payment on its loans, and preserving U.S. right to intervene, which could stave off intervention by other countries. All of these events would substantiate the theory that defense of the United States was the primary motivation of U.S. Cuban policy.

Those who argue for the New Left or narrow economic interest theory could marshal some of the following to back up their case. They might emphasize U.S. trade and property destroyed and endangered by Spain in its attempts to put down the uprising in Cuba, the reference to U.S. property and trade in McKinley's war message, and the fact that repairing war damage in Cuba would provide U.S. business interests with greater trade and investment possibilities. They might also bring up the Platt Amendment, which deprived Cuba of its sovereignty by giving U.S. intervention rights to protect U.S.-owned property and prohibited Cuba from borrowing money from foreign countries; two interventions when U.S. property was threatened; and the subsequent increase in U.S. investment in Cuba between 1900 and 1925.

There is no need to go into as much detail on other topics—B, C, E, and F. The idealist can find evidence to support his/her contentions in all four topics, emphasizing that even if the U.S. supported "strong leaders," helped U.S. businessmen, and protected Cuba from outside interference, all of these acts were intended to assist the Cuban people develop their nation. Strong leaders were better than the alternative of social upheaval and communist domination; business investment generated wealth that trickled down to the average Cuban; and protection from the United States contributed to Cuban democracy, a stable social order, and freedom from foreign interference. Grounds for realist arguments that the United States since 1823 has been mostly interested in maintaining its strategic vantage of being the only major power in the Western hemisphere is most abundant in topics E and F, which deal with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile crisis. Still, one can contend that a main reason for

opposing Grau was the possibility that his government would revoke the Guantánamo clause of the Latt Agreement. Moreover, the United States supported Batista in part because he was a willing participant in U.S./Latin American defense pact against the Axis and communism. Suffice it to say, partisans of the New Left school would argue that U.S. support for dictators who gave carte blanche to businessmen and opposition to pro-reform Cuban leaders offers substance to the theory that narrow economic interest supersede idealistic concerns in the making of U.S. Cuban policy. Information for this position can be found especially in topics B and C.

The break in relations chapter, like the one on the Spanish-American War, is particularly important because it can be used to support any or all of the three theories. The idealists would say the United States was disillusioned by Castro with his show trials, confiscation of property from its rightful owners, failure to hold elections, and imprisoning of his own followers. Those believers in defense as the motive for Cuba policy would argue the United States was just following the Monroe Doctrine and wanted to protect its "sphere of influence," the Western Hemisphere, from communism. Those who hold the New Left's narrow economic interest theory would argue that ill-considered U.S. policies such as asking for compensation for confiscated property and repealing the sugar quota, rather than offering aid to Cuba, drove Fidel Castro to communism.

3. Teachers might plan to instruct students in essay writing over two class periods. On the first day, introduce students to the idea of using a thesis statement (main idea), foreshadowing (statement of major arguments), a main body (facts and ideas supporting major arguments), and conclusion (summing up what has been proved). It might be a good idea for teachers to present their students with this process by outlining an essay, beginning with an introduction containing a thesis and argument foreshadowing, a main body with at least four paragraphs explaining four major arguments substantiated with evidence, and a conclusion. The recommended way to walk students through essay planning would be to elicit an essay outline from them and transcribe it on the chalkboard in a whole class lesson. Get students to come up with a thesis statement from one of the schools, along with foreshadowing of four major arguments to support the thesis. Students could then find evidence in their notes (or in the reading) to substantiate the argument of at least one paragraph in the main body of this essay. They then could originate a final thesis, argument reviews, and concluding general statements. Subsequently, students may be broken into small groups (according to the historical school students ascribe to) to formulate their own outlines, brainstorm main argument, locate evidence, and think about concluding statements. During this group work session, the teacher could circulate to help each group. Teachers should assign every student to write his/her own thesis and foreshadowing statements, and pick which facts to use. For homework, students might be assigned to finish writing an introductory paragraph (thesis and foreshadowing) and continue their search for evidence for the main body.

4. The next day's class can begin with students divided into groups according to their historical school. The teacher can move around the class helping students reformulate their thesis statements and foreshadowing, if necessary, and assisting them to find critical facts from their reading which support their arguments. Teachers may wish to allow one or two students from each school of thought to present their arguments to the class in the form of a debate. This exercise might be of particular use to students who have difficulty either formulating their own positions or finding facts to support them. Meanwhile, the teacher might encourage each student to make a conference appointment in or out of class to review their progress with their essays. Time permitting, students benefit greatly from submitting and getting feedback on a first draft.

REFERENCES

Chapter 1: Was the United States a "Good Neighbor" to Cuba?

Any exploration of Cuban history might well begin with Hugh Thomas's voluminous *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); its 1500+ pages of text depict the events that shaped modern Cuba from the mid1700s. Another fine, and shorter, history of Cuba is James Suchlicki's *Cuba from Columbus to Castro* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974). A closer look at Cuba in the years of the struggle for independence is presented in Louis A. Perez's *Cuba Between Empires: 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983). A very thoughtful study of the evolution of U.S. policy toward Cuba from the 1850s can be found in Jules R. Benjamin's *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). U.S. policy toward Cuba at the time of the first intervention is set forth in detail in David F. Healy's *The United States and Cuba: 1898-1902* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).

The Spanish-American War is recounted in two outstanding histories, the photo-rich and readable *The Splendid Little War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959) by Frank B. Freidel and the more scholarly military study, *The War with Spain* (New York: Macmillan, 1981) by David F. Trask. A critical portrayal of the U.S. role in the first intervention is Philip S. Foner's *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). The domestic impact of this intervention is set forth by Gerald F. Linderman in *The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1974). Allan Reed Millet describes the second U.S. intervention in Cuba in *The Politics of Intervention* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1968). Louis A. Perez's *Cuba under the Platt Amendment: 1902-1934* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986) presents an insightful critique of this intervention.

Chapter 2: Should the United States Support Grau San Martín and the September Revolution?

The best book on the September 1933 revolution is *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972) by Luis E. Aguilar. This analysis focuses on the economic, political, and social events that culminated in the establishment and later overthrow of Grau's government. Another exploration of this upheaval, emphasizing the composition of the social forces in collision, can be found in Ramon Eduardo Ruiz's *The Making of a Revolution* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968). In *The Time of Decision* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), Sumner Welles recalls his tenure as special ambassador to Cuba. Ramón Grau San Martín gives his side of the story in *La Revolution Cubana Ante America* (Mexico City: Ediciones Del Partido Revolutionario Cubana, 1936). Ruby Hart Phillips's *Cuban Sideshow* (Havana: Cuban Press, 1935) is a colorful, anecdotal account of the revolution through the eyes of a *New York Times* correspondent.

Chapter 3: Should the United States Prevent Castro's Revolution in 1958?

This chapter draws on information from books written from a variety of perspectives. *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960) by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy offers a portrait of Cuban politics leading up to the culminating events of 1958 that is frankly sympathetic to the 26th of July Movement. Samuel Farber's *Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933-60* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1976) views Castro's overthrow of Batista as a missed opportunity for positive democratic change in Cuba. In *Red Star Over Cuba* (New York: Hillman Books, 1961), Nathaniel Weyl considers Castro's revolution as a tragic and ominous derailing of progressive social and economic development by a dictatorial demagogue. More idiosyncratic firsthand perceptions of the social revolution in Cuba may be found in the reporting of two *New York Times* correspondents, Herbert Matthew's *Cuban Story* (New York: George Braziller, 1961), and Ruby Hart Phillips's *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1958). Clearly, the most complete record of the actual events of the Cuban revolution is *The Cuban Insurrection: 1952-1959* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974). For a comprehensive, but highly critical, look at U.S. policy toward Cuba leading up to the arms embargo decision of 1958, see *Cuba and the United States* (Athens, GA: Univer-

sity of Georgia Press, 1990) by Louis A. Perez. Earl T. Smith's *The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution* (New York: Random House: 1962) offers a perspective on the Cuban revolution from the last U.S. ambassador to the Batista regime.

Batista justifies his policies in *The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic* (New York: Devan-Adair, 1964) and attributes his fall to an international communist conspiracy in *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962). He was also the subject of a fawning tribute, which nevertheless contains some interesting biographical detail, in *A Soldier Called Batista* (New York: Henry Holt, 1954) by Edmund A. Chester. Castro, of course, is famed as an author of lengthy speeches, many of which are collected in Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes' *Revolutionary Struggle: 1947-1958* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972). Luis Conte Aguero puts forth a favorable account of Castro's life from his university days to 1959 in *Fidel Castro, Vida and Obra* (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1959). *Paris-Match* correspondent Enrique Meneses's *Fidel Castro* (New York: Taplinger, 1966) paints a much darker picture of Castro. Finally, Tad Szulc has written an exhaustively documented, fairly evenhanded, and insightful Castro biography in *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Avon Books: 1986).

Chapter 4: Who Was Primarily Responsible for the Break in U.S.- Cuban Relations?

Several participants in the events leading to the break in relations between Cuba and the United States have written interesting personal accounts of the diplomatic falling out. Philip W. Bonsal, author of *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), was Washington's last ambassador to Cuba. Two former Castro officials give their own versions of the causes for the breakdown in relations in Andres Suarez's *Cuba: Castroism and Communism 1959-1960* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967) and Rufo Lopez-Fresquet's *My 14 Months with Castro* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing, 1966). Castro's speeches in Martin Kenner and James Petras's *Fidel Castro Speaks* (New York: Grove Press, 1969) articulate official Cuba's complaints about the United States.

Supporters and critics of the Castro revolution were quick to publish their opinions on the diplomatic conflict. Examples of the former are C. Wright Mills's *"Listen, Yankee": The Revolution in Cuba* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer's *Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere* (New York: Grove Press, 1963); and William Appleman Williams's *The United States, Cuba, and Castro* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962). Contemporary critics of Castro's behavior toward the United States include Theodore Draper in *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities* (New York: Thomas and Hudson, 1962) and Daniel James in *Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas* (New York: Avon Boos, 1961). Useful collections of documents from this period are Lester D. Langley's *The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1970) and Robert F. Smith's *What Happened in Cuba?* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1963). Excellent scholarly analyses of the break in relations are *Cuba vs. United States: The Politics of Hostility* (San Juan: Inter American University Press, 1981) by Lynn-Darrell Bender; *The Hovering Giant* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) by Cole Blasier; and *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985) by Richard E. Welch.

Chapters 5 and 6: Should President Kennedy Go Ahead with the Planned Invasion of Cuba by Cuban Exiles? and Should President Kennedy Order Sufficient Air Support to Insure Success of the Invasion?

Tad Szulc and Karl Meyer were the first journalists to relate the story of the Bay of Pigs in book form in *The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster* (New York: Praeger, 1962), and their account has a muckraking immediacy. Peter Wyden conducted many first-time interviews with invasion planners, participants, and opponents in order to write *Bay of Pigs* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), whereas Trumbull Higgins's *The Perfect Failure* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987) is noteworthy for the extensive research in U.S. policy he conducted to analyze the decision making of invasion planners.

Accounts of participants include Howard E. Hunt's *Give Us This Day* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1973), an account of the invasion based on his experiences as a CIA Brigade handler; Albert C. Persons's *Bay of Pigs* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1990), a memoir of a CIA contract pilot

who flew for the exile air force; and Haynes Johnson's collection of the stories of the exile invasion leadership in *The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964). Perhaps Castro himself best relates the perspective of the victors in his *Playa Giron—A Victory of the People* (Havana: Editorial en Marcha, 1961). Luis Aguilar's *Operation Zapata* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981) offers the planners' declassified testimony before the Taylor Commission. The best insider chronicle of the disaster is to be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s biography of the Kennedy Administration, *A Thousand Days* (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1965). Mario Lazo's *Dagger in the Heart* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968) is a scathing critique of the invasion from the point of view of exile politicians. Rafael del Pino has written a pro-Castro version of the failed attack in *Amanecer en Giron* (Havana: Instituto Cuban del Libro, 1969).

Chapter 7: Was the Stationing of Soviet Missiles in Cuba Justified?

Raymond L. Garthoff carefully explores the decision to send the missiles from the Cuban, Soviet, and U.S. perspectives in *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987). The most probing account of CIA covert operations against Castro is *The Fist Is Red* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) by Warren Hinckle and William W. Turner. As for information on events in Cuba between the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, Carmelo Mesa-Lago has assembled a fascinating collection of articles on transformations in various sectors of Cuban society in *Revolutionary Change in Cuba* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). Castro's decision to accept the missiles, recalled by the Cuban leader in the already mentioned Szulc biography, is further explored in a diplomatic context by Jorge I. Dominguez's *To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

Nikita Khrushchev gives his own version of the decision to base offensive missiles in Cuba with surprising frankness in *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970). Edward Crankshaw's *Khrushchev: A Career* (New York: Viking, 1966) examines his subject's motives in relation to Kremlin politics as well as Soviet foreign policies. Abram Chayes, legal advisor to Dean Risk, recounts how the legal case that the missile deployment was not justified was made in *The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987). Roger Hilsman, State Department intelligence director, outlines the U.S. position on the Soviet missiles in *To Move A Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967). For an argument holding the United States responsible for the presence of the missiles in Cuba, see Richard J. Walton's *Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Viking, 1972).

Chapter 8: Which Strategy Should President Kennedy Use to Remove the Soviet Missiles from Cuba?

Numerous autobiographies address the missile crisis decision-making: Robert F. Kennedy's *Thirteen Days* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), Dean Rusk's *As I Saw It* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), and McGeorge Bundy's *Danger and Survival* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990). Biographies important to understanding the crisis are Porter McKeever's *Adlai Stevenson* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), and Theodore C. Sorenson's *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

James G. Blight and David A. Welch have organized three conferences of participants in the crisis: some transcripts, synopses, and interviews from these meetings are available in *On the Brink* (New York: Noonday Press, 1989). Three marvelous collections of writings about the crisis are Robert A. Divine's book of U.S. multiple viewpoint articles, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Marcus Wiener, 1988); David L. Larson's selected documents and chronology, *The Cuban Crisis of 1962* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963); and Ronald R. Pope's *Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982). In addition, the Kennedy Library has produced a kit of documents, interviews, meeting transcripts, and notes, the *Cuban Missile Crisis Resource Unit* (Boston: JFK Library, 1984). Among the many histories of the crisis, three are particularly recommended: Elie Abel's eminently readable narrative, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1966); Graham T. Allison's study of crisis decision-making, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Her-

bert S. Dinerstein's exploration of Soviet policy, *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

Chapter 9: Should the United States Intervene in Latin America?

Since little recent historical research on the Dominican Republic in 1965 has been published, most of the available materials date from the 1960s. The best general history of the Dominican Republic is Selden Rodman's *Quisqueya* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1964). Those interested in investigating the pre-Trujillo period in depth should refer to Sumner Welles's classic *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic 1844-1924* (New York: Payson and Clark Ltd., 1928). A portrait of the Dominican economy, social structure, and political party system can be found in *The Dominican Republic – Nation in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1969) by Howard J. Wiarda. Two useful works on Trujillo are Wiarda's technical depiction of Trujillo's governmental system called *Dictatorship and Development: Methods of Control in Trujillo's Dominican Republic* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988) and Jesus de Galindez's *The Era of Trujillo* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973). While a doctoral candidate at Columbia, de Galindez, a Dominican exile, was kidnaped and allegedly personally executed by Trujillo in retaliation for this expose. Trujillo's own demise is exhaustively rendered in Bernard Diederich's *Trujillo – Death of the Goat* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

As for the 1965 uprising itself, the first works to be published were those of journalists who wrote pieces rich in on-the-spot detail and largely critical of the U.S. intervention. Dan Kurzman's *Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), Tad Szulc's *Dominican Diary* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), and Theodore Draper's *The Dominican Revolt* (New York: A Commentary Report, 1968) fall into this category. Juan Bosch gave his perspective on events leading up to the civil war in *The Unfinished Experiment* (New York: Praeger, 1964). John Bartlow Martin, who was Kennedy's and Johnson's emissary to the Dominican Republic, told the story of his ambassadorship in *Overtaken by Events* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966). Lastly, two scholars provide valuable insights into the 1965 intervention based on extensive interviews and research. In *Intervention and Negotiation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), Jerome Slater indicts U.S. intervention policy. Abraham F. Lowenthal in *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) is more interested in how U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was made.

Chapter 10: What was the Underlying Reason for U.S. Policy Toward Cuba?

John Higham with Leonard Krieger and Felix Gilbert produced in *History: The Development of Historical Studies in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965) an excellent general historiography of U.S. history. Other general historiographies include Michael Kraus's *The Writing Of American History* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953) and Harvey Wish's *The American Historian: A Social-Intellectual History of the Writing of the American Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960). To take a closer look at some pivotal American historians, see Marcus Cunliffe and Robin Winks, eds., *Pastmasters: Some Essays on American Historians* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). Oscar Handlin explores the shifting nature of historical proof in *Truth in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). Ian Tyrrell's *The Absent Marx* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) offers observations on the handling of social issues in U.S. historical writing. Recent trends in historical interpretation are examined in Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).

On diplomatic history per se, the best historiography arguably is a pamphlet by Alexander DeConde, *American Diplomatic History in Transformation* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1976). An exemplary nationalist version of U.S. diplomatic history is Dexter Perkins's *The American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). George F. Kennan presents the realist view of U.S. diplomacy in his watershed *American Diplomacy 1900-1950* (New York: Mentor Books, 1952). One of the pioneering New Left diplomatic histories is William A. Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Dell, 1959). For a critique of New Left methods and perspectives, consult Robert W. Tucker's *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

CHAPTER 1:
WAS THE UNITED STATES A "GOOD NEIGHBOR" TO CUBA?

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire; We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.[1]

U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root

Cuba is an island in chains. In chains because it was a colony and, as a consequence, had no other liberty than that which Spain would permit it to enjoy. In chains today, after conquering with bloodshed its independence. In chains today because the United States, while seeming to give Cuba complete and open exercise of her sovereignty [self-government], has locked that sovereignty in the chains of the Platt Amendment.[2]

Poet Marcelino Domingo

Introduction

The period 1898-1906 witnessed the United States' first and second interventions in Cuba, actions that have caused much controversy. But the story of U.S.-Cuban relations actually began in 1823 when, in a message to Congress, President Monroe warned European countries not to intervene in the Western hemisphere (North and South America).This Monroe Doctrine proclaimed an enduring theme in U.S. foreign policy: its role as exclusive protector and arbiter of Latin America. The first U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs occurred in 1898 when Cuba, one of the last Spanish colonies in the New World, was in the midst of a war against Spain for its independence. Many North Americans sympathized with the Cubans, who were suffering under Spanish tyranny; after much hestitation, the United States declared war on Spain. In the conflict that followed, the U.S. army and navy defeated Spain and engineered Cuba's post-war economic and political reconstruction. The United States reorganized Cuban independence in 1901 after the Cubans agreed to grant the United States both a naval base and the right to intervene in cases where the Cuban government could not protect property and liberty. The United States sent military forces to Cuba once again in 1906 at the request of the Cuban government, which was experiencing difficulties suppressing a revolt.

Politicians, diplomats, reporters, and scholars evaluated U.S. intervention in Cuba in the period 1898-1906. Many praised U.S. intervention, contending that the United States helped Cuba gain its independence from Spain in 1898, repair damages caused by the war, and write a democratic constitution. Others criticized the United States for defeating the Spanish and reconstructing post-war Cuba more for the benefit of North American investors than Cubans. Furthermore, the United States left Cuba with a constitution that allowed the United States to keep parts of Cuba and invade when it did not like what the Cuban government was doing. As you read more about U.S. actions in this chapter, keep these two views in mind. You will be asked to develop your own answer to the chapter question: Was the United States a "good neighbor" to Cuba?

The Monroe Doctrine

For some 160 years, U.S. policy toward Cuba has been influenced by the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine was pronounced by President James Monroe in 1823. The statement itself was issued in response to diplomatic moves made by Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria. The rulers of these countries, fearing that democratic revolutions in Latin America might spread to Europe, proposed to help Spain get its rebellious colonies back. Spain's former colonies, including Argentina, Chile, Colom-


GULF OF MEXICO
FLORIDA
Miami
Florida Keys
Key West
STRAITS of FLORIDA
BAHAMAS
Nassau
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Matanzas
Zapata Swamp
Pinar del Rio
Havana
Santa Clara
Cabo de San Antonio
Batabano
Gulf of Batabano
CUBA
Escambray Mts
Sierra Maestra Mts
TURKS and CAICOS ISLANDS
Merida
MEXICO
Cozumel
Gran Cristobal
Isle of Pines
Bay of Pigs
Cienfuegos
Camaguey
WINDWARD PASSAGE
CAYMAN ISLANDS
Sancti Spiritus
Guantanamo Bay
Cap Haitien
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Santo Domingo
Port au Prince
Montego Bay
Kingston
JAMAICA
Belmopan
Belize City
BELIZE
Swan Island
GUATEMALA
Guatemala City
HONDURAS
Tegucigalpa
EL SALVADOR
San Salvador
NICARAGUA
Lake Nicaragua
Managua
Bluefields
CARIBBEAN SEA
MONA PASSAGE
PUERTO RICO
COSTA RICA
San José
PANAMA
PANAMA CANAL
Cartagena
COLOMBIA
Lake Maracaibo
VENEZUELA

bia, and Mexico, had declared their independence when Napoleon invaded the mother country in 1808. Sporadic fighting between Spanish troops and rebels lasted for some ten years. Now their newly won freedom was about to be challenged by a combination of conservative European kings, the Holy Alliance, who planned to send an international expeditionary corps of soldiers to South America to suppress the rebellion and reinstall Spanish military and political control of the region.

President Monroe's response to this threat was to state U.S. policy in a unilateral (one-sided) declaration in December 1823. The United States, Monroe said, would look upon the attempt of European powers to "extend their system" in Latin America as an "unfriendly disposition (stance) toward the United States." In the diplomatic language of the day, this was a warning that the United States might use force to stop these four rulers from invading the Americas to take independence away from neighbors to the south, and perhaps to threaten North American freedom as well.

Fortunately, the United States never had to match its words with actions. The four monarchies had too little at stake in the New World to engage in war with the United States over Spain's colonies. The crisis passed, and for the next 80 years the United States was too absorbed in extending its frontiers to the Pacific Ocean to pay much attention to foreign affairs or the Monroe Doctrine.

U.S. Interest in Cuba

At the time the Monroe Doctrine was issued, Cuba and Puerto Rico were the only colonies in the Western hemisphere that Spain had not lost. Cuba was an island blessed with a mild climate, fertile soil, and rich deposits of nickel and coal. The Spanish had held Cuba for more than 300 years. They had replaced the Indian population of Cuba with slaves brought from Africa.

Only 90 miles from the United States, Cuba had often been the object of plans to expand U.S. national territory. Before the Civil War, many New York and New England merchants engaged in the sugar trade with Cuba. Southerners hoped to buy the island from Spain and bring it into the Union as a slave state. After the Civil War, North American bankers and industrialists saw Cuba as a fine place to invest money and to sell U.S. products. Even after slavery was abolished in the 1880s, Cuba's large sugar plantations were worked by gangs of poor, black workers under the watchful eyes of overseers employed primarily by wealthy Spanish landowners.

Cuba in Revolt

In the 1860s, Cubans rebelled against Spain's dictatorial rule. After much loss of life and property, the rebellion was put down, but the Spanish failed to make promised reforms and unrest continued. In 1895, another rebellion began. Initially caused by low sugar prices, the rebellion grew in intensity. The rebels called for freedom from Spain and a better life for the people of Cuba. Unable to defeat Spanish troops in pitched battles, the rebels decided to make it unprofitable for the Spanish to hold onto Cuba. This strategy called for the deliberate destruction of sugar cane fields, homes of the rich, factories, bridges, railroads, and public buildings.

The Spanish retaliated by herding Cubans into stockades called *reconcentrados*. Here the Spaniards could isolate the citizens from the revolutionaries, who were waging guerrilla warfare in the countryside. This tactic caused increased suffering. Nearly 400,000 Cubans were forced into the concentration-camp-like stockades. Entire families were forced to live in huts no more than 10 by 15 feet in size. Food, clean water, medicine, and sanitary facilities were in very short supply. The results were horrible to behold, as Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont reported to Congress:

> Conditions are unmentionable in every respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half have died, and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved? A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms and chest terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen [stomach] bloated to three times the natural size.[3]

The United States Goes to War to Free Cuba

For three years, the U.S. press carried sensational stories of the conditions in Cuba. North Americans were horrified by what they read and sympathized with the Cubans, whose struggle reminded them of the American Revolution. Many in the United States were eager to see Spain entirely banished from the Americas. War between the United States and Spain might yet have been avoided except for the destruction of a U.S. Navy battleship on a goodwill mission to Cuba. While anchored in Havana harbor, the *U.S.S. Maine* suddenly exploded on February 15, 1898; 260 U.S. sailors died. Though there was no proof, most of the U.S. press assumed the explosion was caused by a Spanish mine. The report of an investigation conducted by the Spanish, sent to President William McKinley on April 2, claimed the explosion was triggered by coal dust in the ship's engine room. This report did little to convince public opinion that Spain was not the guilty party.

Nine days later, President McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. The reasons for going to war, as outlined by the president, were Spain's savage killing of Cubans, harm to U.S. sailors and citizens, and injury to U.S.-Cuban trade and business. McKinley also informed Congress that Spain had agreed to an impartial investigation of the *Maine* disaster and had communicated an intention to end the fighting in Cuba for an indefinite period of time.

After deliberating for eight days, Congress declared war on Spain. Along with that declaration, the U.S. Congress passed an amendment named after its sponsor, Senator Henry Teller. The Teller Amendment committed the United States to free Cuba from Spain and "to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The U.S. war to free Cuba had some unexpected results. The shooting war against Spain started on May 1, 1898. On that day, Commodore George Dewey attacked the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the Spanish colony of the Philippines – a 16,000-mile sea journey from Cuba. After destroying the outmanned and outmoded Spanish ships, the United States brought Emilo Aguinaldo, a Filipino revolutionary, to Manila. Aguinaldo was encouraged to start a revolution against the Spanish, which he did. Two months later, U.S. soldiers arrived in Manila. They elbowed Aguinaldo aside and accepted the surrender of Manila from the Spanish. Later the U.S. army fought Aguinaldo's revolutionaries for three



The *U.S.S. Maine* sails into Havana harbor in February 1898. (National Archives)

years because he refused to agree to U.S. control of the Philippines. At the December 1898 peace talks with the Spanish in Paris, the United States officially acquired the Philippines.

In the meantime, U.S. forces enjoyed equal success over Spanish forces in Cuba. As at Manila, the U.S. navy had no trouble with the Spanish fleet, sinking their Atlantic squadron on July 3, 1898, off Santiago, Cuba, with the loss of only one North American sailor. Theodore (Teddy) Roosevelt, followed by his Rough Rider cavalrymen, charged up San Juan Hill and gained control of the highlands above Santiago. Realizing they could not resupply their troops in Santiago, the Spanish surrendered some 200,000 men to a U.S. force of 18,000 supported by Cuban revolutionaries on July 16. Spain quickly sued for peace, and a ceasefire was declared on August 12.

After the War: Cleaning Up and the Platt Amendment

Easy victories in Cuba and the Philippines did a great deal for U.S. morale. Secretary of State John Hay called the conflict "a splendid little war" and the name stuck. With a characteristic "can do" attitude, North Americans pitched in to repair the damage caused by three years of bloody warfare. A partial listing of U.S. post-war assistance to Cuba includes ending yellow fever epidemics, paying the Cuban revolutionary army, distributing food and clothing to thousands of needy families, organizing courts, and reestablishing city and town governments. U.S. occupation authorities also opened schools, freed political prisoners, got lands back into cultivation, restocked herds of cattle, dredged Havana harbor, built docks, and constructed bridges, highways, and railroads.

The United States also took a special interest in Cuba's government. In 1900 U.S. administrators organized a constitutional convention for Cuba. Cubans responded by writing a constitution that provided for a president, congress, and supreme court with a system of checks and balances. The fact that the Cubans had modeled their frame of government on the U.S. Constitution was not enough to reassure Secretary of State Elihu Root, however. He claimed to be concerned that in the future Cuba might be taken over by a foreign power hostile to the United States. The Cubans were thus required to add parts of a clause from a U.S. military appropriations bill, the Platt Amendment, to their constitution. This Amendment, sponsored in Congress by Senator Orville Platt, stipulated that Cuba limit its dealings with foreign nations so as not to endanger its independence. In addition, Cubans gave the United States the right to intervene in their country if their government could not protect life, liberty, and property. Furthermore, Cuba had to lease the United States lands for a naval base at Guantánamo Bay to guard the approaches to an anticipated canal across the Central American isthmus at Panama.

When the Cubans complained that the Platt Amendment was depriving them of their right to self-government, Secretary Root said that these constitutional additions were intended to protect Cuba. He refused to withdraw U.S. troops until Platt Amendment provisions were adopted. The Cubans complied, and U.S. troops left Cuba in 1902.

The first Cuban president was Tómas Estrada Palma, who was elected in 1902 and served until 1906. His presidency was marked by continued recovery from war damages and by a competent and honest administration. Palma negotiated a trade agreement with the United States through which Cuban sugar was charged a 20 percent lower tariff than sugar from other countries, practically guaranteeing Cuba's access to the U.S. sugar market for years to come. Goods from the United States were granted a similarly low tariff, assuring the United States easy access to Cuban markets.

Amidst allegations of fraud in the elections of December 1905, widespread rioting broke out against his government and President Estrada Palma appealed for American intervention. Though President Roosevelt was reluctant to send troops to Cuba once more, he capitulated in 1906. U.S. soldiers then returned to Cuba, establishing a government in Havana under the direction of the governor of the Panama Canal Zone, Charles E. Magoon. North American troops were to withdraw three years later, after new elections were held and a new Cuban government was formed.

Good or Bad Neighbor?

Some analysts have argued that the United States acted out of generosity and democratic idealism to help Cuba achieve independence and stability. Others have felt that U.S. actions were motivated by selfish economic and strategic interests, undercutting Cuban sovereignty. In the period 1898 to 1906, was the United States a good or bad neighbor to Cuba?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - Monroe Doctrine
    - two rebellions
    - rebel strategy
    - Proctor Report
    - *U.S.S. Maine*
    - Spanish report on the *Maine*
    - McKinley war message
    - Teller Amendment
    - Emilio Aguinaldo
    - Teddy Roosevelt
    - North America's help to Cuba
    - Platt Amendment
    - Estrada Palma's agreement with the United States
    - intervention of 1906
2. Explain the basic reasons for the U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1898.
3. Make a case for one of the following:

    a. The United States was basically a good neighbor to Cuba between 1898 and 1906.

    or

    b. The United States was basically a bad neighbor to Cuba between 1898 and 1906.
4. Read Documents 1 and/or 2, as assigned by your teacher, to support your argument regarding whether the United States was basically a good or bad neighbor to Cuba.

Sources

1. Allan Reed Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 64.
2. Mario Gill, *Cuba Si! Yanquis No!* (Mexico City: Prensa Latina, 1960), p. 49.
3. Leonard Levy, *Major Crisis in American History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), pp. 174-76.

MAP EXERCISE

On the blank map, fill in the names of the following countries, cities, and geographic features. Make sure each word is spelled correctly; use arrows if necessary to point to the right location.

Countries and Capitals

Bahamas/Nassau
Belize/Belmopan
Bermuda/Hamilton
Costa Rica
Colombia/Bogota
Cuba/Havana
Dominican Republic/Santo Domingo
El Salvador/San Salvador
Guatamala*
Haiti/Port au Prince
Honduras/Tegucigalpa
Jamaica/Kingston
Mexico*
Nicaragua/Managua
Puerto Rico/San Juan
Panama/Panama City
United States*
Venezuela/Caracas

Geographic Features

Atlantic Ocean
Caribbean Sea
Cayman Islands
Florida Keys
Gulf of Mexico
Jamaica Channel
Panama Canal
Straits of Florida
Swan Island
Windward Passage

Cuban Geographic Features

Bay of Pigs
Cabo San Antonio
Escambray Mountains
Guantánamo Bay
Gulf of Batabano
Jardines de la Reina
Isle of Pines
Mona Passage
Sierra Maestra
Zapata Peninsula
Zapata Swamps

Cuban Cities and Towns

Camaguey
Cienfuego
Cristobal
Holguin
Matanzus
Pina del Rio
Santiago de Cuba
Santa Clara
Trinidad

*Capital city is not on the map.



Manuel Sanguily: The Chains of the Platt Amendment

Noted Cuban politician/scholar Manuel Sanguily was consulted by students from a Kansas teachers college on the issue of U.S. annexation of Cuba. In this excerpt from his letter to a Kansas team member, Sanguily criticized the United States for imposing the Platt Amendment on the writers of the Cuban constitution. What were his criticisms of this action?

* * * * *

Who is going to speak of the prejudice and lack of respect with which the United States has, for its own benefit and security, settled relations now and for the foreseeable future with the "Cuban Republic," apparently without violence or international controversy? I don't have the time to dwell on this interesting aspect of the problem, much less on its origins, or on the actual way the United States, in "provisionally" governing us at this very moment, exercises the powers given it by the Platt Amendment. This supposedly Cuban constitutional clause was actually dictated to us by your Congress. We were persuaded, or rather obligated, to make it part of our constitution....

Nothing can convince me that the "autonomy" of Cuba under the Americans is true sovereignty [self-rule]. Nor do I believe that the Platt Amendment affords us protection against revolutions, for an evil and oppressive government can simply provoke them. How could the small native population of a Cuba that is suddenly flooded with rich foreigners, not be a little scornful, spiteful, and determinedly defiant when they are poor and generally hungry? Nor do I understand how giving the vote to the Cuban people, whom you seem to think are selfish, ungrateful, and unlikeable, can be viewed as a threat to Cuban independence. Moreover, I find it hard to believe that it is particularly patriotic to summon foreigners (i.e., the United States) to maintain the security and confidence of capital, when much of this capital has already fallen into the hands of these very foreigners. In fact, this property was snatched away from us by force. When will we Cubans have sufficient protection from the intrigue, fraud, and slander that has been imposed on us by what you call "The Protectorate"? Yet another link riveted in the chains of the Platt Amendment is the lie that the delegates of the Cuban Constituent Convention supported adoption of the Amendment. Indeed, the Americans seemed not to be aware that this Amendment was actually tearing our guts out.

La Luncha Anti-Imperialista en Cuba, vol. 1 (Havana: Editora Popular de Cuba y del Caribe, 1960), p. 120.

Document 2

John Kendrick Bangs: To Nurse the Sickly Child Back to Life

John Kendrick Bangs was a former U.S. Army officer who traveled to Havana in 1901 to survey the impact of the U.S. occupation of Cuba. His observations were first printed as a column in Harper's Weekly *and later incorporated into the book* Uncle Sam Trustee, *from which this excerpt was taken. Name five of the services the United States had performed for Cuba during the first intervention.*

* * * * *

Uncle Sam had rescued a helpless child from the hands of a brutal father. It now became his office to nurse the sickly infant back to health again, to start him on the road to prosperity until such time as he should be able to care for his own. Uncle Sam neighbor had been transformed into Uncle Sam Trustee....

To sum the whole story up, Uncle Sam may felicitate himself on the facts that he found Cuba unhealthy and he leaves her healthy; he found her without an adequate system of charities and hospitals and he leaves her a well established one; he found her without schools and he leaves her with a good law school and a good school system established; he found the island teeming with beggars and with an empty treasury; he leaves it without beggars, its people with enough to eat and with a reserve of about a million and a half dollars in the treasury. He found her without any knowledge of popular elections and without an electoral law; he has given her both. He found the insane without any systematic treatment whatsoever, caged up like animals; he leaves them assembled in one large hospital under the best available treatment. He found her prisons indescribably bad and leaves them as good as the average prisons in his country. He has built up a good system of sanitary supervision throughout the island. He has built and put into commission a small fleet of coast guard launches or revenue cutters. He has collected the revenues at a figure which compares favorably with the cost of collection in the United States. He has buoyed the harbors and has added very largely to the lighthouses and lights on the island. An immense amount of road and bridge building has been done. He has organized a system of civil service for the municipal police throughout the island in order to protect them in their rights and secure them from arbitrary dismissal. He has enlisted, equipped, trained, and throughly established a Rural Guard which will compare favorably with any similar force, and not over one percent of those employed to help him in his work come from within his own borders. For the first time in history, the carpet-bagger in a situation of this kind has been held in subjection, and every penny of the Trust has been administered for the benefit of the ward.

If Cuba in the remotest hour of the remotest century to come forgets this service and the names of these men who have rendered it, then will she be guilty of an ingratitude which is inconceivable, and to be likened only to the serpent, who, warmed by the fire of her benefactor, turned and stung the hand that brought him back to life.

John Kendrick Bangs, *Uncle Sam Trustee* (New York: Riggs Publishing Company, 1903), p. 342.

CHAPTER 2: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT GRAU SAN MARTÍN AND THE SEPTEMBER 1933 REVOLUTION?

I have dictated some laws which are beneficial for the entire country....I have never submitted to any foreign embassy....I have tried to benefit the people, and I have used a firm hand against big companies.[1]

Cuban President Ramón Grau San Martín

I agree with former Ambassador Welles as to the inefficiency, ineptitude, and unpopularity with the better classes of the de facto government. It is supported only by the army and the ignorant masses who have been misled by utopian [unrealistically idealistic] promises.[2]

U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Jefferson Caffery

Introduction

As you shall see, the September Revolution of 1933 was brought on by the Great Depression in the United States, but the causes of this crisis predated that economic collapse. From the time of the second intervention, Cuban democracy had been in decline, culminating in the rise of a general-politician, Gerardo Machado, who initially won support with his public works programs. In the 1920s Cuba had experienced many years of rapid economic growth. U.S. bankers and businessmen invested heavily in Cuba's sugar-dominated economy, attracted, in part, by Machado's anti-labor policies. However, hard economic times contributed to the growth of political opposition to Machado. He responded with increasingly dictatorial methods such as torture and assassination of critics. The resulting widespread dissatisfaction created such instability that the United States sent Ambassador Sumner Welles to engineer Machado's resignation.

In the subsequent confusion, students and army supporters proclaimed Ramón Grau San Martín, a university professor, president in September 1933. The pro-business policies of Machado were replaced by calls for an eight-hour day and confiscation of property belonging to U.S. citizens. Throughout the autumn of 1933, workers struck, anti-Grau politicians rebelled, students rioted, and tenant farmers seized land. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt had to decide whether to give diplomatic recognition to the Grau government. Grau's supporters argued for U.S. recognition because Grau's policies would help a large percentage of the Cuban people and bring about necessary changes in Cuba's economy. Welles opposed Grau because he had not been elected and did not seem to be able to end Cuban instability. Welles urged Roosevelt to withhold recognition until a leader who could restore order and a more favorable business climate emerged. Which estimate of Grau San Martín's government is closer to the truth? Why should the U.S. support or refuse to support Grau's government?

The United States and Cuban Politics

The second U.S. intervention in Cuba (in 1906 at the request of the Palma government) had served two purposes. It had a stabilizing and a demoralizing impact on Cuban politics. Governor Charles Magoon, installed by U.S. intervention forces, set up a modern Cuban army and civil service, built a new sewage system for Havana, and drew up a body of laws to regulate courts, local government, and elections. Many Cubans were disillusioned, however, by both the failure of their first attempt at self-government and reliance on North American problem-solvers. Demoralization was widespread in Cuban politics, where, for the next decade and a half, cynicism and corruption were the norm. (Corruption was also a problem in the United States at this time, particularly in the governments of large cities.)

From 1909 to 1925, Cuban democracy was in a state of decline. Control of the presidency tended to alternate between the Conservative and Liberal parties. Despite differing slogans, these two parties seemed to be mainly dedicated to the same goal – distribution of public offices and funds among their supporters. This patronage, accompanied by graft, election fraud, and soaring public debt, characterized Cuban politics. Political stagnation was occasionally interrupted by the armed revolts of discontented groups; such revolts always raised the question of U.S. intervention.

After 1909, the policy of the U.S. government was to avoid the active intervention in Cuban affairs permitted under the Platt Amendment. Instead, the United States used a policy called "preventive intervention." U.S. diplomats sought to influence Cuban politics in order to diminish the necessity of military intervention. By advising Cuban presidents on such matters as government spending, elections, and political reforms, U.S. emissaries [representatives of the U.S. government] hoped to head off internal conflict that one day might lead to a request for U.S. troops. At times, merely the threat of sending in the Marines was enough to prevent revolts. Notwithstanding this policy of intervention restraint, U.S. presidents still saw fit to send troops into Cuba twice between 1909 and 1925 to protect "life, property, and individual liberty" because of revolts.

Cuba's Economy

During the first 15 years under the Platt Amendment, U.S. business interests in Cuba grew dramatically. In 1902 U.S. trade with Cuba amounted to 27 million dollars. In 1917 trade between the two countries topped 430 million dollars. Three reasons for this escalation in trade were (1) the World War I British blockade of the European countries that produced sugar beets; (2) the effect of a mutually advantageous trade treaty negotiated with the United States by the Palma government that lowered tariff restrictions between the two countries; (3) the security financiers felt about funds invested in Cuba because the U.S. could intervene to protect their property.

The growth of U.S. business in Cuba had several consequences. Foreign investments paid for construction of sugar mills, mines, railroads, and power plants. Partially because of the bad investments made by Cuban businessmen and farmers, the ownership of many of these companies fell into the hands of North American banks. The good news was that the Cuban sugar industry boomed, bringing millions of dollars in profits into the Cuban economy. The bad news was that Cuba became essentially

Cuban canecutter at work on a plantation. (National Archives)

a one-crop exporter dependent primarily upon the ups and downs of the U.S. sugar market. Cubans won favorable sugar tariff cuts from the United States. In exchange, U.S. goods received equal treatment at Cuban ports, thereby limiting the growth of Cuba's domestic industries.

Many Cuban sugar cane growers began to look to the government for protection from foreign, and especially U.S.-owned, mills that bought up their land at an alarming rate. Cuban agriculture increasingly became dominated by a small number of planters, often foreigners, who controlled vast estates. They went so far as to bring laborers to Cuba from Haiti and Jamaica because these field hands would work for less money than native canecutters. This drove down wages and caused further hardships for Cuban workers.

Gerardo Machado

In 1925, General Gerardo Machado was inaugurated as President of Cuba. A careful and ambitious politician, Machado ran on a platform calling for public works, political reform, and repeal of the Platt Amendment clause in the Cuban constitution. At first, Machado's presidency won widespread support. Working people liked his public construction program, nicknamed "Water, Roads, and Schools." He attempted to protect and foster new local industry and to assure higher profits for Cuban sugar cane growers. Businessmen were pleased that Machado sent over 300 union organizers out of the country. Because he had been a manager of a foreign-owned public utilities company, Machado had the enthusiastic backing of the U.S. business community. He invited U.S. corporations to invest in Cuba and promised he would protect them "at all hazards." Consequently, North American bankers lent Machado's government nearly 50 million dollars within a year of his taking power.

Machado, however, harbored ambitions that caused him to regret his campaign promise to serve only one term in office. In 1927-1928 he worked out a deal with cooperative politicians in Cuba's legislature to rewrite the constitution so he could remain president until 1935. Many Cubans and foreigners had profited from Machado's public works programs, suppression of radical unionists, and toleration of graft, so there was little outcry at first over his increasingly dictatorial behavior. U.S. companies with close to 1 billion dollars invested in Cuba had few complaints about the government. Machado went out of his way to pass laws that favored such U.S.-owned utilities as the electric and telephone companies as well as railroad, street cars, and bus companies with low taxes and the right to take over Cuban property. U.S. support of Machado was underlined by President Coolidge, who visited Havana in 1928. Coolidge declared that "it is a privilege to be able to participate in the noble vision of President Machado."[3]

Nevertheless, many others were beginning to voice and act on their dissatisfaction with Machado's authoritarian rule. University of Havana students merged all campus organizations into the anti-Machado Student Directory to protest the president's brutal suppression of university reform efforts. Nationalist intellectuals attacked Machado's backing of foreign-owned business. Disgruntled politicians joined together in the National Union party to take action against Machado's cancellation of elections. Labor unions were angry about Machado's suppression of strikes and his exile and even murder of labor activists. As long as Cuba remained prosperous, however, opposition groups were disorganized, disunited, and ineffective.

The Revolution of 1933

Economic difficulties then conspired to strengthen the hand of Machado's critics. By 1929 a rise in U.S. tariffs and competition from other sugar producers led to a 75 percent drop in sugar prices. This meant lowered prices on all goods, reduced salaries, and lost jobs throughout Cuba. The New York stock market crash of 1929 and the collapse of U.S. lending banks made it difficult for Machado to borrow money, thereby ending the public works programs that employed many Cubans. Soon the basic structural weakness in the Cuban economy, its overreliance on sugar, was revealed. Sugar mills closed, unemployment climbed, businesses went bankrupt, and the government was forced to raise taxes.

A chorus of angry protests rose steadily. Machado's response to political unrest was increasingly highhanded and violent. After he suspended constitutional guarantees in June 1932, police and hired toughs attacked union picket lines, tortured student demonstrators, and assassinated newspaper critics. In retaliation, student and middle class revolutionaries bombed police stations, machine-gunned pro-Machado politicians, and organized uprisings in the countryside.

In May 1933, newly elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to mediate the crisis in Cuba. Roosevelt had established a doctrine of non-intervention in Latin America, which he called the "Good Neighbor" policy. He was concerned about the unrest in Cuba, especially because of Cuba's crucial strategic position on the sea route approaches to the Panama Canal. After assessing the strength and extent of the opposition to Machado by unionists, businessmen, students, and U.S. investors, Welles concluded that this president-turned-dictator should resign. Beset by a general strike in Havana, rebellion in the army, and Roosevelt's loss of confidence, Machado submitted his resignation. He was replaced by Cuba's Secretary of State (and former ambassador to the United States) Manuel Céspedes. Some of Machado's opponents joined the Céspedes government at Welles' urging.

Still, many Cubans opposed Céspedes because his government of relatively moderate and unknown politicians (the so-called "cabinet of shadows") offered no commitment for thoroughgoing reform. Radical students began calling for a reorganization of Cuba's economy by nationalizing banks and sugar mills, breaking up large estates, limiting foreign investment, and rejecting the right of the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs. An army sergeants' rebellion, led by Fulgencio Batista, placed the military behind student demands. Batista had risen from headquarter stenographer to de facto commander of the army on the basis of his skills as a public speaker, intelligence, and ability to capitalize on the discontent of Cuban soldiers. Now this new player on Cuba's political stage threw his support to the students, hoping to be backed in turn against the officers who were trying to regain command of the army.

Grau San Martín

Faced with the loss of support of the army, Céspedes resigned. On September 9, 1933, a new government, supported by radical students and the army, was swept into power. The student-appointed president was Ramón Grau San Martín, a doctor and university professor who had demonstrated courage and decisiveness in the struggle for reform at the University of Havana. Now Grau put forward a daring program of national reform. By decree he

- Guaranteed the right to strike and urged all professions to unionize.
- Established the eight-hour day (at a time when most Cubans worked ten to twelve hours a day) and banned wholesale importation of foreign workers.
- Abolished the Platt Amendment and stated his opposition to foreign investment in Cuba.
- Opened Havana University to poor students by means of government scholarships.
- Declared that peasant tenants now had title to the large plantation lands they rented.
- Lowered bank interest rates and suspended payment on loans that Machado had taken out from U.S. banks.
- Seized two U.S.-owned sugar mills that had been closed due to labor unrest and (because of rate disputes and labor problems) temporarily took over the U.S.-owned Cuban Electric Company.

However, Grau seemed unable to make peace with opposing political forces and bring stability to Cuba. Grau's student backers were unwilling to bring the old politicians of the Machado era into the cabinet in order to rally business support for the government. The middle class revolutionaries, whom Welles had originally favored as a potential governing party, thought Grau was unrealistically idealistic and took up arms against the government. On November 8, middle class revolutionaries (who thought

Grau's revolution was too extreme) and the Cuban Air Force attempted to overthrow the Grau government, only to be defeated in a bloody pitched battle. Strikes, land seizures, and anti-Grau shootings and bombings continued to disrupt the country. Businessmen and landowners claimed that Grau was planning to create a communist state. Fulgencio Batista, the ambitious leader of the sergeants' revolt, now wavered in his commitment to Grau's social reforms. He received secret encouragement to consider overthrowing Grau from Welles. Grau, however, felt that the main cause for this continuing instability was Welles' plotting with the opposition and U.S. refusal to recognize his government. "Everyone in the country would support the government," he asserted, "if the United States would accord [grant] recognition."[4]

Should the United States Recognize Grau?

U.S. leaders could not at first decide whether to recognize Grau San Martín's government. It was true that Grau had not been elected, but had come to power on the acclaim of his student supporters. Welles was quick to point out that Grau was not a conventional politician and thus had not built up a following among either the propertied upper classes, middle class revolutionaries, or the workers. Nor was he able immediately to bring order to the country, which was troubled by continuing strikes, peasant takeovers of plantations, political conspiracies, and military unrest. Moreover, some of Grau's decrees were, to say the least, not in the interests of wealth-producing businesses, especially foreign-owned ones. Indeed, Welles warned that

> It is... within the bounds of possibility that the social revolution which is underway cannot be checked. American properties and interests are being gravely prejudiced and the material damage to such properties will in all probability be very great.[5]

Moreover, Welles feared that with repeal of the Platt Amendment, Grau might begin to demand that the United States turn its navy base at Guantánamo over to Cuba. Such an action would be detrimental to U.S. defense of the Panama Canal and the southern seaboard. Welles argued adamantly that Grau San Martín was an impractical idealist who could not control the country and that the United States ought to withhold recognition of his government until some more reliable and effective politician, like army head Fulgencio Batista, took over.

Others thought that the United States ought to recognize Grau's government. They believed that Grau was addressing the problems faced by such ordinary Cubans as tenant farmers, canecutters, workers, and students. The former governments, they thought, had been primarily interested in helping Cuban and North American businessmen and investors. Furthermore, they agreed with Grau that it was time to end the U.S. domination of Cuba's economy and politics. The continuing disorder in Cuba, they argued, was simply the natural consequence of the difficult, but welcome, birth of real Cuban democracy. Grau's supporters urged the United States to throw its considerable influence behind Cuban reform by recognizing his government.

President Roosevelt had a difficult decision to make: Should the United States withhold recognition from Grau and encourage Batista to take over on the grounds that Grau is an "unrealistic idealist" unfriendly to American interests? Or should the United States recognize and support Grau's government because he is a reformer who will bring about necessary social and economic changes in Cuba?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
   - Ramón Grau San Martín
   - Jefferson Caffery
   - Charles Magoon
   - demoralization

- "preventive intervention"
- U.S. investments in Cuba
- Gerardo Machado
- Machado's critics
- economic difficulties
- Sumner Welles
- Grau's decrees
- opposing political forces
- Fulgencio Batista
- social revolution
- reasons for recognizing Grau

2. Describe the role played by the United States in Cuba from 1906 to 1930.

3. Make a case for one of the following:

a. The United States should withhold recognition for the government of Ramón Grau San Martín to get a government that maintains public order and establishes a more positive economic climate.

or

b. The United States should recognize and support the Grau San Martín government because it will end U.S. domination of Cuba and help the Cuban people.

4. Read documents 3 and/or 4, as assigned by your teacher, to support your argument, regarding whether the United States should recognize the government of Grau San Martín.

Sources

1. Luis Aguilar, *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), p. 227.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

5. Letter from Sumner Welles to Cordell Hull, September 18, 1933, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 447-48.

Ambassador Sumner Welles: Disastrously Incompetent

Sumner Welles served as a U.S. emissary to Latin American countries for more than three decades. In 1933 President Roosevelt sent Welles to Cuba to mediate the political crisis caused by the collapse of the Machado regime. Why, according to Welles, was the provisional government of Grau San Martin not deserving of U.S. recognition?

* * * * *

Unfortunately, disorders increased both in number and in gravity. The new provisional government, while proclaiming its intention of helping the common man and while promulgating a series of decrees providing for better conditions for the working classes appeared to be completely incapable of maintaining even a semblance of public order. Property after property was seized by groups of workers, and industry was generally forced to shut down. Opportunity for employment naturally ceased. The government seemed to overlook the fact that the bettered conditions for Cuban labor which it had decreed necessarily would remain theoretical while plantations and industries remained in the control of the workers and no opportunity for actual employment existed. Sporadic minor rebellions broke out in various parts of the republic. By the end of November a seriously anarchic condition had once more arisen.

The open minded expectation with which the majority of the Cuban people had at first regarded the new government soon crystallized into a studied opposition. None of the established political parties, none of the commercial or business interests, no responsible labor organization, and only a few of the members of the professional classes supported the government....I have always felt that, in view of the existence at that time of the Treaty of 1901, which granted this government the right to intervention in Cuba, and only because of that fact, the United States would have been derelict in its obligations to the Cuban people themselves had it given official support to a de facto regime which, in its considered judgment, was not approved by the great majority of the Cuban people, and which had shown itself so disastrously incompetent in every branch of public administration.

Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1944), p. 199. Copyright 1944 by Sumner Welles. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.

Document 4

President Ramón Grau San Martín: To Help My Destitute Countrymen

Ramón Grau San Martín was a distinguished professor who had led the opposition to Machado at the University of Havana. In September 1933 a coalition of revolutionaries named him president of Cuba. Why did Grau think that previous Cuban governments had not truly represented the Cuban people? How was Grau's government different?

* * * * *

With explosive rapidity North American capitalism established itself as arbiter of the social, political, and economic life of the Republic...In the social order, the big sugar planter and the actions of foreign corporations have excluded Cubans from ownership of the means of production and the enjoyments of property. The proletarian masses have been subjected to a feudal regime and a low standard of living because of the importation of masses of field workers, subjected to hard exploitation with the goal of lowering wages. The triple action, political, social, and economic, of the penetration of North American capitalism has begun to contaminate the foundations of our national identity. In this way the Republic, created by the Constitution of 1901, was only a mere legal fiction....

(When we came to power) we were faced with a situation full of difficulties. We did not abide by the Constitution of 1901 because it contained the Platt Amendment. We swore our allegiance directly to the people, making it clear at that time that we recognized no other authority than that which originated from the people of Cuba. The traditional political parties, docile instruments of immorality, were declared illegal. Many measures to reduce the cost of living and make conditions better for the people were put into practice. Our governmental methods were revolutionary. We did not have other alternatives. Before me swelled the immense cry of the dispossessed, and out of humanity and patriotism, I had to help my destitute countrymen.

Ramón Grau San Martín, *La Revolución Cubana Ante America* (Mexico City: Edicciones Del Partido Revolucionario Cubana, 1936), p. 97.

CHAPTER 3:
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PREVENT CASTRO'S REVOLUTION IN 1958?

Look, the Cuban people want something more than a simple change of command. Cuba longs for a radical change in every aspect of its political and social life. The people must be given something more than liberty and democracy in abstract; decent living must be given to every Cuban.[1]

Fidel Castro

Despite Cuba's obvious prosperity and advanced labor, educational and social welfare institutions, it was alleged that her underdeveloped condition called for revolution. This came as an unbelievable shock to those of us who...battled constantly for better health, more education and culture, and higher standards of living for the people.[2]

Fulgencio Batista

Introduction

A social revolution occurs when a government rapidly takes money, property, and power from the middle and upper classes in a country. The government then reorganizes the country economically and socially so as to benefit the lower classes. On the positive side, a social revolution can offer many poor people a chance to better their living and working conditions. On the negative side, such revolutions are often accomplished only at the price of bloodshed and upheaval and often lead to political dictatorship.

Those who believe a social revolution was necessary in Cuba in the 1950s point to the continuing poverty of the average citizen, long after Cuba gained its independence from Spain. These critics blame Cuba's dependence on sugar exports, its underemployed and landless peasantry, and U.S. economic and political influence for the failure of Cuba's wealth to trickle down to Cuban peasants and workers.

Those who argue against the necessity for a Cuban social revolution deny that Cuba's social and economic conditions justified radical change. These advocates cite the growth of Cuba's economy, the vitality of its labor movement, and its progressive social laws and programs as proof that Cuba did not need a social revolution. They usually argue that the United States helped rather than hindered Cuban development.

After the overthrow of the Grau regime, Fulgencio Batista emerged as the most powerful politician in Cuba. Through his control over the army, Batista governed Cuba either directly or indirectly for much of the period between 1934 and 1958. During these years, Cuba's economy grew and diversified, but remained essentially dependent on one industry – sugar – and extensive foreign investment. In the 1950s, critics became more active in attacking Batista's economic and political policies. Fidel Castro took the lead in this uprising against Batista's government, promising that his revolution would bring about basic economic and social change. But did Cuba need such radical change? With this question in mind, how should the United States respond to Castro's revolution against Batista?

Batista Takes Center Stage

On January 14, 1934, Fulgencio Batista forced Grau to resign and appointed a new president, Carlos Mendieta. Mendieta was the first of a number of politicians through whom Batista ruled. U.S. recognition of the Mendieta government was given within five days, and the Platt Amendment was unilaterally renounced later that year. When student riots and labor strikes broke out against the new

Fulgencio Batista and his wife at a public ceremony in 1938. (Library of Congress)

government in 1935, Batista threw the army's full weight against these opponents. Labor unions were dissolved, student leaders were assassinated, and private property, including foreign investment property, was protected. Backed by the army, Batista attempted to gain popular support by sponsoring public works programs and by passing legislation providing for pensions, insurance, maximum working hours, and minimum pay. Schools and health clinics were built in the countryside. These reforms, however, did not guarantee the average sugar cane worker a living wage. Furthermore, the owners of the immensely profitable plantations and sugar mills were not forced to pay proportionally higher taxes than the poor.

By 1939, Batista felt secure enough to allow all political groups to compete in an election for a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly then wrote a new constitution for Cuba: over half of those elected came from opposition parties, such as Grau's Auténticos. The constitution of 1940 thus voiced many of the reform hopes of the 1933 revolution. For instance, big landholdings were prohibited, limits were placed on foreign purchase of Cuban property, and legislation was recommended in order to protect small farmers, workers, blacks, and political dissenters. However, this constitution resulted in little immediate change because its provisions needed to be passed as laws before they could be enforced.

In 1940, relatively free and honest elections were permitted, and Batista won the presidency. His victory was, in part, due to the strength of his social and educational legislation. In alliance with the Communist party, Batista arranged for a profitable expansion of the sugar trade with the United States and passed laws to aid urban businessmen and workers.

But Batista also presided over a corrupt government: he himself was accused of stealing over $20 million from public funds. He also did little to help chronically unemployed cane workers. Nor did he reduce Cuba's economic dependence on selling sugar to the United States. This dependence meant that even a small drop in the international price of sugar or in U.S. sugar purchases led to massive joblessness for workers, business failure for employers, and property foreclosure for farmers. It was only because of high demand caused by World War II and later by the Korean War that the negative effects of this dependence were temporarily papered over.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Post-War Cuban Politics

In 1944, free elections were held once again, and Batista's hand-picked successor lost the presidency. The winner of the election was Auténtico leader Ramón Grau San Martín. For eight years, Grau and his successor, Carlos Prió Socarrás, held power, providing public works jobs for the unemployed, establishing national banks to aid Cuban investors, and helping small businessmen. But the Auténtico governments were plagued by payoffs to officials, embezzlement, and even sale of pardons to criminals. In response, ex-1933 revolutionaries, such as Eddy Chibás, founded the Orthodoxo party, vowing to clean up government and realize the goals of the Constitution of 1940. Still, no politician seriously attempted to implement the radical programs of 1933.

In 1952, Batista decided to run for president, but this time informal polling indicated he would come in third in a three-man race. Shortly before the June election, then, he seized power. He justified his coup by claiming, on slim evidence, that outgoing president Prío Socarrás had been planning a revolution to make himself dictator. Batista announced that he wanted to prevent this civil war, root out corruption, and protect foreign and domestic investments in Cuba. He also promised land reform, the building of new schools, cheap housing, and honest government. He pledged to hold free elections in 1954. Many businessmen, foreign corporations, labor union officials, and even the Cuban communists supported Batista's coup. Auténtico, Orthodoxo, and student leaders denounced his interruption of Cuba's democratic process and refused to enter elections set up by his government; Batista therefore ran unopposed in the 1954 presidential race, declaring that he intended to serve his full four-year term.

"Trickle-Down" Economics and U.S. Investment

The Batista government presided over an economy whose basic health was a matter of controversy. Cuba was still predominantly a sugar producer. Over two-thirds of Cuban agriculture was devoted to sugar cane cultivation. Wartime prices had brought prosperity to sugar growers and refiners. However, with peace in Korea, the United States needed less sugar, leading to a drop in prices. Temporarily, the Batista government bought up excess sugar production and put it into a reserve to be sold when prices were higher; the government also negotiated favorable purchase agreements with the United States. Critics claimed that this was only a stop-gap measure. What the agricultural economy really needed, they declared, was government-aided development of new crops and markets.

A second criticism involved the fact that 8 percent of Cuba's farmers owned 75 percent of all the available farmland, while 200,000 farm laborers had no land at all. This concentration of land into few hands often meant that agricultural goods were grown cheaply and efficiently because of modern technology. However, it also determined that a large number of landless workers' only employment opportunity consisted of cutting cane for four months a year. Illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and despair characterized the life of these canecutters. Critics thought that the big sugar plantations ought to be taken over by the government and parceled into small farms for these peasants.

Batista, however, could boast that life in Cuba's cities was relatively prosperous. He pointed out that the 1 million members of the Cuban Confederation of Workers enjoyed high wages by Latin American standards, an eight-hour day, and the right to strike. Cuba's industrial output was growing. In the countryside, farmer tenants were lawfully entitled to low rents and permanent residency on their plots. Moreover, Batista had negotiated a treaty granting Cuba access to 28 percent of the U.S. sugar market at a favorable tariff. By urging U.S. businesses to invest in Cuban industry and tourism, Batista hoped that Cuban economic development would be bankrolled by U.S. consumers and corporations. The wealth created in this way, he felt, would "trickle down" to the poor in the form of high wages and increased demand for agricultural products.

U.S. investment in Cuba was in itself controversial. North American ownership of Cuban property totaled over $1 billion in 1958. Many farms and mills were owned by North Americans, as were many factories and mines and virtually all Cuba's power, communication, transportation, and oil refining industries. Batista welcomed U.S. investments, claiming that North American dollars created jobs, products, and new industries for Cuba. Critics complained that much of the wealth produced by these

investments did not "trickle down" to Cuba's landless and unemployed. Instead, profits were spent by Cuban businessmen on imported luxuries or sent back to stockholders in the United States. In addition, critics argued that the U.S. government was tempted to prevent reforms in Cuba that might harm the interest of North American businesses, such as land redistribution and taxes on corporations. One of Batista's critics decided to take up arms to bring about radical change.

Enter Fidel

Among the Cubans who had hoped to win elected office in 1952 was a young lawyer named Fidel Castro. Son of a small plantation owner, Castro had been an Orthodoxo student leader at Havana University. Soon after the canceled election, Castro decided to try to trigger the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista through a daring military operation. On July 26, 1953, Castro and some 150 followers attacked the Cuban army's Moncada barracks at Santiago. Here he hoped to seize guns and ammunition with which to conduct a revolution. The poorly planned and executed attack failed, and most of Castro's followers were either killed in combat or captured. Many of these prisoners were then massacred by the infuriated government. Castro himself was brought to trial and conducted his own defense. In a speech entitled *History Will Absolve Me*, Castro cleverly made the social conditions of Cuba and the behavior of the Batista government, rather than his own killing of soldiers, the issue of the trial. Nevertheless, Castro was found guilty and condemned to serve a 15-year sentence. But Castro's widely publicized trial defense had earned him much approval among Batista's critics. Therefore, as a gesture of conciliation to his opponents, Batista decided to pardon his captive some 18 months later.

Fidel Castro and guerrilla followers in the Sierra Maestra. (Library of Congress)

After release from prison, Castro went to Mexico. There he continued to organize an uprising against Batista. Castro secretly returned to Cuba on December 2, 1956, abroad a small yacht with 20 supporters from his 26th of July Movement (named after the day Castro and his fellow revolutionaries had attacked the Moncado barracks). Castro set up a base in Oriente province, deep in the rugged Sierra Maestra mountains. Under constant pressure from Batista's U.S.-equipped, -trained, and -supplied army, Castro's small force at first simply sought to stay alive.

With good military leadership, strong ties with the local farmers, and high morale, Castro did more than survive. Often using captured weapons, his forces repeatedly raided big plantations, attacked garrisons, and lured army patrols into ambushes. Batista responded with escalating government violence against opponents to his increasingly dictatorial regime. Government forces struck back at suspected Castro sympathizers with suspension of constitutional guarantees, newspaper censorship, breakup of meetings, arbitrary arrest, and torture. It is even alleged that 50 26th of July Movement supporters were buried alive in large sand pits by Batista soldiers in bulldozers. Batista, for his part, claimed that Castro was an undemocratic extremist who assassinated officials, threatened candidates in government elections in 1957, and planned to make himself dictator if his revolution were victorious. Harsh measures to defeat so dangerous an opponent were fully justified, Batista added.

Then, early in 1958, Castro threatened to burn all the sugar cane crop in the fields before the zafra [harvest]. Worried about this threat to both Cuba's economy and his own eroding authority, Batista planned an all-out offensive to defeat Castro in the mountain stronghold. In order to secure military superiority in the field, Batista needed to resupply his army with new U.S. weapons, in particular 8 tanks, 20 armored cars, and almost 2000 rifles. The United States had been supplying Batista's army with training and arms since 1952, but the military assistance pact between Cuba and the United States did state explicitly that arms sold to Cuba could only be used "for defense of the Western Hemisphere" from external aggression. This meant that Batista would have to get prior approval from the United States in order to use these arms in the civil war. Batista thus wanted the United States to fill his arms orders, so that his army might have the technological edge on Castro's forces, who were fighting with hunting rifles and weapons captured in raids on military posts. He also wanted assurances of Washington's support of his government in the fight against "extremist groups."

Should the United States Continue to Support Batista?

Castro called on the United States to stop supporting Batista with arms and advisors. Batista, he claimed, did not have the support of the people. Moreover, Batista would never bring about the radical restructuring Cuba's economy needed. Castro promised U.S. reporters that he was indeed a democrat and emphasized that to continue selling arms to Batista made North Americans responsible for thousands of Cuban deaths.

Batista was quick to defend his actions and policies. Batista accused Castro of being a potential dictator and extolled the success of the Cuban economy under his leadership. He pointed out that economic prosperity was due, to no small degree, to his support for North American investment. All Cuba needed was political stability, which could in part be provided by continued U.S. military aid.

In view of these arguments, should the United States continue to support Batista with funds, arms, and even troops in order to prevent a social revolution? Or should the United States stop supplying arms to Batista, persuade him to leave Cuba, and support Castro's social revolution?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - social revolution
    - advantages and disadvantages of a social revolution
    - Colonel Carlos Mendieta

- Batista's reforms
- constitution of 1940
- Cuba's dependence
- Grau's Auténticos
- Eddy Chibás
- election of 1952
- sugar, plantations, and U.S. investments
- Cuban Confederation of Workers
- Fidel Castro
- July 26, 1953
- Sierra Maestra
- 50 buried alive
- undemocratic extremist
- 2000 rifles

2. Describe Fulgencio Batista's role in Cuban politics from 1934 until 1952.

3. Make a case for one of the following. Based on your position, argue whether the United States should continue sending arms to Bastista in 1958 to prevent Castro's revolution.

   a. Cuba needed a social revolution to reduce its dependence on sugar, redistribute wealth, and limit foreign influence.

   or

   b. Cuba did not need a social revolution because its economy was becoming less dependent on a single crop, welfare programs were helping the poor, and foreign investment helped the economy.

4. Read Documents 5, 6, 7, and/or 8, as assigned by your teacher, to support your argument regarding whether the United States should continue to ship arms to Batista in 1958.

Sources

1. Fidel Castro, "Speech in New York," quoted in Roland E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, *Revolutionary Struggle 1947-1958* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), p. 283.

2. Fulgencio Batista, *The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic* (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1964), p. 271.

Ruby Hart Phillips: The ABC Colony

Ms. Phillips, a U.S. journalist, wrote a book on Cuba published the year Castro took power. She based many of her insights on personal observations, including these accounts of the gala Christmas celebration on the eve of the Batista government's collapse and of the ABC colony. Why did U.S. and Cuban business interests want Batista to crush Castro's rebellion? Give examples of "high living" in the ABC colony.

* * * * *

In Havana, Christmas was gay, but the prisons were full and the armed forces prowled the streets like big cats looking for someone to pounce on. Money was flowing freely in the western provinces. The sugar workers had been given a bonus, seventeen million dollars, which they promptly spent for Christmas. There were many tourists in the capital city and night life was lavish. Christmas trees, adopted by the Cubans during the past several years, appeared everywhere. In every house, from mansion to hovel, there was a Christmas tree and the stores were filled with shoppers. The new Havana Riviera opened with a gala fiesta. Tourists arriving in Havana asked where the revolution was and were told it was only a minor disturbance seven hundred miles away. American businessmen told me that I was contributing to the ruin of the economy by stories of the rebellion. Both American and Cuban businessmen were annoyed. With Cuba so prosperous and money so plentiful, they couldn't understand why anyone would support a revolution. They wanted Batista to crush the Fidel Castro rebellion so they could "get on with business."

* * * * *

The English-speaking colony in Havana is made up of Americans, British and Canadians, usually referred to as the "ABC" colony. Owing to the stringent labor laws, designed to prevent foreigners from working in Cuba, most of this colony are executives of companies. This gives the lower classes in Havana the impression that all English-speaking people are wealthy. Also, since the Americans, British, and Canadians have similar business and social interests, they tend to group together, admitting into their affairs only Cubans of similar interests and cultural standing. They live comfortably in beautiful houses, for which they pay high rent of course, employ one to three servants, and belong to one or two clubs, such as the American Club, the Rovers Club, the Country Club, Habana Yacht Club and Miramar Club. The number of clubs a man belongs to does not reflect his personal wealth as much as it does his company's expense accounts. There is of course a small group who settled in Cuba many years ago and built up industries or business firms. This group has a different interest in and attitude toward the Cubans, since their fate is tied to that of the island. But the average executive lives here a few years and is then transferred to some other Latin-American, European, or Asian country. Conversely, it is easy to find someone who has lived in India, China, Lebanon, Egypt, or France. This also applies to the diplomatic corps. It is easy to understand why the "ABC" colony favored Batista, who represented a degree of security for business and industry. They had little interest in the activities of the Castro rebels, except as a possible threat to the stability of their lives.

Ruby Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: Astor-Honor, 1959), p. 353.

Document 6

Fidel Castro: Shocking and Tragic Conditions

To defend himself against the charges stemming from his Moncada barracks attack, Castro delivered a stirring oration, ending with the boast, "History will absolve me." In this excerpt from the speech, Castro reviewed some of the ills of the Cuban economic and social system. Describe the sufferings he said were endured by the Cuban people. Whom did Castro blame for these conditions?

* * * * *

Eighty-five percent of the small farmers in Cuba pay rent and live under the constant threat of being dispossessed from the land that they cultivate. More than half the best cultivated land belongs to foreigners. In *Oriente*, the largest province, the lands of the United Fruit Company and West Indian Company join the north coast to the southern one. There are two hundred thousand peasant families who do not have a single acre of land to cultivate to provide food for their starving children. On the other hand, nearly three hundred thousand "caballerias" of productive land owned by powerful interests remains uncultivated.

With the exception of a few food, lumber and textile industries, Cuba continues to be a producer of raw materials. We export sugar to import candy, we export hides to import shoes, we export iron to import plows. Everybody agrees that the need to industrialize the country is urgent, that we need steel industries, paper and chemical industries; that we must improve cattle and grain products, the technique and the processing in our food industry, in order to balance the ruinous competition of the Europeans in cheese products, condensed milk, liquors and oil, and that of the Americans in canned goods; that we need merchant ships; that tourism should be an enormous source of revenue. But the capitalists insist that the workers remain under a yoke.

Just as serious or even worse is the housing problem. There are two hundred thousand huts and hovels in Cuba; four hundred thousand families in the country and in the cities live cramped into barracks and tenements without even the minimum sanitary requirement; two million two hundred thousand of our urban population pay rents which absorb between one fifth and one third of their income; and two million eight hundred thousand of our rural and suburban population lack electricity....

Only death can liberate one from so much misery. In this, however – early death – the state is most helpful. Ninety percent of rural children are consumed by parasites which filter through their bare feet from the earth. Society is moved to compassion upon hearing of the kidnapping or murder of one child, but they are criminally indifferent to the mass murder of so many thousands of children who die every year from lack of facilities, agonizing with pain....When the head of a family works only four months a year, with what can he purchase clothing and medicine for his children? They will grow up with rickets, with not a single good tooth in their mouths by the time they reach thirty; they will have heard ten million speeches and will finally die of misery and deception....

When you judge a defendant for robbery, Your Honors, do you ask him how long he has been unemployed? Do you ask him how many children he has, which days of the week he ate and which he didn't, do you concern yourselves with his environment at all? You send him to jail without further thought. But those who burn warehouses and stores to collect insurance do not go to jail, even though a few human beings should have happened to [be cremated with the property insured]. The insured have money to hire lawyers and bribe judges. You jail the poor wretch who steals because he is hungry; but none of the hundreds who steal from the Government has ever spent a night in jail; you dine with them at the end of the year in some elegant place and they enjoy your respect.

Fidel Castro, *History Will Absolve Me* (Havana: Cooperative Obrera de Publicidad, 1960), pp. 33-40, 78-79, quoted in Lester D. Langley, *The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1970), pp. 4-5.

81

Nathaniel Weyl: Encouraging Economic Growth

Nathaniel Weyl, an ex-communist, had as a party member devoted his time to Latin American affairs. A scholar who wrote about such diverse topics as Mexican history and the role of blacks in U.S. life, Weyl criticized Marxism. What evidence does Weyl give that Cuba's economy in the 1950s was doing well? To what did he attribute its relative prosperity?

* * * * *

One of the many myths that the Castro regime would disseminate was that Cuba under its previous Presidents had been a land of oppressive poverty in which the common man had practically nothing. This is remote from the truth. In 1957, according to estimates prepared for me in the International Monetary Fund, Cuba ranked fourth among the 20 Latin American Republics in per capita income. The average Cuban had an income in 1957 of $361 annually. This compared with $409 annually for Argentina, $281 for Brazil, $234 for Mexico, and $88 for Paraguay. The average for Latin America as a whole was $284. The 1957 per capita income of Cuba was about one-sixth that of the United States, 90 percent that of Italy, significantly higher than that of Japan, and six times that of India. All of these estimates are in dollars of 1957 purchasing power.*

In a 1956 report on Cuba, the [U.S.] Department of Commerce concluded: "Cuban national income has reached levels which give the Cuban people one of the highest standards of living in Latin America."

Until Castro brought civil war to the island, there was encouraging economic growth. Between 1950 and mid-1958, Cuban national income rose from $1,623,000,000 to an estimated $2,170,000,000. When this is deflated by a 10 percent increase in living costs, the gain in national income during the period works out to about 22 percent.

During the entire period, there was a progressive increase in the share of national income going to labor. "Compensation of employees represented from 56 percent to 61 percent of total national income between 1946 and 1949, and from 59 to 65 percent between 1950 and 1954," the U.S. Department of Commerce reported in 1956. The upward trend in wages continued and, in mid-1958, the Commerce Department noted: "Pay increases ranging from 10 percent to 30 percent were mainly obtained through collective bargaining and Government resolution."

Marxist economists and propagandists assert that Cuba's poverty is directly related to her concentration on sugar production and to the fact that a large part of the sugar industry was foreign-owned and foreign-operated. This is false. Cuban land is excellently suited to sugar production and there is no alternative way in which Cuba can acquire equivalent [roughly equal] amounts of foreign exchange [money] for industrialization and capital creation through agricultural effort. The dominant United States position in the sugar industry was of immense benefit to Cuba, since it meant massive investment in field and plant modernization, modern scientific research and business management from which Cuban enterprises learned and benefited.

---

*The actual figures compiled in the International Monetary Fund are: United States $2,097, United Kingdom $946, Italy $404, Japan $252, and India $61.

Copyright by Devin-Adair, Publishers, Inc., Old Greenwich, Connecticut 06870. Permission granted to reprint from *Red Star Over Cuba*, by Nathaniel Weyl, 1961. All rights reserved.

Document 8

Edmund Chester: Batista Faced up to Every Problem

In a generally favorable biography written five years before Batista's downfall, Edmund Chester provided the following assessment of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista's handling of the Cuban economy. Explain four problems and how Chester claimed Batista faced up to them. You will have to infer some problems from the solutions credited to Batista.

* * * * *

When Fulgencio Batista came into power in March, 1952, he inherited one of the most perilous sugar problems any president ever faced. His predecessor, Carlos Prio, had allowed the nation's sugar mills to produce a 1952 crop of over seven million tons, in spite of the fact that there appeared to be no market for more than five million tons. It costs money to produce sugar, and a crop of seven million tons represents an investment of many millions of dollars. The raising, grinding, and marketing of Cuba's sugar crop is financed to a great extent by the banks of Cuba. So the nation's financial structure was jeopardized by the huge surplus, which no one seemed to want....After weeks of conferences with sugar men, bankers, and economic aides, Batista took the first step toward a solution of the problem. He announced that the banks of Cuba had agreed to underwrite the 1952 surplus and that new efforts would be made to dispose of it, little by little, if necessary, in the markets of the world at a satisfactory price. What the banks did, in effect, was to advance the sugar operators sufficient funds to finance the 1953 crop, holding the 1952 surplus as a sort of collateral.

The problem of a dangerous sugar surplus was just one of many confronting Batista when he came into power in March, 1952, and combined, they represented a great challenge to the administrative ability of the former humble canecutter. There were national problems, such as a sacked treasury, a national lack of confidence in government because of the prevalence of gangsterism throughout the island, and a defunct, impossible public works program which his predecessor had inaugurated, in bad faith, as a stimulus to his party's vote-seeking campaign for the June elections....

Batista faced up to every problem. He met them head-on and provided solutions, most of which were permanent and satisfactory....He eliminated the gangsters by direct methods. He readjusted the public works program and by intelligent management completed during his first year in office thirty-three of the one hundred and twenty-four projects which his predecessor had started.

Under Batista a new tobacco treaty was negotiated with Spain in 1952, which resulted in the restoration to Cuba of one of its principal markets in the Old World. Under previous regimes there had been a tendency to keep alive the memory of the Spanish rule in Cuba which terminated with the end of the Spanish-American War.

...He imported the finest seed from El Salvador for the purpose of improving the coffee crop, and he distributed large quantities or rice, peanuts, corn, and black beans to assure abundant crops.

The meat shortages which, under previous regimes, had plagued everyone living on the island were solved, and Batista established various centers for artificial insemination throughout the country to improve the breed of cattle. Special attention was devoted to veterinary care and fifteen mobile units were put in circulation to take care of the livestock of the poor farmers.

Batista is a strong advocate of mechanized agriculture. In the spring of 1953, his government acquired a large amount of farm equipment for use throughout the Republic and these machines were rented to the poorer farmers at insignificant rates. The cost of tilling the soil was reduced to one-fifth of its previous figure.

From *A Sergeant Named Batista* by Edmund A. Chester. Copyright 1954 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Reprinted by permission of Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

CHAPTER 4: WHO WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAK IN U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS?

What began two years ago as a bright hope for the Cuban people, applauded by the American people, and by the Eisenhower administration, as well as throughout the world, quickly turned into a reign of terror at home and thence a danger to the peace and freedom of the entire hemisphere.[1]

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
James Wadsworth

At the very moment when Cuba is commemorating the second anniversary of its liberation, it is once again forced to turn to the Security Council to denounce in front of world opinion the policy of harassment, reprisals, aggression, subversion, isolation, intervention, and imminent military attack being carried out by the United States.[2]

Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa

Introduction

In the two years from January 1959 to January 1961, the relationship between the United States and Cuba deteriorated from uncertain friendship to bitter antagonism. When Castro and his 26th of July Movement took power on New Year's Day 1959, the United States was the first foreign country to recognize the new government. Soon, however, actions of the new regime, such as the Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959, were causing protests and warnings from the United States. In turn, U.S. efforts to encourage change in Cuban policy by such measures as preventing Cuban arms purchases in Europe provoked Castro to strike out against liberal domestic foes and seek new sources of support abroad. Thus, when the United States and Cuba finally broke relations in January 1961, Castro had irrevocably launched Cuba into a socialist/communist revolution at home and an alliance with the Soviet Union abroad. At the same time, the United States was training anti-Castro guerrillas, undermining Cuba's economy, and declaring that Castro's regime endangered the peace of the Western hemisphere. Diplomats were left with differing interpretations of how and why U.S.-Cuban relations had deteriorated so rapidly and completely.

U.S. officials, like James Wadsworth, held that the Castro government was essentially responsible for the souring of relations. They pointed to the show trials of Batista officials held in soccer stadiums with no respect for due process, the lack of elections, the confiscation of property belonging to U.S. citizens, the attempts to spread the revolution and increasing trade with and arms purchases from the Soviet Union. Cuban diplomats, like Raul Roa, countered that it was the United States that poisoned relations because Washington could not accept Cuban social reforms and sovereignty. They claimed that the United States simply refused to cooperate with Castro's reform program because it threatened the interests of U.S. investors in Cuba. Instead, Cuban officials alleged, the United States worked to overthrow Castro and his revolution by supporting counter revolutionaries, promoting acts of sabotage, and training exiles. Each side blamed the other for bringing about the dissolution of the traditional friendship between the United States and Cuba. The quarrel seemed to center around four issues: agrarian reform, democratic practices, U.S. intervention, and Cuba's ties with the USSR. With these issues in mind, the central question posed by this chapter is: was the United States or Cuba primarily responsible for the break in U.S.-Cuban relations?

Castro's Triumph

On January 8, 1959, Havana hosted the triumphant parade of Fidel Castro and his bearded guerrilla comrades. Signs reading "Gracias (Thank You) Fidel" hung from buildings along the route that the truck and jeep column took through streets mobbed by cheering crowds. As Castro prepared to ad-

dress the vast throng in the presidential palace square, many of the soldiers, administrators, and policemen of the Batista regime were settling into comfortable exile in the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Spain. Still more former government officials were hiding from the 26th of July Movement squads sent to arrest them. Overnight, the Castro revolution had turned political life in Cuba upside down.

Castro's victory was largely the product of good military leadership and widespread support, aided by the brutality and corruption of his opponents. Despite the Eisenhower arms embargo, Batista had ordered 17 of his battalions, supported by tanks and aircraft, into the Sierra Maestra in May 1958. Castro's guerrillas drew back to lure the attackers deep into the mountains and then ambushed them so relentlessly that by August Batista's army was in full retreat. Soon guerrilla forces became active in the Escambray Mountains to the northeast and managed to advance onto the central plain, threatening Batista's main supply lines. Batista's incompetent officers lost battle after battle to numerically inferior rebel forces. In addition, their brutal policy of torturing and executing prisoners cost Batista backing at home and abroad. Batista's army simply did not have sufficient will and ability to stop Castro's guerrillas from joining forces with urban revolutionaries in late-December street fighting in Cuba's cities. When his thoroughly demoralized soldiers began laying down their arms, Batista and his top-ranking followers fled the country on New Year's Eve 1958.

Despite friendly exchanges in those early days of January 1959, trouble was brewing between the United States and Cuba. Castro surely had a list of particulars about which to complain. He was angry that up until April 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration had given full military, diplomatic, and economic aid to Batista. Even as the revolutionaries were converging on Havana in December 1958, U.S. Ambassador Earl Smith had tried to install a new military dictatorship in Cuba to foil Castro's victory. Meanwhile, U.S. authorities permitted exiled Batista supporters to enter the United States with stolen government funds and apparently looked the other way when these exiles used Florida as a base for raids against Cuba.

For their part, starting on January 22, 1959, U.S. citizens were shocked at the sight of televised trials in Cuba. Hundreds of Batista's soldiers and policemen were ultimately tried by revolutionary courts in soccer stadiums in front of grandstands full of howling crowds. The guilty verdicts, without the right of appeal, were quickly followed by executions. Because of national disorganization, in February Castro indefinitely postponed the elections he had promised; as prime minister, he began to rule by decree. Moreover, members of the communist party of Cuba, who had once been political allies of Batista, began to be appointed to management positions in the government bureaucracy. U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon met with Castro in April 1959 and presented evidence concerning the communist leanings of his aides, along with pleas for elections. From this interview, Nixon concluded that the Cuban leader was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline."[3]

Agrarian Reform and Confiscation

Serious disagreement between Cuba and the United States was touched off by the new regime's Agrarian Reform Law, decreed on May 17, 1959. The Agrarian Reform Law was intended to address a long-standing grievance in Cuba, where 8 percent of the farmers owned 75 percent of the land. The inequitable pattern of landholding resulted in landlessness, hunger, and seasonal unemployment for 200,000 poor rural workers.[4] This law set up the Institute for National Agrarian Reform (INRA), which took title to any privately held estate over 1,000 acres (3,333 acres in the case of sugar and rice lands). Actually, only 10 percent of all Cuban farms were affected by this legislation. Due to the concentration of property in relatively few hands, however, 40 percent of all land in Cuba fell under INRA regulations. Owners of nationalized farm lands were to be paid off with 20-year Cuban government bonds yielding 4 1/2 percent interest. The payments were supposed to be made in accordance with estimated taxable value. Many landowners, nevertheless, complained that this method was unfair because pre-revolutionary government tax collectors had estimated the value of their land at far below fair market price. Consequently, the prices the INRA offered and what landowners wanted for their land were often dramatically at odds. Among the first estates to be nationalized in this manner was one which had belonged to the Castro family. Soon afterwards, many other Cubans, as well as many North

Americans, had their estates confiscated. Land so seized was either divided into 66-acre plots for distribution to individual farmers or, more likely, consolidated into over 1,000 state-run cooperatives. This measure dramatically reduced rural underemployment and poverty.

On June 11, 1959, the U.S. State Department sent a note to the Cuban government asking for "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" for the properties of its nationals. U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip Bonsal did not deny the Cuban government's right to carry out land reform, but he did complain about the "denial of the basic rights to ownership of United States citizens in Cuba.... In many cases no inventories were taken, nor were any receipts proffered [offered], nor any indication afforded [given] that payment was intended to be made."[4] The King Ranch and the United Fruit Company, whose lands were seized under the agrarian reform regulations, were never repaid. Castro claimed that, because the Cuban treasury had been looted by Batista, the Cuban government simply lacked the cash to buy the properties outright: the INRA was apparently willing to pay for the expropriated land with some cash down and the rest in bonds. Bonsal replied that the Cuban constitution itself demanded 100 percent cash payments for seized land and that it was not fair to make investors wait 20 years for part of their money. Moreover, he pointed out that the Cuban government was only offering $6 million for land valued at $32 million by its U.S. owners. Despite frequent protests and attempts at negotiation, the United States and Cuba never resolved the issue of compensation: most U.S. citizens with property in Cuba were never paid for the property taken from them. During the next 15 months, more than 275,000 acres of North American property were seized by the INRA.

Revolution and Counterrevolution

With the fall of Batista, many foreign revolutionaries who had enlisted in the 26th of July Movement looked to Castro for aid in overthrowing their own governments. With Cuban aid and support, these revolutionaries began to infiltrate Panama, Haiti, and Nicaragua. On June 14, 1959, a force of Cuban and Dominican revolutionaries was detected landing by plane and ship in the nearby Dominican Republic. In ensuing battles, several Cubans were killed or captured. The Dominicans were ruled by the notorious dictator Rafael Trujillo, whose record of human rights violations certainly rivaled Batista's. Also like Batista, Trujillo had received economic and military aid from the United States. Cuba was cautioned by the U.S. government not to spread violence and revolution to neighboring states.

In addition, the Eisenhower administration was concerned by Castro's behavior toward liberals in the Cuban government and army. In June, Castro began to attack the critics of the agrarian reform program, claiming that they were traitors to the revolution. Cabinet members whom Castro accused of undermining the legislation were asked to resign on June 12, 1959. Shortly afterward, Cuban President Manual Urrutia told a television interviewer that "The communists are fighting for a dictatorship of the proletariat (working class) in which I do not believe."[5] In a lengthy speech, Castro denounced Urrutia as an incompetent reactionary who fabricated stories about communist subversion in government; Urrutia immediately wrote a letter of resignation. Hubert Matos, military commander of Camaguey province, and 14 of his officers resigned on October 19, protesting growing communist control over the revolution. Fearing the outbreak of military counterrevolution against his reforms, Castro arrested Matos and his men; they received long prison terms for treason that December. To many Cubans, leaving their homeland in increasing numbers, as well as to the U.S. government, the revolution seemed to be becoming both communist and dictatorial.

Sugar, Soviets, and Suppression

In January 1960, Eisenhower let it be known that the United States had contemplated cutting the U.S. purchase of Cuban sugar. Since U.S. importers bought over 50 percent of Cuba's sugar, a significant cutback would deal a potentially devastating blow to Cuba's economy. Eisenhower then warned Castro and other Cuban officials to tone down criticism of the United States. The Cuban government was also advised to meet with U.S. Ambassador Philip Bonsal to work out payment for expropriated U.S.-owned property.

Throughout the previous fall, Castro had sought to purchase arms for the new militia units he was recruiting to defend the Revolution. However, U.S. diplomats had pressured allies in Europe not to sell the Cubans any weapons in order to prevent more "instability" in the region. Castro defiantly promised, "If they don't sell us planes in England, we shall buy them wherever they will sell to us."[6] He shortly invited Anastas Mikoyan, the deputy chairman of the USSR, to Havana. On February 4, they worked out a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement that committed the USSR to sugar purchases, loans, technical aid, and, later, arms shipments.

Castro called his critics "miserable tools, instruments...of reaction...of the powerful interests against the interests of the Cuban people."[7] Pointing to plots against the government by disgruntled liberals, exile firebomb raids from Florida, and sabotage of a munitions ship in Havana harbor, Cuban authorities introduced security measures. Initiated in February 1960, these included seizing the bank accounts of rightists, takeover of opposition television stations and newspapers, and expulsion of anti-communists from the labor movement. As open dissent became more difficult, some Castro opponents began to organize guerrilla bands in the very mountains that had sheltered the 26th of July movement two years before. The U.S. government denied that it helped exile groups to raid Cuba from Florida harbors. Eisenhower representatives explained that U.S. authorities were prosecuting Castro opponents who illegally purchased arms or made unauthorized flights to Cuba. However, on March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved a secret CIA plan to recruit, arm, and train refugees who had fled Cuba. Composed of former Batista supporters and more recent liberal exiles, this force was originally intended to support the guerrilla bands operating in Cuba to overthrow Castro's government.

Measures and Countermeasures

The Soviets were delighted when, on May 7, 1960, Castro restored diplomatic relations with the USSR. Soon Castro announced new economic agreements with the Soviets: Cuba contracted to buy 30 factories, undisclosed amounts of arms, and tanker-loads of crude petroleum from the Soviet Union. Consequently, on May 23, the Cuban government told two U.S.-owned refineries in Cuba to prepare to process this Soviet oil. The Eisenhower administration forthwith cut off all foreign aid to Cuba and urged Texaco and Standard Oil not to cooperate. On June 30, Castro responded by nationalizing the oil companies' Cuba refineries. When Eisenhower retaliated by cutting off all U.S. sugar purchases

Castro and Khrushchev meet in New York in September 1960. (National Archives)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

from Cuba, Castro ordered 600 U.S. companies in Cuba to prepare lists of their property for nationalization. Seizure of all U.S. sugar mills in Cuba followed on August 6.

The dispute between the United States and Cuba now took on a distinctly international tone. On July 9, Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would buy the sugar the United States had not purchased and that "Soviet artillerymen" would defend Cuba, if necessary, with rockets. The United States condemned Cuba as a danger to the Western hemisphere at a meeting of the Organization of American States that August. Castro replied with the September 2 Declaration of Havana, calling on the poor of Latin America to "throw off your chains." Castro publicly embraced the Soviet Premier during a New York appearance at the United Nations on September 20.

Break in Relations

The end of this escalating diplomatic conflict came quickly. Eisenhower placed an embargo (ban) on virtually all U.S. trade with Cuba on October 13, 1960. The next day, the INRA nationalized 382 large foreign- and Cuban-owned businesses. Two weeks later the Castro government seized the last North American properties in Cuba. Washington promptly recalled Ambassador Bonsal for "extended consultations." In January 1961, amid much mutual recrimination, the United States and Cuba formally severed relations.

In their accusations against each other, U.S. and Cuban diplomats had consistently mentioned four main issues of contention: agrarian reform, Cuban democratic practices, U.S. intervention, and Cuba's ties with the USSR. In light of these four issues, who do you think was primarily responsible for the break in U.S.-Cuban relations? Why?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly explain the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - threats to end sugar quota
    - Khrushchev pledge to defend Cuba
    - Ambassador Smith's plan
    - U.S. State Department note
    - invasion of the Dominican Republic
    - Cuba's security measures
    - break in relations
    - resignation of Hubert Matos
    - Castro's parade through Havana
    - CIA plan approved
    - Sierra Maestra offensive
    - seizure of oil refineries
    - Agrarian Reform Law
    - televised trials
    - trade embargo declared

2. Place the events listed in question 1 in the correct chronological order (the order in which they occurred) along a timeline beginning in May 1958 and ending in January 1961.

3. Describe the U.S. and Cuban positions on three of the four issues of contention between the United States and Cuba: agrarian reform, Cuban democratic practices, U.S. intervention, or Cuba's ties with the USSR.

4. Read the two documents assigned by your teacher and be prepared to argue whether the United States or Cuba was primarily responsible for the break in U.S.- Cuban relations.

Sources

1. Lester Langley, ed., *The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1970), p. 39.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

3. Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 178.

4. Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 92.

5. Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1230.

6. Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Avon Books, 1986), p. 549.

7. Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds., *Fidel Castro Speaks* (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1969), p. 66.

Fidel Castro: They Never Asked Us About Our Problems

In a four-hour speech before the United Nations on September 26, 1960, Fidel Castro defended his government's actions in its dispute with the United States. The previous year, Castro's National Institute for Agrarian Reform had expropriated most of the large estates owned by North Americans in Cuba. According to Castro (1) Why did Cuba institute agrarian reform? (2) How did the United States respond to this policy? and (3) In what ways was the U.S. position on agrarian reform unreasonable?

* * * * *

...In my country, it [agrarian reform] was absolutely necessary: more than 200,000 peasant families lived in the countryside without land on which to grow essential crops.

Without an agrarian reform our country would have been unable to take that step [toward economic development]. We made agrarian reform. Was it a radical agrarian reform? We think not. It was a reform adjusted to the needs of our development. In other words, it was an agrarian reform which was to solve the problems of the landless peasants, the problem of supplying basic foodstuffs, the problem of rural unemployment, and which was to end, once and for all, the ghastly poverty which existed in the countryside of our native land....

Then the problem of payment arose. Notes from the State Department rained on our government. They never asked us about our problems, not even out of sheer pity, or because of the great responsibility they had in creating these problems. They never asked us how many died of starvation in our country, or how many were suffering from tuberculosis, how many were unemployed. No, they never asked about that. A sympathetic attitude toward our needs? Certainly not. All the talks by the representatives of the government of the United States centered on the telephone company, the electric company, and the land owned by American companies.

How could we solve the problem of payment? Of course, the first question that should have been asked was what were we going to pay with, rather than how. Can you gentlemen conceive of a poor, underdeveloped country with 600,000 unemployed and such a large number of illiterate and sick people, whose treasury reserves had been exhausted, and which had contributed to the economy of a powerful country with one billion dollars in ten years – can you conceive of this country having the means to pay for the land affected by the Agrarian Reform law, or the means to pay for it in the terms demanded?

What were the State Department aspirations regarding their affected interests? They wanted prompt, efficient, and just payment. Do you understand that language? "Prompt, efficient, and just payment." That means, "pay right now, in dollars, whatever we ask for our land."

We were not one hundred percent Communist at that time. We were just becoming slightly pink. We did not confiscate land. We simply proposed to pay for it in 20 years, and in the only way in which we could pay for it: in bonds which would mature in 20 years at 4 1/2 percent interest.

How could we pay for the land in dollars? And in the amount they asked for it? It was absurd. Anyone can readily understand that, under those circumstances, we had to choose between making the agrarian reform and not making it. If we chose not to make it, the dreadful economic situation in our country would have continued indefinitely. If we decided to make it, we exposed ourselves to the hatred of the government of the powerful neighbor to the north.

Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds., *Fidel Castro Speaks* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1969), p. 23.

U.S. Department of State: Ill-Conceived and Drastic Measures

The U.S. State Department presented this memorandum to the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States on August 2, 1960. The memorandum charged that Cuba was becoming a threat to the Western Hemisphere in a variety of ways. The following excerpt condemned the Cuban government's agrarian reform expropriations. Note the excerpt's three arguments against these expropriations.

* * * * *

The Cuban Government has taken discriminatory actions against the property of United States citizens in Cuba, valued at over $850 million. Without regard for the customary practices of civilized nations, United States citizens have been dispossessed of property which often had been acquired as the result of a lifetime of toil; no effort has been made by the Cuban government to assure anything approaching adequate compensation.

The Cuban Government has attempted to justify these acts by stating that there is no discrimination because Cuban citizens are undergoing the same treatment. While this may be the case, it does not justify action contrary to accepted international law and practices. The fact remains that the Cuban Government has failed to protect adequately the rights of the United States citizens who have in no way contravened Cuban law or the accepted practices of international law....

History has shown that ill-conceived and drastic measures aimed at destroying existing systems of agricultural production have led to sharp declines in production. The experience of the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries has clearly shown that the serious decline in agricultural production which they experienced was a consequence of the drastic collectivization policies followed by those governments. In fact, a number of communist countries which were previously self-sufficient in foodstuffs now meet these requirements only by importing surplus agricultural products from the United States....

In summary, the Cuban Government is embarked on a program of breaking its economic ties with the United States.... It is achieving this through hostile and discriminatory economic and financial actions, including the seizure of assets of nationals of the United States and other countries without adequate compensation in disregard to its own laws and international law.

U.S. Department of State, "Responsibility of the Cuban Government for Increased International Tension in the Hemisphere," *Department of State Bulletin* XLIII, no. 1105 (August 29, 1960), p. 346.

Fidel Castro: Democracy Without Bread Is Not Democracy

Castro addressed this speech to the 10th Congress of the Confederation of Cuban Workers on November 18, 1959. He attacked opponents of the revolution who, he claimed, were taking advantage of certain constitutional rights in order to undermine his government's program. According to Castro, who were these opponents? Why did they oppose the Revolution? What were they actually doing?

* * * * *

Who is against the Revolution?... When you think about it, you will see that it is those interests that are affected by the revolutionary laws, national or foreign interests, who are the first to oppose the Revolution. When you examine the writers who are against the Revolution, you will see that they write in the service of the great interests, enemies of the Revolution. When you look at the press that is against the Revolution, you will understand, logically enough, that a press that developed in order to protect those interests, that developed at the generous udder of the government budget or of paid political campaigns, you will understand why it is against the Revolution....

Only a few months have passed since we encountered a small group of such large landowners who fought against the Agrarian Reform, associated with the criminals of the recent war...and this no more than seven months after the triumph of the Revolution.

If only we knew then what is evident today, the suspicious coincidence of accusations that...the war criminals, the trusts and the reactionary foreign press, and some others make against us, such as the accusation that there is no freedom of the press [in Cuba]...this right that is the fruit of the sacrifice of others than those who are now using it against their country and against the Revolution, those who are trying to overthrow the Revolution and their country, those who write vicious poison day after day, those whose actions coincide suspiciously with those of...the war criminals in their campaigns against the Revolution....

The monopoly of publicity, the monopoly of information has been in the hands of a little group that has the monopoly of riches and bought the protection and the weapons that they today protect themselves with, namely the press that they defend themselves with, the intrigue that they defend themselves with, because they have acquired this ability to be heard, this art of spreading poisonous and untrue insinuations, this art of deceit....

They defend the lie of democracy, which isn't democracy at all, but rather the rule of the big landowners against the hungry peasants who live on the plantations, the rule of the mercenary and abusive army, corrupt and allied with the great interests, allied with the companies, an army that persecuted workers and peasants. This is the democracy that they defend and not the democracy...of the people.

Thus those foreigner-loving gentlemen who advocate foreign policies, who seize on foreign lies, who defend foreign monopolies, who defend foreign privilege, who defend foreign lies, who fight the Revolution that is actually freeing the people and the Cuban nation, these gentlemen are somewhat less than democrats, although they carry the banner of pseudo-democracy in order to appear democratic. Let us tell the people the truth; enough of the lies and deception, enough of the tricks and the empty words and the false words. Democracy without bread is not democracy; democracy without books and teachers is not democracy.

From Fidel Castro, *2 Discursos* (Havana: Cooperative Obrera de Publicidad, 1959), p. 39

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Castro Betrays His Own Revolution

This State Department White Paper, largely written by a Kennedy advisor and published in April 1961, lays out the case that Castro had, in effect, betrayed his revolution. The United States criticized Castro because of his supposedly anti-democratic behavior. According to this document, in what ways had Castro subverted the freedoms of the Cuban people?

* * * * *

What began as a movement to enlarge Cuban democracy and freedom has been perverted, in short, into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions in Cuba.... Not only the first Prime Minister and the first President of the Revolutionary Government but a large proportion of the Revolution's original political and military leaders now reject Dr. Castro and his course of betrayal. Of the 19 members of the first cabinet of the Revolutionary Government, nearly two-thirds are today in prison, in exile, or in opposition.... All centers of economic power have been taken over by the state and to a considerable degree delivered to the Cuban Communist party.

This process of consolidation has been extinguished, and all political parties, save the Communist, are effectively denied political activity. In recent months, the regime, by completing its purge of the judiciary, has perfected its control over all organized institutions of political power. Justice is now the instrument of tyranny. Laws have been redefined in such a way that any manifestation of disagreement can be branded as "counterrevolutionary" and the accused hauled before military tribunals and sentenced to long prison terms or to the firing squad.

Professional groups and civil organizations have lost their autonomy and are systematically integrated into the "revolutionary" discipline of the regime. The remaining vestiges of opposition in the trade unions, represented by union leaders from the 26th of July Movement, have been destroyed. Recently the hand of the dictatorship has been reaching out beyond the middle class to strike down elements of organized labor....

In characteristic Communist manner the regime has seized control of the nation's educational system, introduced Communist propaganda into the schools, destroyed academic freedom, and ended the traditional autonomy of the university.... In a similar fashion the Castro regime has seized control of the agencies of public communication—the newspapers, the publishing houses, the radio and television networks, the film industry. No Cuban today, whether in field or factory, in school or cafe or home by the radio, can hope to escape the monotonous and implacable din of Communist propaganda.

U.S. Department of State, *Cuba* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 16.

Central Intelligence Agency: A Program of Covert Action

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan to recruit, arm, and train Cuban exiles for possible infiltration into Cuba to lead resistance groups against Castro. (Note that parts of this plan remained secret and were blacked out when this document was declassified in 1977.) Cuban intelligence agents found out about these efforts early on. From the summer of 1960, Cuba's foreign minister, Raul Roa, persisted in mentioning these plans in his accusations that the United States intended to invade Cuba. What was the objective of this CIA program? What measures was the United States undertaking in order to achieve this objective?

* * * * *

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGHAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba.

[redacted] (Tab A)

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency, *A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime* (Cuba Study Group, National Security Files, Box 61, John F. Kennedy Library), p. 3.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

[redacted] (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition.

[redacted]

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. [redacted]

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Henry Cabot Lodge: No Aggressive Purposes Against Cuba

On July 18, 1960, Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, delivered this response to the Cuban complaint to the Security Council. A week before, Cuba's foreign minister, Raul Roa, had accused the United States of aggression against Cuba by aiding and abetting "counter-revolutionary" opponents of the Castro regime. Cite the evidence Lodge offered in order to deny this charge.

* * * * *

The United States has engaged in no threats, harassment, intrigues, reprisals, or aggressive acts against the Government of Cuba. Dr. Castro would like assurance from the United States that the United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba. Unnecessary though it most certainly seems to me, let me here and now give him this assurance, heaped up and overflowing: The United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba.

The United States has consistently exercised restraint in the face of what seems to be deliberate and concerted efforts on the part of the present Government of Cuba to create a grievance with the United States....

Mr. President, the United States has just been accused by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba of harboring war criminals, providing facilities for counterrevolutionaries, of frequent violations of air space...

1. To the best knowledge of the State Department, extradition has never been requested by the Government of Cuba for any of those persons commonly defined by the Government of Cuba as war criminals.

2. A number of Cuban nationals (suspected of conducting sabotage in Cuba) have been required by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service to leave Florida and remain away from any area within a hundred and fifty miles of the Gulf of Mexico....

3. The United States has taken elaborate precautions in accordance with its obligations under the 1928 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife to enforce our domestic laws dealing with the traffic in munitions and implements of war which might be used in revolutionary activities.

4. The United States has instituted the most vigorous and elaborate system of controls ever adopted by the United States Government in time of peace to prevent unauthorized flights in the Caribbean area and has deplored the very few that took place in spite of our restrictive action.

Richard P. Stebbins, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. Copyright Council on Foreign Relations Inc. Reprinted with permission.

Raul Roa: Friendly Countries that Gave Help

Raul Roa, Cuba's foreign minister, responded to President Eisenhower's severing of U.S.-Cuban relations with this speech on January 4, 1961. He gave Cuba's rationale for forming a new alliance system. According to Roa, what was the United States accusing Cuba of doing? What reasons did he give for the U.S. break in diplomatic relations with Cuba? Why did Cuba form an alliance with the USSR?

* * * * *

Now, at the end of his discredited and ruinous mandate, [Eisenhower] has broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba and has approved the sinister plan of the Central Intelligence Agency to create conditions for military aggression against the Government and people of Cuba.

The pretexts that are used for the policy that is followed are the same as those that were used in the past since the time the revolution first took power – the transformation of Cuba into the spearhead of international communism; the setting up of a Communist government in Cuba; the granting of Cuban bases for the launching of Soviet rockets.

The purpose is obvious; to undermine and disfigure the character of the Cuban revolution in order to set the subjective and objective groundwork for direct military aggression....

It has been stated falsely that Cuba is the satellite of international communism, but the truth is different. Cuba has ceased forever to be a satellite of American imperialism, and it is for this reason that we are accused of being Communists.

Unable, in its blindness, to understand the profound and vast changes that are taking place in present-day society, American imperialism can consider only one alternative: either its satellite or another's. And since it does not admit any relation with other peoples except submission, it can only accept such submission unconditionally.

Since we have rejected this opprobrious [shameful] servitude, American imperialism is trying to break down our Government by the means of harassment, pressure, threats, reprisals, and aggression. But it could not do this. It tried to break Cuba's back by hunger. Now it is trying to stop Cuba's revolutionary impulse by force.

But Cuba owes its survival in this crucial moment of its history to the unshakable determination of the revolutionary Government and to the prodigious courage of its people, and, second, to the friendly countries that gave it help without insisting on subordination of political commitments.

Cuba was able to overcome the economic catastrophe to which it was condemned by the Government of the United States thanks to the economic, commercial, and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union.

Lester D. Langley, *The United States, Cuba, and the Cold War* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1970), p. 38.

Christian Herter: Agency of a Foreign Power

Secretary of State Christian Herter delivered this address at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States at San Jose, Costa Rica, on August 24, 1960. Herter accused Cuba of becoming a threat to the Western Hemisphere. What evidence did he employ to support this contention?

* * * * *

I think we can accept as an established fact that our inter-American association is firmly based on the foundation of resistance to intervention in our affairs by any foreign power.... We should now consider on the basis of available evidence whether the present regime of Cuba has submitted to the control of the Communist powers....

1. I am sure we have all noted the increasing tendency of the Cuban regime to support the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists in the field of foreign affairs. I have yet to see in recent months the slightest criticism from any official Cuban source of any Soviet or Chinese action or attitude. This is another manifestation of a developing pattern in the Cuban revolution which is a legitimate matter of concern to us all.

2. Cuban soil is being used for the export of Soviet Communism to other American Republics. The extent of this effort is known to all of us. Some elements of it have been experienced by virtually every other American Republic. Note has been taken, for example, of the statement by Fidel Castro at a rally on July 26, 1960, as follows: "Let us promise, let us promise to those who gave their lives to create a new life for the fatherland, that we will continue to make efforts so that our fatherland will daily be a better example. And here, before the undefeated mountain range, let us promise ourselves to continue making our fatherland the example which will make the Andes Mountains the Sierra Maestra of the American continent."

3. We all have noted, I believe with sorrow, the enthusiastic welcome given by the Cuban Government to statements by the Soviet rulers that they are ready to support Cuba with rocket fire against the United States....

These trends and the general pattern we see developing in Cuba would indicate...a form of controlled foreign intervention in the affairs of American states and hence a threat to our peace and security.

Richard A. Stebbins, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. Copyright Council on Foreign Relations Inc. Reprinted with permission.

CHAPTER 5:
SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY GO AHEAD WITH THE PLANNED INVASION OF CUBA BY CUBAN EXILES?

Castro was moving to consolidate his power; the regular army was being displaced by a loyal militia. If we did not act swiftly, we would lose not only the brigade, but our last chance to overthrow Castro quickly, easily, and without direct military intervention. It was soon or never.[1]

Presidential Advisor Richard Goodwin

The counterargument would be: why not wait? Every month Castro is making himself more unpopular both through the hemisphere and in his own country. Every month more people through the world are coming to understand the nature of his regime. Opinion has changed tremendously in the last six months; it will change even more in the next six months, if Castro is not made a martyr. The combination of internal discontent and external isolation will doom his regime.[2]

Presidential Advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Introduction

Within the first three months of his administration, President John F. Kennedy was confronted with a momentous decision. Should he carry through with a plan to send a brigade of 1,300 Cuban refugee exiles, trained by the CIA, to Cuba to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro? President Eisenhower had actually set the invasion plan in motion in March of the previous year. The development of the CIA's March 1960 plan had been personally supervised by Vice President Nixon. Indeed, Cuba policy became an issue in the presidential campaign that fall when Kennedy criticized Eisenhower's appeasement of Castro. After Kennedy's inauguration, this CIA operation became the responsibility of his administration. In briefings, the new president and his staff learned that the CIA planned an exile-manned invasion of Cuba, supported by privately purchased ships and planes. Moreover, the CIA intended to keep the U.S. role in preparing and carrying out this invasion secret.

Thus, in early April 1961, President Kennedy had to grapple with a pressing decision: Should the United States send an exile brigade to Cuba in order to overthrow Castro? Or should he cancel this operation and disband the brigade? Were the president to give his approval for the invasion, he faced the risk that it might not succeed. In that event, he would expose the United States either to a humiliating loss of face in front of the world or the unpredictable consequences of direct U.S. military involvement. Even the success of the exile invasion would raise the issue of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of another country. On the other hand, Kennedy feared that Castro's Cuba would serve as a springboard for communist subversion in Latin America and provide the Soviets with a military base 90 miles from the United States.

In order to make his decision concerning the fate of the exile invasion of Cuba, Kennedy needed to resolve two questions: Was the invasion likely to succeed? Was it the right thing to do?

The Decision

The exile invasion operation was set into motion as part of contingency (possible, but not definite) planning for operations against Castro's Cuba during the last year of President Eisenhower's administration. At a Washington meeting in April 1959, then-Vice President Richard Nixon had presented Castro with evidence of communist infiltration of his government. Castro's lack of concern about such subversion convinced Nixon that the Cuban leader was a dangerous radical under the influence of the international communist movement.

Alarmed about the policies of the Castro government and the increasing Soviet presence in Cuba, President Eisenhower finally heeded Nixon's warnings. He ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to put together a plan to overthrow Castro's government by covert (undercover) action. On March 17, 1960, he approved the CIA contingency plan and turned it over to the "Special Group." This informal committee was composed of presidential assistants and officials from the CIA and the State and Defense Departments. Under the leadership of Vice President Richard Nixon, the committee supervised the execution of the plan, including the training and equipping of a brigade of Cuban exiles.

CIA Director Allen Dulles put his deputy director of plans, Richard Bissell, in charge of mounting the invasion. Bissell established training bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua, which ultimately housed 1,300 exiles who had fled Castro's Cuba for economic and political reasons. These exiles included former Batista soldiers known in Cuba for their cruelty, as well as ex-26th of July Movement activists who felt Castro had betrayed the democratic goals of the revolution. The exiles were formed into a combat unit, Brigade 2506, named after the identification number of a recruit who had died in training.

Prepared for an amphibious (from the sea) landing on the Cuban coastline and combat against Castro's army, the men of the brigade hoped to spark a revolution against Castro throughout Cuba. To incite this uprising, a CIA-manned radio station on Swan Island off the coast of Mexico beamed anti-Castro messages to the Cuban people. A fleet of 15 World War II vintage B-26 planes were slated to knock out Castro's airforce in surprise raids. They were based at a secret airfield in Nicaragua. CIA agents persuaded a group of exile politicians, ranging from Batista men to anti-Castro socialists, to form the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which would act as the spokesman of the invasion effort. Once in Cuba, the council could also serve as a provisional government that could then ask for U.S. aid.

Kennedy and Cuba

Where Cuba was concerned, Kennedy carried considerable political baggage into the White House. He had become well acquainted with events in Cuba during frequent stays at his parents' house in Palm Beach, Florida. Here he spent much time with Earl Smith, the ex-ambassador to Cuba, and Florida Senator George Smathers. Kennedy had even visited Havana during the twilight months of the Batista dictatorship. Realizing that Castro was much on the minds of the U.S. electorate, Kennedy made a point during his presidential campaign of criticizing the Eisenhower administration and Vice President Nixon for inaction on the issue of Cuba. During a televised debate with Nixon on September 26, 1961, Kennedy called for strengthening "the non-Batista Democratic anti-Castro forces in exile and in Cuba itself."[3] Kennedy's accusations went even further on October 19, 1960, when he claimed that "these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our government."[4] Kennedy himself perceived that his victory in the November elections owed much to the hard line he took on Cuba.

On January 22, 1961, two days after taking office, President Kennedy initiated a series of meetings to work out his administration's policy toward Cuba. CIA measures were presented, evaluated, and altered by a committee composed of cabinet officers, intelligence directors, chiefs of staff, and special advisors. The final plan that emerged from the meetings of this National Security Working Committee essentially envisioned a three-stage exile attack.

First, two days before the invasion, on D-2, three coordinated events would occur. CIA B-26s flown by exile pilots would attack Castro's air bases, destroying his air force of 16 operational aircraft. Two fake Cuban bombers (also B-26s) would land in Florida, where exiles, pretending to be Cuban defectors, would take credit for the bombings. This, it was hoped, would keep the existence of the exile air force, and its U.S. supplier, secret. Finally, a small detachment of exiles would divert Castro's reserve forces from the proposed invasion site by landing to the south in Oriente Province.

Second, on D-day, B-26s from Nicaragua would destroy any remaining Castro aircraft. The 1,300 men of Brigade 2506 would then be landed in the early morning hours from a fleet of CIA-commissioned ships. This main landing would take place at three beaches on the Bay of Pigs along the Zapata Peninsula, a swampy district on Cuba's southwest coast. The airfield there was to be seized as

an on-island base for exile bombers. The exile B-26s would then provide air support by bombing and strafing approaching pro-Castro attackers.

Third, the brigade would hold off counterattacks from an expected force of some 25,000 poorly trained, badly led, and unmotivated revolutionary militia soldiers: many of them were expected to desert to the exiles. In the meantime, planners expected a spontaneous national uprising to occur when anti-Castro Cubans got word of the invasion. The Revolutionary Council, composed of exile politicians, would then be brought to Cuba to take charge of a short and victorious civil war. The planners were convinced that Castro's army and government would collapse much as Batista's had two years before. If the invasion failed, the Brigade survivors were expected to "go guerrilla," escaping into the Escambray Mountains 70 miles away.

The Moment of Decision

At 6:00 on Tuesday, April 4, 1961, President Kennedy, accompanied by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, slipped out of an ambassadorial reception and stole into a conference room behind Rusk's office at the State Department. There they met with members of the National Security Working Committee, who had taken similar precautions to avoid detection.

At this meeting, proponents of the invasion plan, such as Admiral Arleigh Burke, the CIA's Richard Bissell, and State Department Attorney Adolph Berle, argued that the exile invasion would spark an uprising that would lead to Castro's overthrow. They added that unless Castro was dealt with now, Cuba would become the base from which a communist-inspired revolution would spread, threatening U.S. security. Critics like Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann and Presidential Advisor Arthur Schlesinger felt that the invasion plan was seriously flawed questioning, for instance, the prospects of the "go guerrilla" option. Moreover, the United States, they held, should not become involved in actions that would violate both treaty commitments and the spirit of the Good Neighbor policy.

What the president needed to know from his advisors was:

- Would the invasion succeed?
- Was such an action the right thing to do?

Secretary Dean Rusk and Senator William Fulbright confer. (National Archives)

Only after grappling with these issues could the president and his advisors make their final judgment about the fate of the invasion. The moment of decision had arrived! Should President Kennedy go ahead with the planned invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro government?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly explain the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
   - contingency plan
   - Special Group
   - Brigade 2506
   - Cuban Revolutionary Council
   - fighters for freedom
   - B-26s
   - Zapata Peninsula
   - spontaneous uprising
   - Escambray Mountains
   - April 4, 1961
   - two questions
2. Describe the CIA contingency plan for the exile invasion of Cuba, citing its strengths and weaknesses.
3. Make a case for one of the following:

   President Kennedy should go ahead with the planned invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles because it would probably work and was the right thing to do.

   or

   President Kennedy ought to cancel the planned invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles because it would probably not work and was not the right thing to do.
4. Prepare to play the role assigned by your teacher, drawing on the appropriate character card and document from the following file.

Sources

1. Richard N. Goodwin, *Remembering America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 172.
2. Letter from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to John F. Kennedy, April 5, 1961 (Presidential Office Files, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library), p. 4.
3. Herbert S. Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 45.
4. Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1962), p. 354.

Arleigh Burke – Navy Admiral and Chief of Naval Operations (Hawk)

Known as "31 Knots" because of his cruising at top speed as a World War II destroyer commander, Burke was promoted over 92 senior admirals to head the world's biggest navy. His credentials for the job were an outstanding war record, a reputation for leadership, and the courage to speak his mind. This lumbering bear of a man was born and raised far from the sea in Colorado, but an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy started Burke on a career path that earned him fame as a destroyer commander in the Pacific Theater during World War II. He distinguished himself in post-war bureaucratic battles as the brains behind the Navy's fight to maintain an air corps separate from the U.S. Air Force. He believed his mission was to modernize the U.S. Navy's ability to exercise worldwide control of the seas. Burke was convinced that the sea lanes to the Panama Canal, vital to U.S. security, were menaced by a communist Cuba. Burke had not been involved in the inception of the Cuban invasion plans, but his subordinates had reviewed them favorably.

See Document 17, "Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan"

Thomas Mann – Assistant Secretary of State (Dove)

A lawyer-turned-diplomat from Laredo, Texas, Thomas Mann's boyhood knowledge of Latino culture served him well in later life. Mann's foreign service career was spent mainly in Latin America. He represented the United States in Uruguay and El Salvador. As a Latin American expert sent to Guatemala on the heels of the CIA overthrow of the Arbenz government, Mann had overseen the organization of a regime sympathetic to U.S. interests. His conservative and legalistic bent made him quite concerned about the nature and implication of U.S. intervention in the affairs of other states. In his position as assistant secretary of state, this tall, lean, and serious man had devoted much time to researching the questionable legality of the U.S. launching of an exile invasion of Cuba and the probable reaction of other countries to this event.

See Document 18, "List of Conclusions"

Adolph Berle – Attorney for the State Department (Hawk)

A recipient of a Harvard law degree, Adolph Berle lived most of his adult life in New York City. There he combined a career as partner in a major law firm with a professorship of corporate law at Columbia. Since the 1920s he had worked for U.S. sugar companies, thereby cultivating a long and knowledgeable acquaintance with Cuban politics. As a member of the Sumner Welles mission to Cuba in 1933, as ambassador to Brazil, and as a delegate to many Latin American conferences, Berle had represented U.S. interests throughout Central and South America. Now, as chairman of the American Molasses Company and special consultant to the secretary of state, he turned his attentions again to U.S.-Cuban relations. Specifically, he was concerned about Castro's seeming transformation of Cuba into a communist dictatorship.

See Document 19, "The Communist Totalitarian Government..."

Richard Bissell – Deputy Director of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Hawk)

Nicknamed the "human computer," Bissell was the son of a millionaire father and socialite mother. Raised on an estate and schooled at Groton and Yale, Bissell early on exhibited great energy and perfectionism. After winning an economics professorship at Yale, he sought a more exciting life in government service. Under President Truman, Bissell administered – some say originated – the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after World War II. As a CIA official, he helped overthrow the left-leaning Arbenz government of Guatemala, ran the U-2 spy plane program, and developed the intelligence reconnaissance satellite. His persuasive salesmanship made Bissell a powerful advocate of the exile invasion, which he had largely planned.

See Document 20, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba"

William J. Fulbright – Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dove)

Born into a socially prominent family in Arkansas, William Fulbright was brought up with a taste for refinement and culture. Academic and earnest, Fulbright was awarded a prestigious Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford. His interest in education led him to a law professorship and later tenure as president of the University of Arkansas. In his career as senator, Fulbright was known for his sponsorship of the international scholarship program that bears his name. In time, Fulbright's eloquence and interest in world affairs earned him a seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As chairman of this committee, he often played the role of critic of U.S. foreign policy, regardless of the president's party or prestige. Thus, he was eager to share with the president his opinion that toleration, rather than overthrow, of the Castro government was in the long-run interest of the United States.

See Document 21, "Memorandum: Cuba Policy"

Dean Rusk – U.S. Secretary of State (Dove)

Despite his humble birth and modest manner, Dean Rusk was promoted to the rank of staff officer in Burma during World War II. Later, his hard work and agreeable personality assured him the support of a series of powerful superiors in government service. With their aid, he had risen through the State Department to his present position as secretary. To run the State Department, Rusk relied heavily upon Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles. Bowles's executive experience as head of a New York advertising agency and as governor of Connecticut made him a valuable advisor to the secretary. It was Bowles who handed Rusk a memo stating his objections to the Bay of Pigs invasion on diplomatic grounds. Bowles hoped the usually unassertive Rusk would raise these views at the meeting.

See Document 22, "On Tuesday, April 4th..."

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.—Historian, Author, and White House Assistant (Dove)

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., established his reputation as an outstanding intellect by winning a Pulitzer Prize in history at age 29. Small, somewhat owlish behind thick glasses, Schlesinger had been a professor in Harvard's history department when he became interested in politics. His gift for phrasemaking earned him a speech-writing post on Kennedy's 1960 campaign staff. Charmed by this sociable scholar and impressed with his intelligence, President Kennedy made Schlesinger a special assistant on his White House staff. One of Schlesinger's assignments was to act as Kennedy's representative to Cuban exile leaders. Schlesinger had strong reservations about the potential success and implications of the proposed invasion.

See Document 23, "Memorandum for the President"

Colonel Jack Hawkins—Inspector of CIA Exile Brigade Base Camp in Guatemala, and CIA Chief of Paramilitary Operations (Hawk)

A soldierly six-footer, Colonel Hawkins was once described as a "typical movie marine." His combat experience included landing in Iwo Jima, two years of guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, and combat in the hills of Korea. Hawkins had thus spent a good portion of the previous 15 years trying to stem what he perceived to be the rising tide of communism in the Third World. A teacher of military science and a talented writer-orator, Hawkins inspired confidence in both commanders and commanded. President Kennedy dispatched Hawkins to the exile camp in Guatemala to assess the readiness of Brigade 2056 for action. His glowing appraisal would carry much weight in the president's deliberations.

See Document 24, "From...."

Document 17

Admiral Arleigh Burke: Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan

On January 28, 1961, President Kennedy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the CIA invasion plan. A committee of officers inspected the plan, prepared the following evaluation, and presented it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 3. Note the central assumptions on which the success of this plan was based, as Admiral Burke saw them.

* * * * *

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The mission of the Task Force of Volunteer Cuban Exiles is to:

a. Invade the island of Cuba by amphibious and airborne assault.

b. Hold a beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government, act as a rallying point for volunteers and as a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba.

c. Integrate with existing guerrilla bands and carry on guerrilla operations if driven from the beachhead area.

8. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air operations is within the capability of the air units and should be successful.

9. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault would be opposed, it should be successful.

10. The amphibious assault should be successful even if lightly opposed. However, the personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. Against moderate, determined resistance, logistic support as presently planned will be inadequate.

11. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound.

15. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks.

16. Even if the invasion Task Force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-up forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible.

17. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention.

18. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

From Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Military Evaluation of CIA Paramilitary Plan, January 28, 1961* (Cuba Study Group, National Security Files, Box 61, John F. Kennedy Library).

19. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third-hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan.

20. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the basic memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which sets forth the above conclusions and recommends that a copy of this evaluation be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency for his information and consideration.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Document 18

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann: List of Conclusions

Over the first two weeks of 1961, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann investigated the implications of the U.S. involvement in the CIA plans to overthrow Castro. On February 15 he prepared for the Secretary of State this summary of his thoughts, in which he stated three reasons for believing the plan might not work. State these reasons and summarize the information supporting each.

* * * * *

LIST OF CONCLUSIONS

I

The March 1960 Plan

What is proposed is the landing of a brigade of approximately 800 men from bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua, supported by an air strike from the same bases either simultaneously with the landing or 24 hours preceeding it. Naval craft, with some "contracted" United States national aboard, would transport the brigade and supply logistic support. It is planned that the brigade, if unopposed and if surprise were achieved, would be able to consolidate their position and hold a beachhead for a limited number of days. If internal support does not materialize, it is planned that the brigade could either march directly to nearby mountains or be withdrawn from the beach to other nearby beaches from whence they could move into the mountains. Once in the mountains they would operate as a guerrilla unit.

My conclusions regarding this proposal are as follows:

(1) The military evaluation of this proposal is that "ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces." It is unlikely that a popular uprising would promptly take place in Cuba of a scale and kind which would make it impossible for the Castro regime to oppose the brigade with superior numbers of well armed troops.

(2) It therefore appears possible, even probable, that we would be faced with the alternative of a) abandoning the brigade to its fate, which would cost us dearly in prestige and respect or b) attempting execution of the plan to move the brigade into the mountains as guerrillas, which would pose a prolonged problem of air drops or supplies or c) overt U.S. military intervention; a JCS staff officer has estimated there is at least a 10% chance that U.S. forces would be required unless alternative a) were adopted.

SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~ – EYES ONLY

Dept. of State (NLK-79-174)
BY MTM NARS, DATE 3/29/82

From Thomas Mann, *List of Conclusions, February 15, 1961* (National Security Files, Box 35, John F. Kennedy Library).

(3) Execution of the proposed plan would be in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, Articles 18 and 25 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and Article 1 of the Rio Treaty, which, in general, proscribe the use of armed force with the sole exception of the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs."

The Castro regime could be expected to call on the other American States (Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty) to assist them in repelling the attack, and to request the Security Council (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) to take action to "maintain and restore international peace and security." The chances of promptly presenting both international organizations with a *fait accompli* are, in my opinion, virtually nil. It would therefore be extremely difficult to deal with Castro demarches of this kind.

[redacted]

(4) Since the proposal comes closer to being a military invasion than a covert operation [redacted] account must be taken of the possibility that the execution of this proposal would attract to Castro additional support within Cuba. More important, a majority of the people of Latin America would oppose the operation, and we would expect that the Communists and Castroites would organize and lead demonstrations designed to bring about the overthrow of governments friendly to us. At best, our moral posture throughout the hemisphere would be impaired. At worst, the effect on our position of hemispheric leadership would be catastrophic.

(5) Time is running against us in Cuba in a military sense since it is probable Castro soon will acquire jet aircraft, since he may acquire missiles and since Castro needs time to train his army and militia. Nevertheless, Defense does not currently consider Cuba to represent a threat to our national security. If later it should become a threat we are able to deal with it.

[redacted] In any case, time is not currently running against us in terms of Latin American public opinion; there has already been a significant decline in Castro's popularity in Latin America, a trend which we have reason to hope will continue, assuming Castro continues to employ the same methods. If one looks at the Castro problem in the context of the struggle between the East and the West for Latin America, if one assumes the success or failure of the Castro policies to achieve a better life for the masses will significantly influence future hemisphere thought and action, and if one assumes that discipline and austerity will be hallmarks of Castroism, the political advantages to us of letting Latin America see for itself the practical results of applying communist theory in a Latin American country could well give us a decisive advantage in the ideological hemisphere struggle ahead of us.

(7) I therefore conclude it would not be in the national interest to proceed unilaterally to put this plan into execution.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 19

State Department Attorney Adolph Berle: The Communist Totalitarian Government of Cuba as a Fact or Situation Endangering the Peace of America

After reviewing events in Cuba since Castro took power, the U.S. State Department, with the assistance of State Department attorney Adolph Berle, concluded that Fidel Castro had become an "instrument of the international communist movement" and had imposed a total dictatorship on this island republic. Summarize the evidence supporting these charges.

* * * * *

What appeared prior to the Seventh Meeting of Consultation as a disturbing trend by the Castro regime toward association with the Sino-Soviet bloc is not an accomplished fact. During the past six months the ideological, political, economic and cultural ties which have been established with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the countries associated with them have become so extensive and intimate as to render Cuba a practicing member of the communist system. Far from rejecting the efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to exploit situations within this hemisphere, as called for in the Declaration of San Jose, the Castro regime has converted itself into an instrument of the international communist movement for achieving this exploitation.

It is important to distinguish between on the one hand a legitimate readjustment of policies, spurred by a genuine nationalism seeking to reaffirm political independence and obtain economic advantages, and on the other the cynical exploitation of authentic revolutionary aspirations of a people to implant an alien system designed to enslave that people and serve as a vehicle for spreading that system to other free nations. The Castro regime corresponds to the second of these.

Ideologically, the Castro government has placed Cuba in the communist camp. This is clearly demonstrated in the Cuban-Soviet joint communique of December 19, 1960. It was succinctly expressed by major Ernesto Guevara Serna in endorsing the statement of beliefs and purposes by the congress of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow on December 6, 1960. Guevara said: "Cuba trusts in the strength of the socialist camp led by the USSR...Cuba wants to tread the way of the Soviet Union."

The Castro regime has established diplomatic relations with all the members of the Sino-Soviet bloc, except East Germany. It is currently engaged in an extraordinary military buildup which has literally transformed the country into an armed camp. Cuba's ground forces are now larger than any country in Latin America, and at least ten times greater than those maintained under the Batista regime. This has been made possible by the receipt of thousands of tons of military equipment from the Sino-Soviet bloc. During the period September 1960 to January 1961 more than 30,000 tons of Soviet bloc arms were delivered to Cuba. Additional shipments are expected.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From State Department, *The Communist Totalitarian Government of Cuba..., March 1, 1961* (National Security Files, Box 35a, John F. Kennedy Library).

Through a series of trade and financial agreements it has moved toward integration of its economy with that of the Communist world. The major result of the trip of Major Guevara to Moscow during the last two months of 1960 was to coordinate Cuba's economic planning with that of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The degree to which Cuba has become economically dependent on the bloc is evidenced by the fact that approximately 75 percent of its trade is now tied up in barter arrangements with Iron Curtain countries. At the beginning of 1960 only two percent of Cuba's total foreign trade was with the bloc.

While reorienting its foreign policy to accept partnership in the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Castro regime internally has moved swiftly to implant a communist totalitarian system which increasingly dominates all facets of Cuban national life. The principles of representative democracy, to which the Cuban Revolutionary Government subscribed in approving the Declaration of Santiago, Chile, have in the process been rejected.

During the past six months the Castro regime has completed its control over all organized institutions of political power in Cuba. The purge of the judiciary, begun in December 1960 and continued in January and February 1961, has brought all three branches of government under the domination of the ruling clique. The last vestiges of opposition in the leadership of the labor movement, represented by "26 of July" Movement union officials opposed to the communist orientation of the regime, have been liquidated. Elements of questionable loyalty to the regime in the military establishment have been neutralized. The regular armed forces have been downgraded and the supposedly politically more reliable worker-peasant-student militia elevated to a position of prominence. The regime is implanting an extensive informer system. It has redefined its laws in such a way that any manifestation of disagreement and opposition can be branded as "counterrevolutionary" and the accused tried before military tribunals and sentenced to long prison terms or given the death penalty. As a result civil liberties and due process as practiced by western democracies no longer exist in Cuba. Cubans are fleeing their homeland by the thousands. The jails are overflowing with political prisoners living under miserable conditions. Those who choose to remain and fight to regain their liberty are being hunted down, summarily tried before military tribunals and shot, in a renewal of the executions which shocked the sensibilities of free peoples of this hemisphere when the Castro regime assumed power.

The foregoing describes the reality of Cuba today: the subjugation of a country by a group of men willingly oriented toward the Sino-Soviet bloc and deliberately serving the interests of the international communist movement. For the Cuban people this represents a betrayal of their revolution and the emergence from one tyranny to fall into an even greater one. For the American Republics it constitutes an imminent and serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

Document 20

CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell: Proposed Operation Against Cuba

The "proposed operation" is a version of the CIA plan to send Brigade 2506 to invade Cuba. In an in-house review of the proposed invasion plan, CIA operations director Richard Bissell listed the men and equipment available for the exile invasion and described conditions in Cuba. Review this information, giving as many specifics as you can.

* * * * *

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 Mar 1961

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. **Status of Preparatory Action:** About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows:

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness.

(1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion.

(3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C54s and 5 C-46s.

(4) Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCUs and 4 LCVPs.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency, *Proposed Operation Against Cuba, March 1, 1961* (Cuba Study Group, National Security Files, Box 61, John F. Kennedy Library).

c. **Timing:** It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem [redacted] The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. **The Situation in Cuba:** We estimate that time is against us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external presure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the militia agianst guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force; are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Document 21

Senator William Fulbright: Memorandum: Cuba Policy

In this memorandum, Senator William Fulbright cited two possible courses of action regarding Cuba. Note both policies, explain how Fulbright argued for one and against the other, and state the values he thought should guide U.S. conduct in the world.

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM

March 29, 1961

CUBA POLICY

The question of United States policy toward Cuba involves a choice of two practical possibilities:

1. Overthrow of the Castro regime.

2. Toleration of the Castro regime, combined with efforts to isolate it and to insulate the rest of Latin America from it.

The Overthrow Policy

It is possible for a regime to be overthrown either from within or without. Despite signs of dissatisfaction within Cuba, the preponderance of the evidence points to the conclusion that the Castro regime is actually strengthening its control of the island, through familiar police-state methods. One cannot, therefore, count on a collapse of the Castro regime or its forcible overthrow through unaided internal forces.

If Cuban exiles mounted an invasion of Cuba, if they then proclaimed a revolutionary government, if this government appealed to the United States for help, if it were recognized by the United States and given help -- all these things would put a coating of legality on the enterprise, but they would do nothing to lessen effectively the universal popular impression that the whole operation was a brainchild and puppet of the United States.

Most Latin American governments are probably sufficiciently outraged, or scared, or disillusioned with Castro to be willing to look politely the other way while these things were going on. But the United States problem in Latin America is not with governments; it is with people, particularly with workers, peasants, and students.

The argument is made that Castro must go in order to keep his influence from spreading further among these groups. But Castro's influence has already gone far beyond the personal appeal of Castro as an individual. It has been converted into *Castrismo*, which can be expected to persist as a doctrine of radical social reform with heavy anti-Yanqui overtones long after Fidel Castro ceases to be the dictator of Cuba. For the United States to overthrow Castro behind a facade of Cuban exiles would merely add fuel to the appeal of *Castrismo*. Such an action would be denounced from the Rio Grande to Patagonia as an example of imperialism and as the conclusive answer to those who felt that the 1960 election presaged a change in U.S. policy. We would undoubtedly also confront a serious situation in the U.N.

Senator William Fulbright to JFK, *Memorandum: Cuba Policy, March 29, 1961* (Presidential Office Files, Box 114a, John F. Kennedy Library).

The prospect must also be faced that an invasion of Cuba by exiles would encounter formidable resistance which the exiles, by themselves, might not be able to overcome. The question would then arise of whether the United States would be willing to let the enterprise fail (in the probably futile hope of concealing the U.S. role) or whether the United States would respond with progressive assistance as necessary to insure success. This would include ultimately the use of armed force; and if we came to that, even under the paper cover of legitimacy, we would have undone the work of 30 years in trying to live down earlier interventions. We would also have assumed the responsibility for public order in Cuba, and in the circumstances this would unquestionably be an endless can of worms.

One further point must be made about even covert support of a Castro overthrow: it is in violation of the spirit, and probably the letter as well, of treaties to which the United States is a party and of U.S. domestic legislation.

The Toleration Policy

It is argued that, recognizing the disadvantages of intervening in Cuba through an exile front, the disadvantages of not intervening are even greater. In this view, it is held that the longer Castro stays in power the harder it will be to dislodge him and the shakier the situation will become in Central America and the Caribbean.

Remembering always this proviso, the Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart. Its existence represents a great blow to the prestige of the United States. Conversely, it is a great boon to the Soviet Union. It also serves the Soviets as a base for agitation in the rest of Latin America, though removal of this base would by no means exclude the Soviets from the Hemisphere so long as they have their embassies in Mexico, Montevideo, and elsewhere. Nor would it remove the cause of social and political unrest in the area.

Neither, however, is Cuba all net gain for the Soviet Union. It is a long way away. It is expensive in terms of rubles and of Soviet resources.

It was said above that the fall of the Castro regime from internal causes could not reasonably be expected, but this is true only so long as the Soviet Union is willing to pay the price of keeping Castro in power. This price is likely to become progressively higher.

If the Castro regime remains in power, its agitation and propaganda elsewhere in the Hemisphere and particularly in Central America and the Caribbean is certain to continue and is more likely to increase than to diminish. But as was pointed out above, the sources of social and political unrest in these areas pre-dated Castro and, in the absence of correction action, will also out-live him.

The real question concerning the future of the Castro regime and its effect on the United States is whether Castro can in fact succeed in providing a better life for the Cuban people; in making Cuba a little paradise, a real Pearl of the Antilles; and whether he can do a better job in this respect in Cuba than the United States and its friends can do elsewhere in Latin America. In all honesty, one should be wary of dogmatic answers on this point. But if one has faith in the human values of the United States, and if that faith is supported by vigorous and intelligent action, then there is no need to fear competition from an unshaven megalomaniac. To look at the other side of the proposition, it would be a fatal confession of lack of faith in ourselves and our values if we decreed that Castro must go because he might succeed.

It will not be easy in any circumstances to shore up the countries of the Caribbean and Central America, and Castro will make it more difficult. But the disadvantages of a policy of overthrow are a good bit clearer than the disadvantages of a policy of toleration, isolation, and insulation.

Document 22

Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: On Tuesday, April 4th...

When Assistant Secretary of State Chester Bowles heard that his boss, Dean Rusk, would be attending the April 4th meeting of the National Security Working Committee, he prepared this memorandum. Bowles personally handed Rusk this document on Friday, March 31, 1961, urging him to present its main arguments at the meeting. State and elaborate upon each of these arguments.

* * * * *

March 31, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

FROM: The Under Secretary

On Tuesday, April 4th, a meeting will be held at the White House at which a decision will be reached on the Cuban adventure.

During your absence I have had an opportunity to become better acquainted with the proposal, and I find it profoundly disturbing.

Let me frankly say, however, that I am not a wholly objective judge of the practical aspects. In considerable degree, my concern stems from a deep personal conviction that our national interests are poorly served by a covert operation of this kind at a time when our new President is effectively appealing to world opinion on the basis of high principle.

Even in our imperfect world, the differences which distinguish us from the Russians are of vital importance. This is true not only in a moral sense but in the practical effect of these differences on our capacity to rally the non-Communist world in behalf of our traditional democratic objectives.

In saying this, I do not overlook the ruthless nature of the struggle in which we are involved, nor do I ignore the need on occasion for action which is expedient and distasteful. Yet I cannot persuade myself that means can be *wholly* divorced from ends – even within the context of the cold war.

Against this background, let me suggest several points which I earnestly hope will be fully taken into account in reaching the final decision.

1. In sponsoring the Cuban operation, for instance, we would be deliberately violating the fundamental obligations we assumed in the act of Bogatá establishing the Organization of American States. The Act provides:

> "No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

To act deliberately in defiance of these obligations would deal a blow to the Inter-American System from which I doubt it would soon recover. The suggestion that Cuba has somehow "removed itself" from the System is a transparent rationalization for the exercise of our own will.

Chester Bowles to Dean Rusk, *Memorandum*, Chester Bowles Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

More generally, the United States is the leading force in and substantial beneficiary of a network of treaties and alliances sretching around the world. That these treaty obligations should be recognized as binding in law and conscience is the condition not only of a lawful and orderly world, but of the mobilization of our own power.

We cannot expect the benefits of this regime of treaties if we are unwilling to accept the limitations it imposes on our freedom to act.

2. Those most familiar with the Cuban operation seem to agree that, as the venture is now planned, the chances of success are not greater than one out of three. This makes it a highly risky operation. If it fails, Castro's prestige and strength will be greatly enhanced.

The one way we can reduce the risk is by commitment of direct American military support. In talking to Bob McNamara and Ros Gilpatric at lunch Tuesday at the Pentagon, I gathered that this is precisely what the military people feel we should do.

3. Under the very best of circumstances, I believe this operation will have a much more adverse effect on world opinion than most people contemplate. It is admitted that there will be riots and a new wave of anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. It is also assumed that there will be many who quietly wish us well and, if the operation succeeds, will heave a sigh of relief.

Since January 20th our position has been dramatically improved in the eyes of the world vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The Kennedy Administration has been doing particularly well in Africa and Latin America, and with a little luck in Laos and more affirmative policies, we may soon be able to improve our position in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Within the next few months we can also begin to strengthen our relations with Western Europe.

I believe it would be a grave mistake for us to jeopardize the favorable position we have steadily developed in most of the non-Communist world by the responsible and restrained policies which are now associated with the President by embarking on a major covert adventure with such very heavy built-in risks.

I realize that this operation has been put together over a period of months. A great deal of time and money has been put into it, and many able and dedicated people have become emotionally involved in its success. We should not, however, proceed with this adventure simply because we are wound up and cannot stop.

Document 23

Presidential Advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Memorandum for the President

Arthur Schlesinger, one of Kennedy's advisors on Cuba, gave the president this memo on April 5 because he felt that he had not expressed his point clearly during the previous day's meeting. Schlesinger counseled against the invasion. State his concerns about the predicted uprising, the dangers of direct U.S. intervention, and the impact of the invasion on world opinion.

* * * * *

April 5, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: **Cuba**

1. When you asked me after the meeting yesterday what I thought about the Cuban proposal, I am afraid that I did not give a properly ordered answer.

2. My brief answer is that I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba – i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of the provisional government would represent, however, a change of phase in our Cuban policy. If entirely successful, it would have the highly beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be for it. But in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance – and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented – I am against it.

3. The following considerations concerning the beachhead operation seem to be vital:

a) *No matter how "Cuban" the equipment and personnel, the US will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success.*

b) *Since the Castro regime is presumably too strong to be toppled by a single landing, the operation will turn into a protracted civil conflict.*

4. If these assumptions are true, it seems to me that the operation involves the following hazards:

a) The protraction of the struggle and the commitment of American prestige (especially if we proceed to recognize and supply a provisional government) will create increasing pressure on us to guarantee the success of the operation through ever more intense and overt involvement. It will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba. If the landing fails to trigger uprisings behind the lines and defections in the Militia (and the evidence that it would do so is inconclusive), the logic of the situation could well lead us, step by step, to the point where the last step would be to dispatch the Marines.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11
NSC Enclosure (NSK-77-598)
BY tnfh NARS, DATE 9/12/78 [redacted]

Arthur Schlesinger to JFK *Memorandum for the President. Subject Cuba, April 5, 1961* (Presidential Office Files, Box 115n, John F. Kennedy Library).

b) The protraction of the struggle will give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged). The situation is made to order for the Communist agitprop apparatus. Jose Marti Brigades and no doubt Abraham Lincoln Brigades will be recruited to support Castro, not just from beyond the Iron Curtain, but in Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There will be demonstrations and riots around the world on the model of the movement for Loyalist Spain in the late Thirties. There will be resolutions in the United Nations, with testimony by prisoners or Castro agents about the US preparation of and responsibility for the action.

c) As the struggle protracts itself and as the political campaign mounts against the US, our government – and you – will have to meet penetrating questions about our role in the affair. We will have either to evade the questions and thereby tacitly plead guilty; or deny involvement; or declare ignorance. Each course presents obvious difficulties. If we admit involvement, we admit action taken in violation of the basic charters of the hemisphere and of the United Nations. If we justify such violation by pleading a higher law, we place ourselves thereafter on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union. If we deny involvement, few will believe us; and we invite a repetition of the U-2 episode, which made us look absurd before the world.

Whatever we do, the effect will be to spoil the new US image – the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has already had such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the US and increasing world confidence in US methods and purposes.

d) And there is the Fulbright point: our responsibility for the post-Castro regime. The eyes of the world will be upon us, and we cannot afford a post-Castro mess. On the basis of the documents they have submitted to us containing their ideas for the future, I rather share his doubts as to the competence of the exile leaders.

6. The consequences of abandonment remain to be considered. Abandonment would conceivably suggest a US failure of nerve. It might seem to place a premium on the defiance of Castro; it would certainly dishearten those in Latin America who have exposed themselves by demanding action against Castro; it would certainly disillusion the brave men we have gathered in Guatemala; it would confront us with the problem of demobilizing and resettling these men. The fact that the expedition was conceived, prepared and then called off at the last moment would increase Castro's prestige and power.

These are all powerful points. They weigh very heavily in my mind on the side of going ahead. However, I hesitate to say that we should do something simply because we have seemed to commit ourselves to doing it which, if we were starting fresh, we would not do.

On balance, I think that the risks of the operation slightly outweigh the risks of abandonment....

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Document 24

Colonel Jack Hawkins: From...

President Kennedy commissioned this Marine colonel to inspect the CIA training camp in Guatemala and write a report on the morale and capability of the exile soldiers. Colonel Jack Hawkins sent him the following account of Brigade 2506 in early April. Cite how Hawkins rated the combat-readiness of these troops. Also note the intangible factors Hawkins thought would contribute to the success of the invasion.

* * * * *

SANITIZED COPY

FROM: [redacted]

1. [redacted] ability this force to accomplish not only political combat missions but also ultimate objective of Castro overthrow.

2. Ref arrived during final briefing of brigade and battalion commanders. They now know all details of plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated with a fanatical urge to begin battle for which most of them have been preparing in the rugged conditions of training camps for almost a year. [redacted] without exception they have utmost confidence in their ability to win. They say they know their own people and believe after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon opposing forces, the latter will melt away from Castro whom they have no wish to support. They say it is Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win and all engagements against the best Castro has to offer. [redacted]

3. The brigage is well organized and is more heavily armed and better equpped in some respects than U.S. infantry units. The men have received intensive training in the use of their weapons including more firing experience than U.S. troops would normally receive. [redacted] Movements were quiet, disciplined and efficient and [redacted] accomplished with remarkable smoothness.

4. The brigade now numbers [redacted] a truly formidable force.

5. [redacted] The aircraft are kept with pride and some of the crews are so eager to commence contemplated operations that they have already armed their aircraft. [redacted] informed me today that he considers the [redacted] squadron equal to the best U.S. Air Force squadron.

6. The brigade officers do not expect help from U.S. armed forces. They ask only for continued delivery of supplies. [redacted]

7. This Cuban force is motivated, strong, well trained, armed to the teeth and ready. I believe profoundly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to deter it from its intended purposes.

SANITIZED

CIA IT- (WLK-79-185)
BY [redacted] NARS DATE 3/11/81

Approved for Release
Date 11 February 1981

~~SECRET~~

Jack Hawkins to JFK. *From* , *No date* (Presidential Office Files. Box 115. John F. Kennedy Library)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CHAPTER 6: SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY ORDER SUFFICIENT AIR SUPPORT TO INSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE INVASION?

This was the moment for the United States Government to come in and help this operation; otherwise it would appear that the United States had abandoned the people who were fighting against Communism in Cuba.[1]

Cuban Revolutionary Council President José Miró Cardona

Such an overt unilateral [one-sided] intervention, "contrary to our traditions and our international obligations" as the President said, would have been far more costly to the cause of freedom throughout the hemisphere than even Castro's continued presence.[2]

Presidential Advisor Theodore Sorenson

Introduction

Less than a day after the long-debated invasion of Cuba by CIA-trained and -equipped Cuban exiles had been launched, the 1,300 men who had stormed ashore were in serious trouble. Little seemed to have gone according to plan. The air raids by the squadron of eight exile B-26s had failed to knock out 11 of Castro's planes; Castro's air force was thus able to control the skies over the invasion beaches, strafing Brigade 2506 positions and sinking exile supply ships. Unable to call in air strikes on the reinforcing columns of Castro's militia, the exiles soon were outnumbered 20 to 1 and totally vulnerable to shelling by Castro's tanks and artillery. Pepe San Roman, the exile brigade commander, radioed desperate appeals for air support from U.S. Navy planes stationed over the horizon on the *U.S.S. Essex*.

As this distressing news reached the White House, President Kennedy faced a crucial dilemma. On the one hand, the invasion, and the U.S. anti-Castro policy, was bound to fail unless the United States was willing to commit air power and even ground forces to insure its victory. On the other hand, the president had publicly committed the United States not to interfere directly in Cuban affairs. Should the president not order air support for the invasion, the United States would condemn the men it placed on the beaches to death or capture. Direct U.S. military intervention, however, could provoke the Soviets to challenge other U.S. interests in Europe or Asia.

At an April 18 meeting in the Oval Office of the White House, Kennedy and his advisors had to decide whether to deepen U.S. commitment to the invasion. Should the president order sufficient U.S. air support to guarantee the success of the invasion? Or should the president avoid direct U.S. military intervention in this losing cause?

Invasion Problems

By April 18, D + 1, it was clear to everyone involved that the invasion was not going well. An exile air raid on April 15 had alerted Castro to the coming invasion and given him time to round up 100,000 known opponents of his regime. With this action, virtually all hope of a spontaneous anti-Castro rebellion in Cuba was dashed. That day, a small diversionary force, sent to confuse Castro's army by landing well to the south of the Bay of Pigs, had not been able to go ashore. Moreover, an uncharted reef off the Zapata peninsula forced the debarkation of much of Brigade 2506 in water deep enough to short out their portable radios. In addition, unexpected militia guards resisted the invaders on "Blue Beach." Worse, a radio operator's report of the landings to Havana authorities enabled Castro to dispatch forces to the Bay of Pigs well before CIA planners had anticipated.

The invasion's critical problem, however, related to control of the skies over the Bay of Pigs. On D-2, April 15, a squadron of eight B-26s, piloted by Cuban exiles flying from Nicaragua, bombed, strafed, and rocketed three Cuban military airfields. Only five of Castro's 16 operational aircraft were destroyed in this Saturday raid. According to CIA-concocted evidence presented at the United Nations by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (who had not been informed as to the true extent of U.S. involvement in the invasion), the raid had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban air force. When this "cover story" withered under the scrutiny of the international press, an angry and embarrassed Stevenson warned the president of dangerous consequences should the United States lose its reputation for honesty at the United Nations. Fearful of exposing the U.S. hand in the Cuban exile invasion in front of the world, President Kennedy canceled the D-day bombing raid against Castro's remaining planes. Castro thus retained several Sea Fury bombers and two T-33 training jets with which to attack the invaders.

The failure to knock out all of Castro's air force proved extremely damaging to the invasion effort. On the morning of D-day, April 17, Sea Furies sank two exile ships, the ammunition-laden *Houston* and the *Rio Escondido*, off the Zapata beaches. This event deprived the invading forces of medical and communications gear. Other exile support ships promptly withdrew from the beachhead. The faster Cuban T-33 jets drove off or shot down exile B-26 air cover over the beachhead. With air superiority now in Castro's hands, columns of his tanks and trucks full of militiamen could be sent unhindered down the roads heading toward the landing zones. Furthermore, Cuban artillery batteries, firing on exile positions with new Soviet-supplied guns, could not be knocked out from the air. Without effective air cover, the exile brigade, facing a force of 25,000 Castro militiamen, stood little chance of success.

The president's options concerning the situation on the beaches were constrained. In a press conference on April 12, President Kennedy had committed the United States to a policy of no direct intervention in Cuban affairs. The president pointed out that U.S. security interests were not really endangered by Cuba. "The basic issue in Cuba," Kennedy had held, "is not one between the United States and Cuba. It is between the Cubans themselves."[3] Likewise, the United States was publicly obliged to abide by the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), which forbade military takeover of the land of a member country. Accordingly, the rules of engagement set down by the president required that U.S. ships and aircraft escorting the invasion supply ships remain "over the horizon," 20 miles away from the Cuban coast. They could only fire if fired upon. As a consequence, U.S. seamen and naval pilots could do little more than observe the increasingly unequal struggle. In addition, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent an urgent message to the president on the morning of April 18 (D + 1) warning that "any 'so called' small war can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world."[4] White House advisors took this as a threat of Soviet countermeasures in Berlin, deep in Soviet-allied East Germany, or Laos, in Southeast Asia, where communist guerrillas fought against a U.S.-supported government.

D + 1 at Blue Beach and Washington

By Tuesday, April 18 (D + 1), the exile invasion had met with serious reversals. Green Beach to the east had never been occupied, and the exiles on Red Beach (Playa Largo) to the west were forced to retreat to the main landing site at Giron, Blue Beach (see map). There the exiles consolidated their forces and held off Castro's advancing tanks on the San Blas road, the main route inland. Low on ammunition, gasoline, and first aid supplies, strafed by Castro's jets, and shelled by tanks and guns, the embattled exiles angrily radioed their CIA advisors. Where was the umbrella of U.S. planes they had been promised?

On the night of April 18, President and Mrs. Kennedy were attending the annual White House congressional reception. In the middle of the evening, the president was informed of an urgent phone call from CIA headquarters. He was told that the situation on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs was desperate enough to necessitate an immediate meeting of the National Security Working Committee. Around midnight, the president, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Secretary Rusk, all in white tie, met in the Oval Office with, among others, Admiral Burke, resplendent in a full-dress uniform, medals aglow.

PLANNED DISPOSITION OF FORCES



GENERAL DISPOSITION OF FORCES – END OF D + 1



Examine the two maps above. The top map represents the military objectives that planners expected the Brigade to achieve by the second day of the invasion. The bottom map indicates the actual position of Brigade forces on the second day. Name the objectives that the Brigade had not taken on D + 1.

Bissell, drawn and unkempt, briefed the group. He told them about the collapsing Zapata defenses, the shortage of ammunition, and the refusal of exile pilots to fly virtually suicidal missions to a beachhead patrolled by T-33s. Bissell made it clear, much to the Working Committee's surprise, that impassible swamps and lack of training prevented the brigade from "going guerrilla" and dispersing. Nor could the brigade be rescued by sea without directly engaging U.S. Marines in the battle.

Bissell reported that the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the CIA-sponsored government in exile headed by Dr. Miro Cardona, complained of U.S. betrayal. They protested that the United States was permitting the slaughter of their sons and threatened "extreme action," or suicide. The only way to rescue the invasion from complete defeat, Bissell advised the president, was by allowing direct U.S. military intervention. U.S. Navy jets from the carrier *Essex* must fly air cover over the beachhead and drive Castro's planes from the sky. After having gained air superiority, U.S. planes could then destroy oncoming tank and truck columns and knock out Castro's airfields and artillery. Because of Castro's arrest of opponents who might have staged an uprising, the ultimate success of the invasion would depend on U.S. troops.

President Kennedy's Choice

The president faced a very difficult dilemma. On the one hand, he felt responsibility for the exile combatants on the beaches, most of whom had assumed that they would receive the aid they needed from U.S. forces. On the other hand, the president had clearly stated the limits of U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs in his April 12 press conference. Furthermore, President Kennedy's concern about the spread of communism in Latin America had to be balanced against U.S. responsibility to protect areas such as West Berlin, as vulnerable to Soviet aggression as Cuba was to U.S. intervention.

Should President Kennedy order U.S. jets to engage the Cuban air force and use whatever force was necessary to assure the success of the invasion? Or should the president refrain from drawing the United States more directly into the battle?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - failure of air raid
    - Adlai Stevenson
    - Rio Escondido
    - T-33s
    - news conference
    - OAS charter
    - Premier Khrushchev
    - D + 1 at Blue Beach
    - umbrella
    - Oval Office
    - "extreme action"
    - West Berlin
2. Describe in detail the military situation of the brigade on D + 1 (the second day of the invasion).
3. Read the document assigned to you by your teacher. Using information from this document, help your cooperative group fill in the decision chart. After completing the chart, discuss in your group

the pros and cons of committing U.S. forces to the invasion. Then each group should prepare a recommendation for one of the following courses of action, supported by an argument that takes into account the Brigade, U.S. Cuba policy, and U.S. worldwide commitments:

President Kennedy should commit the U.S. military forces required to insure the success of the exile invasion.

or

President Kennedy should not commit the U.S. military forces required to insure the success of the exile invasion.

Sources

1. Cuba Study Group, Meeting 19, José Miró Cardona Interview, May 25, 1961 (National Security Files, Box 61a, John F. Kennedy Library), p. 2.

2. Theodore C. Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 297.

3. John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents – John F. Kennedy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 258.

4. *New York Times* (April 18, 1961), p. 1.

Document 25

U.S. News and World Report: Air Will Be Ours

At the beginning of 1963, three former officers of the exile air force met with a reporter from U.S. News and World Report. *These men cited specific promises regarding air support during the invasion. Recount several different occasions when, according to these officers, the CIA promised U.S. air support for the invasion.*

* * * * *

"The camp commander in Guatemala was an American officer of high rank. We knew him as Colonel Frank. We considered his word official enough for us. On Feb. 10 or 12, 1961, the training was halted because of a disagreement among the members of the Brigade. Colonel Frank came to our barracks and talked to all of us. He said training must be resumed right away because there was a time schedule which was co-ordinated with American preparations. He told us the American preparations could not be halted and that we had to get on with the training so we would be ready to do our part.

"Then Colonel Frank gave us some inkling of the over-all plan. He said that we were to lead the way onto the beach, but that we would be joined in three days – certainly no more than five days – by 30,000 American marines. He said those marines were combat-loaded on the aircraft carrier *Boxer* and other ships in Puerto Rico and Florida.

"Then he said that we would have American air cover during the operation. In addition, he told us that American naval vessels would escort us to the beaches and would stand by to give us any support that we needed. For us, this was as official as it could have been."...

They [the three Cuban airmen] said the entire air force of the invaders consisted of 15 B-26 attack bombers, 4 C-54 transport planes and 5 C-46 transport planes. The air force, they said, trained at Tray Base in Guatemala and operated during the invasion from a base called "Happy Valley" in Nicaragua. Tail guns were removed from the B-26 bombers so that they could carry more fuel for the long flight to Cuba. This created uneasiness among the B-26 fliers. How, they asked their American advisers, could B-26 pilots be expected go to into combat without tail guns?

From an American advisor, the pilots related, came this answer: "You don't have to worry about Castro fighters because they will not be in the air. The air will be ours."...

Dagoberto Darias, commander of a transport vessel in the Cuban invasion, said he received an American promise of air support. It came, he said, in a radiogram from "the American flagship directing our operations." That radiogram, he related, was received at 11 a.m. on April 18, 1961, and said that air cover would arrive at 2:30 p.m. that same day. It did not arrive....

Gonzalo Herrera, operations officer of the B-26 squadron of the Liberation Air Force, told this story:

"We were told that, in advance of the invasion, there would be a series of air strikes against Castro's airfields to knock out his air force. On April 15 – two days before the invasion – we attacked three airfields and knocked out several planes. Then, suddenly, we were told there would be no more strikes against Castro airfields. Our American advisers told us the reason was that the attacks on airfields were endangering civilian lives and were 'having a bad effect on public opinion in Latin America.

"We protested that the job of knocking out Castro's air force was not yet finished. Again the Americans told us: 'Don't worry. Air cover will take care of everything.' Furthermore, they told us we were not to ask any more questions about fighter cover."

From *U.S. News and World Report* (February 4, 1963), p. 34.

Richard Bissell: A Hope Transferred into a Belief

In oral testimony recorded for the Kennedy Library in the 1960s, Deputy Director Richard Bissell claimed that the CIA had never intentionally given the Cubans cause to believe that they would get direct military assistance in the form of U.S. air support after they landed on the beaches. In this excerpt, Bissell tried to explain how the Cuban exiles got the false impression that the United States would supply what was needed to insure the success of the invasion. Note at least two separate but interrelated explanations.

* * * * *

O'CONNOR: Okay. In connection with the men who were training, evidently the men who were training in Guatemala thought that there would be more support from the United States than actually was forthcoming or than had ever been decided to put forth. Do you know how that misunderstanding or misconception arose?

BISSELL: Well, I don't know how much of a misconception there was, nor do I know when any misconception arose. I can make some guesses, however, as to when and how. The reason I say that I don't know how much of a misconception there was is that the instructions that went out were very clear throughout the whole period of training, to the effect that U.S. forces would not become involved in any way in the attack against Castro. In the late stages of the training, actually only days before the deployment of the force was to be started, this report kept recurring in Washington that the trainees had been told that they would receive U.S. military support, air cover, or naval support or whatever form it might take.

So at that late stage the Marine colonel, whom I have referred to before, who was the senior military officer in charge of this activity on my staff, was dispatched to Nicaragua where the embarkation was taking place, the primary purpose being a last minute assessment of the brigade. A mission of almost equal importance was again to make clear to its officers that they could not expect any direct U.S. military support. I have every reason to believe that he made just this explanation to them. My own belief is that probably at that stage of the game, when they were highly confident of success, at least in the early part of their plan, the issue didn't bulk large in their minds and they probably accepted these assurances. My feeling is that when, not having achieved command of the air, they found themselves in a desperate situation, they were obviously hoping that U.S. forces would come to their assistance in some way or other. They probably knew there was a carrier offshore, they probably saw U.S. military aircraft in the area and hoped for the best. And it's very easy under these circumstances for the hope to be translated into a belief that further support had been promised.

However, I do have a further surmise. Over the months, and especially the last few weeks of training, the Americans who were doing the training were and had to be very close to the Cubans. The American trainers were, I think, almost as much emotionally involved in this operation as any of the Cubans themselves. I have little doubt that on occasion the Americans gave some impressions that perhaps they didn't intend, but in any event gave rise to some impressions that went beyond any explicit instructions. I think it's perfectly possible that at one time or another they may have said, "Well, if you really get in trouble, you can be sure that the U.S. will be in a position where it will have to intervene to help you out." This is my own surmise as to how any such belief came into being.

From Richard Bissell, John F. Kennedy Library – Oral History (Joseph E. O'Connor Interview), p. 34.

Jose Betancourt: You Can't Go by the Books

In testimony before an investigative commission, exile soldier Jose Betancourt was asked to give his opinion concerning the brigade's need for air support. What two types of air support did Betancourt think should have been provided? In what way did he believe the United States should alter its method of fighting communism?

* * * * *

MR. BETANCOURT: Yes. The initial plan called for three air strikes – the 15th, the 16th, and the 17th. The 15th, there was an air strike, but then there was an order to stop the rest of the air strikes. We had to have these air strikes because they were supposed to take care of the air fields and the tanks – maybe not 100% but quite a bit, so actually the success of this invasion was based on those air strikes. That was the initial plan, so why didn't they tell us we couldn't carry on with the invasion because the air strikes were stopped. They could have told us and we could have gone back to the point of departure.

RESPONSE: We know the D-2 strikes were quite successful but not entirely successful.

MR. BETANCOURT: We knew the success of the Brigade depended on the success of the air strikes; otherwise, it's just like sending a bunch of human beings to get killed.

MR. BETANCOURT: Well, there's no point in asking why the American jet airplanes didn't help us. They could have very well. They could have been our planes as far as we were concerned. We could have arranged to take all the insignia off.

There are many things I don't understand about political affairs and so on, but I don't think the United States knows how to fight the Communists. You can't go by the books. Sometimes you have to throw away the book to fight. There's only one way to fight those people and that's by fighting them the way they fight. You cannot fight them by talking. You cannot fight with conferences. Look at what's happening in Laos. In my opinion, Laos is completely lost.

QUESTION: There was some comment as to whether the force could be turned back. If they had been ordered to turn around and go back because there were no air strikes, do you think that Pepe would have turned around and gone back?

MR. BETANCOURT: We could have delayed the invasion.

QUESTION: Do you think he would have responded?

MR. BETANCOURT: I couldn't answer that question. That's not the point. The point is that the order never came in. If he had taken the order and not responded to it, that would have been his responsibility.

QUESTION: Any other comments?

MR. BETANCOURT: Yes, as far as I'm concerned, I'm willing to help anyway I can. I think we fight a common cause. It's not just Cuban against Cuban – it's throughout the world.

Cuba Study Group, Jose Betancourt Interview (National Security Files, 61a, John F. Kennedy Library), p. 22.

The Charter of the Organization of American States

The Charter of the Organization of American States was signed in Bogata, Colombia, in 1948 by the United States and 20 other Western hemisphere countries, including Cuba. The Charter declared ideals that signers felt ought to cover relations between American countries. It also prohibited certain behaviors between nations. Identify some of these ideals and prohibited behaviors.

* * * * *

CHAPTER II: PRINCIPLES (ARTICLE 5)

The American States reaffirm the following principles:

a) International law is the standard of conduct of States in their reciprocal relations;

b) International order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law;

c) Good faith shall govern the relations between States;

d) The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy;

e) The American States condemn war of aggression; victory does not give rights;

f) An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States;

CHAPTER III: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

ARTICLE 15: No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

ARTICLE 16: No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

ARTICLE 17: The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

ARTICLE 18: The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

ARTICLE 19: Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

From O. Carlos Stoetzer, *The Organization of American States* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 121.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Worldwide Defeat for Democracy

On April 18, 1961, President Kennedy sent Schlesinger and Adolph Berle to Florida to confer with the Cuban Revolutionary Council. There they met with council members, including José Miró Cardona, Tony Varona, and Antonio Maceo, all of whom had sons in the Brigade. These exile politicians tried to persuade the president to commit U.S. forces to the battle in Cuba. According to them, what would be the consequences, in Cuba and the world, should Kennedy not back the invasion with all necessary military support?

* * * * *

Our arrival brought the house to life. The members of the Council wore khaki fatigues: Miró Cardona, with a son at the beachhead; Tony Varona, with a son, two brothers, and a nephew; Antonio Maceo, with a son; Ray; Justo Carrillo; and Carlos Helvia. Bender and two CIA people joined the group.

Miró Cardona looked ten years older than the man with whom Berle and I had lunched at the Century a short week before. He spoke to us with deep earnestness. It was, he said, a life and death struggle, and not too late to turn the tide. He talked of sending in more contract fliers. In any case, he said, the only excuse the Revolutionary Council could now offer to the people of Cuba was to be permitted to die with the men on the beaches. "It is this," he said with immense gravity, " which I request, this which I beg."

Miró was followed by Varona. Where Miró was melancholy, Varona was intense, florid, and truculent. For five minutes it was hard to make out what he was trying to say. Then there began to emerge from his resonant periods a violent indictment of the CIA. CIA, he said, had not consulted with the council nor coordinated with the resistance groups inside Cuba. All it had done was to land 1400 men at the worst possible place. Why no uprising behind the lines? CIA had entirely disregarded the resistance groups....As for the B-26s, the Brigade was now running out of pilots, while 30 experienced Cuban pilots were sitting around Miami yearning for an opportunity to fight for their homeland. Varona said vehemently that he had inspected the camps in Guatemala; that the CIA had deceived him; that on returning to Miami he had urged the sons of his friends to enlist. It was evident that he had condemned these young men, the flower of their generation, to a wretched death.

What could be done now? Evacuation was impossible. The only possible course, Varona said, was to put United States planes into the battle and, if this was not enough, to send the Marines. After all, Castro had Soviet planes, Soviet tanks, Soviet technicians. Why could not the United States do as much for its friends? If this was not done, no Cuban would ever trust the United States again. And, if this were not done, then the great United States would have been whipped by Fidel Castro. The Americans, he said grimly, could not hope to escape responsibility. The men dying on the beaches might be Cuban; but the training, the command, the timing, the decision to invade – all were American. Did not Washington understand that its whole future in Latin America turned on whether it could meet the challenge of Castro in Cuba?...

Maceo added that the struggle in Cuba was not between two groups of Cubans but between two ways of life; failure on the beaches would mean a worldwide defeat for democracy. If Castro could successfully defy the United States, more and more of Latin America would move into his orbit.

From *A Thousand Days*, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., pp. 279-281. Copyright © 1965 by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Robert F. Kennedy: The Russians Would Move on Berlin

In an interview recorded for the Kennedy Library's oral history program, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy recalled the difficulty in deciding whether to send sufficient air support to save the brigade on April 18. The attorney general cited three reasons for not affording the brigade U.S. air support. State each of these three reasons.

* * * * *

RFK: He was – it was really a question then what we could do in order to save the situation. I remember Secretary Rusk was strongly against sending any airplanes in; that the President had made a public announcement that no military forces of the United States would be used and therefore, he'd be going back on his word if American forces were in fact used in order to save it.

JBM: Yes, he said that flatly and publicly before the invasion –

RFK: So that – that problem. The other argument against doing anything – sending American forces in was – we didn't know whether in fact airplanes going in there or bombers going in there wouldn't save the situation. The third – because again we didn't have enough intelligence information to know that. The third factor was that we didn't know if we did that – this was a very important factor – it was always the feeling that the Russians would move on Berlin, and if we used American forces which would have to be mostly planes at that time, because there weren't enough American military forces in the area prepared to land, whether you'd use American planes and all you'd do is instead of having them destroyed in 72 hours it would be destroyed in six or seven days and you would have used American military forces and still not have saved the situation. And then with the risk that the Russians would move in Berlin while we moved there in the Bay of Pigs and moved ineffectively.

JBM: Khrushchev said at the time publicly that Cuba is not alone.

RFK: Yes, I don't think we often thought that he'd do anything in Cuba or a great deal that he could do but we did think that there was a great risk that he'd move and make it more difficult in Laos, more difficult in Viet Nam, make it more difficult in Berlin, that he couldn't just stand by. The other thing, as I say, we didn't even know then whether it would be effective. So we sat around at these meetings without having – it was a most frustrating period. Sat around at the meetings without having any information and without really knowing what you could do that would be effective.

From Robert F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library – Oral History (John Barlow Martin Interview), p. 66.

CHAPTER 7:
WAS THE STATIONING OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA JUSTIFIED?

This sudden, clandestine [secret] decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitment are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.[1]

President John F. Kennedy

Our position was that steps were needed to demonstrate that an aggression against Cuba was equivalent to aggression against the Soviet Union.[2]

Prime Minister Fidel Castro

We hadn't given the Cubans anything more than the Americans were giving their allies. We had the same rights and opportunities as the Americans. Our conduct in the international arena was governed by the same rules and limits as the Americans.[3]

Premier Nikita Khrushchev

Introduction

In October 1962, a year and a half after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy and his inner circle of advisors learned about a secret accord that they felt would have significant consequences for the United States. The Soviet Union and Cuba had concluded an agreement to base medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Moreover, Soviet technicians were already constructing these missile sites in western Cuba. This new move by the Soviets raised two important questions. First, was the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba justified? Second, what would be the most effective strategy for removing the missiles? The first of these questions will be discussed in this chapter; the second awaits consideration in Chapter 8.

The leaders of the United States, Cuba, and the USSR had conflicting positions on the question of whether the USSR was justified in stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy held that the Monroe Doctrine gave the United States the responsibility to defend the Western Hemisphere from communist aggression. Soviet dishonesty in acknowledging sending the missiles to Cuba only underlined their intent to upset the balance of power, threatening U.S. security and world peace. Prime Minister Fidel Castro, on the other hand, alleged that ever since the Bay of Pigs operation, the actions of the U.S. government indicated that the United States intended to attack his country. Castro claimed that Cuba needed Soviet missile bases in order to persuade Kennedy that an attack on Cuba would lead to a wider war. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev contended that he stationed the missiles in Cuba to protect a vulnerable ally that was threatened by a much more powerful aggressor. In addition, he argued that if the United States would base missiles on the borders of the Soviet Union, the USSR should have equal rights in Cuba. Considering the following events, was the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba justified? Why or why not?

Events Following the Bay of Pigs

April 21, 1961

President Kennedy set up a board of inquiry into the Bay of Pigs operation, headed by General Maxwell Taylor. This investigation soon produced a report that was critical of the CIA's handling of the invasion and led to establishment of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency to coordinate the worldwide struggle against communist revolution.

May 1, 1961

Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Minister of Industry, announced that all non-agricultural productive property in Cuba was now in state hands. A central planning board, JUCEPLAN, would issue the yearly economic plans for Cuba, replacing the free market as a means of economic decision-making. The Soviet Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe signed aid and trade agreements to develop socialism in Cuba.

June 3-4, 1961

President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev of the Soviet Union conferred in Vienna about the international situation. Khrushchev pressed Kennedy about the Pay of Pigs invasion. After admitting that this operation had been a mistake, Kennedy asked what Khrushchev might have done if a pro-U.S. government had come to power in neighboring Poland.

August 13, 1961

In order to end escapes of thousands of East German citizens to the West, the communist East German government put up a wall between East and West Berlin. Construction of the wall violated previous agreements to allow free movement of people in Berlin. Khrushchev threatened to cut off U.S. access to the city by January 1962. Kennedy reinforced the U.S. garrison in West Berlin.

August 17, 1961

At the urging of the United States, the Organization of American States formally inaugurated the Alliance for Progress at Punta del Este, Uruguay. This program called for the modernization of Latin America through political democratization, economic development, and social reforms. The United States would provide $20 billion in foreign aid and private investment to help accomplish these goals.

President Kennedy meets with Alliance for Progress leaders in March 1962. (John F. Kennedy Library)

October 17-31, 1961

At the 22nd Communist Party conference in Moscow, Khrushchev indirectly criticized Mao Zedong and the communist government of China. One of the points of disagreement between the USSR and China was their rivalry for leadership of the worldwide communist movement.

October 21, 1961

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric announced that the alleged missile gap that Kennedy had blamed on the Eisenhower administration did not, in fact, exist. Kennedy had claimed that the United States was militarily inferior to the USSR in numbers of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), Gilpatric now claimed that the United States actually had far more ICBMs than the USSR.

November 20, 1961

Under guerrilla warfare expert General Edward Lansdale, the CIA began a secret campaign against Cuba, code-named Operation Mongoose. This operation authorized CIA case officers to smuggle exile agents into Cuba to commit acts of sabotage, organize anti-communist resistance, and carry out a series of assassination attempts on Castro.

December 1, 1961

In a television interview, Fidel Castro declared "I believe absolutely in Marxism....I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life." He merged the remaining legal political parties into the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, with himself as its general secretary. Castro had previously denied being a communist.

January 22-31, 1962

The Organization of American States resolved by a 14 to 1 vote, with 6 abstentions, to exclude Cuba because of its government's commitment to communism and military alliance with the USSR. By spring 1962, 15 Latin American countries had broken diplomatic ties with Cuba.

February 3, 1962

President Kennedy declared a complete embargo on all U.S.-Cuban trade. U.S. officials stepped up their efforts to persuade NATO allies to stop trading with Castro.

February 4, 1962

Castro issued the Second Declaration of Havana. In this speech, he complained that the United States was using the conservative governments of countries of Latin America to attack the Cuban revolution. Castro urged the peoples of Latin America both to support Cuba and rid themselves of their own upper class oppressors by overthrowing their governments and setting up communist regimes.

April 9, 1962

U.S. armed forces began an unprecedented series of large-scale military exercises in the Caribbean. These included naval maneuvers, amphibious landings and airborne assaults, one of which aimed to overthrow a fictitious dictator named Ortsac (Castro spelled backwards). These contingency operations (rehearsals for possible action) were conducted throughout the summer and into the fall.

May 17, 1962

Khrushchev complained in a speech in Bulgaria about 15 United States Jupiter nuclear missiles that had just become operational (ready for use) in Turkey. A U.S. ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Or-

ganization, Turkey had been granted the missile bases in response to the threat of Soviet missiles. Thirty Jupiter missiles were also sited in Italy.

July 3-8, 1962

Fidel Castro's brother Raul met in Moscow with high Soviet officials to negotiate a military aid agreement. Claiming that the United States was about to invade his country, the Cuban representative asked the USSR to supply Cuba with arms, planes, and advisors.

September 2-11, 1962

Premier Khrushchev reassured President Kennedy that he was not planning to send offensive weapons to Cuba. Kennedy warned Khrushchev that the United States would "do whatever must be done to protect its security," should the USSR base nuclear missiles in Cuba.[4]

October 5, 1961

The previous day, high-flying U-2 spy planes had taken pictures of western Cuba. CIA photo analysts identified a Soviet nuclear missile site under construction and sent this evidence to the White House.



U-2 photos of Soviet missile base under construction in Cuba. (John F. Kennedy Library)

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles
    - General Maxwell Taylor
    - JUCEPLAN
    - Berlin Wall
    - Alliance for Progress
    - Mao Zedong
    - missile gap
    - Operation Mongoose
    - United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution
    - trade embargo
    - Jupiter missiles
    - meeting in Moscow
    - messages from the USSR and the U.S.
    - CIA analysts
2. Write a short statement of the U.S., Cuban, and Soviet positions on stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba.
3. Make three headings on your paper as indicated below. Give yourself room to write. Then review the reading and list events that support the positions of Kennedy, Castro, and Khrushchev on sending Soviet missiles to Cuba.

    Kennedy's Case Castro's Case Khrushchev's Case

4. Read the document your teacher assigns you. Using the events you listed in support of your case in question 3, prepare a speech to be delivered at the United Nations. Your speech should cite your position on the basing of Soviet missiles in Cuba, supported by at least three events from the narrative.

Sources

1. David L. Larson, ed., *The Cuban Crisis of 1962* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 43.
2. Tad Szulc, *Fidel* (New York: Avon Books, 1986), p. 642.
3. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 496.
4. Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 671.

Document 31

John F. Kennedy: Deliberate Deception and Offensive Threats

Not long after he was informed of evidence indicating Soviet installation of medium-range and intermediate nuclear missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy appeared on national television to inform the American people of this threat to their security. What three reasons did he offer as to why the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was not justified?

* * * * *

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction -- constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warning to the Soviets of September 4 and 13.

This action also contradicts the repeated assurance of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had no desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to the nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic weapons are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious *status quo* which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines.

David L. Larson, ed., *The Cuban Crisis of 1962: Selected Documentary, Chronology and Bibliography*, Second Edition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), p. 59-60.

Fidel Castro: A Direct Invasion of Cuba Was Being Seriously Considered

Fidel Castro explained his reasons for agreeing to base Soviet missiles in Cuba in a 1984 interview with journalist Tad Szulc. According to Castro, why was basing Soviet missiles in Cuba both strategically and morally correct?

* * * * *

The Soviets were giving us maximum help, they had responded with the purchase of Cuban sugar when [our] market in the United States was totally closed, they supplied petroleum when all the sources of petroleum supply were suspended...now we were discussing what measures should be taken.... We told them: It is necessary to take steps that would imply, in a clear manner, that an aggression against Cuba is an aggression against the Soviet Union. It was then that they proposed the missiles....

Put yourself in our place – between a situation of impotence [weakness] facing a very powerful country that could at any moment decide to invade Cuba, costing the lives of millions of Cubans who would have resisted, and the situation of running a risk from a more secure position....From a strictly moral as well as a legal viewpoint, as a sovereign country we had the right to make use of the type of arms we considered gave us a guarantee....In the same way as the United States had bases in all parts of the world around the Soviet Union, we considered we had the absolute legal right to make use of such measures in our own country.

Tad Szulc, *Fidel* (New York: Avon Books, 1986), p. 645.

Document 33

Nikita Khrushchev: A Little of Their Own Medicine

Nikita Khrushchev offered this account of his thinking about sending missiles to Cuba in his memoirs in the late 1960s. Tell three ways Khrushchev justified this act.

* * * * *

If Cuba fell, other Latin American countries would reject us, claiming that for all our might the Soviet Union hadn't been able to do anything for Cuba except to make empty promises to the United Nations. We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. We had to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. The logical answer was missiles. The United States had already surrounded the Soviet Union with its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that American missiles were aimed against us in Turkey and Italy, to say nothing of West Germany. Our vital industrial centers were directly threatened by planes armed with atomic bombs and guided missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. As Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I found myself in the difficult position of having to decide on the course of action which would answer the American threat, but which would also avoid a world war....

It was during my visit to Bulgaria that I had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out they were there until it was too late to do anything about them. I knew that first we'd have to talk to Castro and explain our strategy to him in order to get the agreement of the Cuban government. My thinking went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and then if the United States discovered the missiles there after they were already poised and ready to strike, the Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military means. I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them. If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived – even if only one or two big ones were left – we could still hit New York....

The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro's government. In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call "the balance of power." The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointed at you; we'd be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine. It was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.

From *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Copyright © 1970 by Little, Brown and Company, Inc.

CHAPTER 8: WHICH STRATEGY SHOULD PRESIDENT KENNEDY USE TO REMOVE THE SOVIET MISSILES FROM CUBA?

I recognize fully the public opinion difficulties involved in a surprise attack but believe that, if no other effective course is available, they must be accepted rather than run the grave risk to our national security involved in allowing the weapons to remain in Cuba.[1]

Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon

I supported McNamara's position in favor of a blockade. This was not from a deep conviction that it would be a successful course of action, but a feeling that it had more flexibility and fewer liabilities than a military attack. More importantly, like others, I could not accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs on Cuba, killing thousands and thousands of civilians in a surprise attack.[2]

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

People would certainly ask why it was right for the United States to have bases in Turkey, but wrong for the Russians to have bases in Cuba. The President...should consider offering to remove the Jupiters in exchange for the removal of the Russian missiles in Cuba.[3]

United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson

Introduction

In July 1962 Premier Khrushchev of the USSR made an agreement with Fidel Castro's government to send Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba. The previous chapter addressed the question of whether these leaders were justified in stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba. Needless to say, President Kennedy, for one, did not think such an action was justified and warned of serious consequences, should the Soviets install nuclear missiles in Cuba. Initially, the president lacked hard evidence that offensive missiles had indeed been shipped to Cuba. Then in mid-October CIA director McCone sent the president photographs of a missile site under construction in western Cuba. McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's National Security Advisor, informed the president about the missiles on October 16; the president immediately called for a meeting of top-level advisors from inside and outside the administration. This group, the Executive Committee (ExComm), would be in daily session over the next two weeks of the crisis. Their first task was to devise a strategy for removal of the missiles from Cuba.

The ExComm ultimately came up with three options for removal of the missile sites. The first strategy was to bomb the missile installations and even invade Cuba, if necessary, in order to be certain that the missiles had been eliminated. The second strategy was to blockade Cuba to prevent shipment of equipment needed to complete the installations until the Soviets agreed to ship the missiles back to the USSR. The third strategy was to negotiate with the Soviet Union, trading removal of their missiles in Cuba for removal of the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. The president's ExComm advisors created and debated these three strategies over five intense days of meetings. These men knew that a badly-planned response to the missile problem could have dire consequences; either a permanent Soviet nuclear base 90 miles from Florida or a world war. In addition, ExComm advisors had to take into account the need to both maintain strong U.S. alliances in Europe and Latin America and avoid offending world opinion with unjustified violations of international law. Which of the three options – air strike/invasion, blockade, or negotiation – would result in removal of the missiles, avoid a world war, preserve strong U.S. alliances, and maintain the U.S. international reputation as a law-abiding nation?

Discovery of the Missile Bases

Premier Khrushchev intended to construct four bases in Cuba armed with a total of 80 medium-range (1000 miles) and intermediate-range (2200 miles) ground-to-ground nuclear missiles. Perhaps wishing to present the United States with a "done deal" once the missiles became operational in November 1962, Khrushchev tried to keep the United States and the world from finding out about the plan. However, the great increase in USSR shipping to Cuba starting in late July indicated to U.S. intelligence experts that a major build-up of the Soviet military in Cuba was underway. The appearance of Soviet surface to air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba was observed by U.S. agents in late August: CIA director James McCone (who had replaced Allen Dulles in February) warned the president that such defenses would only be needed to protect offensive weapons, like nuclear missiles. Consequently, the CIA scheduled daily reconnaissance flights over Cuba by high-flying U-2 aircraft to take photos of potential missile sites from above the range of anti-aircraft defenses.

On October 9, Director McCone ordered overflights of western Cuba, where SAM sites had been detected. After a period of bad weather, two U-2 missions were flown on Sunday, October 14; their photos of the area around San Cristobal unmistakably depicted a nuclear missile base under construction. As the president's main National Security planner, Bundy received the CIA's report on this base at 8:30 p.m. the following evening. He decided not to inform the president until Tuesday morning, hoping to let Kennedy enjoy the last untroubled night's sleep he was likely to have for awhile. Thus, it was not until Tuesday morning, October 16, that Bundy briefed President Kennedy about the base, showing him the incriminating photographs of the half-erected missile launchers. The president was surprised and immediately recognized that this was the beginning of a major international crisis. He ordered low-level photographic flights over the suspected bases and asked Bundy to arrange a meeting of top administration policy makers to advise him on how to respond.

The Deliberations Begin

The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) that the president had Bundy convene began meeting to discuss the crisis on Tuesday, October 16. ExComm was composed of three types of advisors: representatives of responsible government departments, administration insiders whom the president trusted, and former government officials whose judgment and experience were valued. From the State Department the president summoned such key policy makers as Secretary Dean Rusk, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, and ex-ambassadors to Moscow Lewellyn Thompson and Chester Bohlen. The Defense Department was represented by Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others; Director McCone spoke for the CIA. Administration insiders included the president's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Treasury Secretary (and Republican) Douglas Dillon, and White House aides Bundy and Theodore Sorenson. Lastly, the president asked former government officials like ex Secretary of State Dean Acheson to sit in.

At 11:45 a.m., President Kennedy entered the cabinet room accompanied by CIA Deputy Director Marshall Carter. The president asked those present to set aside all other tasks for the duration of the crisis and swore all to secrecy. Carter displayed the aerial photographs of the Soviet base under construction at San Cristobal. He pointed out the missile transporters, erector launches, and motor pool and informed the ExComm that these medium-range missiles could hit targets as far away as Dallas and Washington, D.C. Were the Soviets to install intermediate-range missiles at this base, Carter went on, most of the United States would be exposed to attack with very little warning. He expected that this base would be fully operational in two weeks. Moreover, three other base construction sites had been located in Cuba. Carter ended by noting that as yet analysts had failed to spot any nuclear warheads.

The president told the ExComm members that he was determined to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Officially, he refused to bow to this "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo."[4] Among intimates, he stated his certainty that he would be impeached if he did nothing about the Soviet challenge. So the question before the ExComm was not whether, but rather how, to



CIA chart indicating ranges of missiles stationed in Cuba. (John F. Kennedy Library)

get the missiles out of Cuba in a timely fashion. In their debates over the next five days, Kennedy's advisors came up with three viable alternative plans to achieve the president's goal:

1. A series of surgical air strikes directed at missile installations in Cuba, followed by an invasion if necessary.

2. A naval blockade of Cuba until the missiles were dismantled and sent back to the Soviet Union.

3. A trade with the USSR – offering to pull obsolete Jupiter missiles out of Turkey and Italy in exchange for Soviet removal of their offensive missiles, along with demilitarization of Cuba.

In their deliberations, the ExComm advisors explored each strategy in a dramatic, confrontative, and somewhat haphazard manner. Over these tense five days, their strategy investigation tended to cover three topic areas. First, they argued whether each strategy would result in removal of the missiles from Cuba. Second, they debated how likely it was that each strategy might escalate into a war with the Soviets. Third, they weighed the effect of each strategy on both U.S. alliances in Latin America and Europe and on world opinion. In the end, they presented President Kennedy with the following cases for each of the three strategy options.

Ends and Means: Three Strategies

The first option the ExComm wrestled with was the air strike/invasion strategy, the so-called "fast track." Dillon, Bundy, McCone, Taylor, and Acheson advocated surprise U.S. bombing raids on the missile sites and other support facilities, such as air bases. It might be necessary as well, they advised, to send in an invasion force to make sure that all Soviet missiles had been destroyed. Air strike supporters argued that bombing raids were the most direct, efficient, and prompt means of eliminating these dangerous missiles before they were ready for use. Such an act would send the Soviets a compelling message about how the United States intended to deal with threats to its security. And the fast track had the added benefit, if accompanied by an invasion, of overthrowing Castro. This strategy would also reassure our allies in Latin America that we intended to defend them against communist aggression. Moreover, a surprise air strike was legally justifiable, the sponsors of the fast track contended: for a century and a half the Monroe Doctrine had proclaimed that the United States would

consider the intrusion of a European power into the Americas to be an unfriendly act. Lastly, "We must be prepared," Dillon asserted, "to accept the public opinion results of a surprise strike, placing the full blame on Cuba for ignoring our clear and repeated warnings."[5]

The blockade/quarantine option was nicknamed the "slow track." Its advocates, McNamara, Rusk, Sorenson, and Robert Kennedy, thought that the United States should declare an embargo on all military shipments to Cuba. To enforce this embargo, U.S. Navy ships would blockade Cuba, intercepting and inspecting any ships suspected of carrying armaments, and turning back those that did. A blockade had several advantages to recommend it. At first, it could be directed solely at the offending missiles. Then it could be gradually tightened, if necessary, to prohibit such materials as gasoline from reaching Cuba. Next, since the U.S. Navy was more powerful than the Soviet Navy, such a strategy would discourage the Soviets from directly challenging U.S. actions. It would also give Khrushchev time to thoughtfully consider his response to the U.S. demand that he remove the missiles. In addition, since U.S. allies like Britain strongly believed in freedom of the seas for trading purposes, the United States would initially only intercept offensive weapons. Since blockades had traditionally been classified as acts of war, slow track supporters suggested calling this naval action a defensive "quarantine" (using a term that suggested halting the spread of disease). Blockade/quarantine advocates were confident that world opinion would appreciate the restraint and reasonableness with which the United States pursued its goal. As McNamara reflected, "For all kinds of political reasons, especially to preserve unity in the alliance, we had to indicate to the Soviets that we weren't going to accept the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. However, I believed it was essential to express their unacceptability in ways that did not lead to escalation. I thought the quarantine would accomplish this."[6]

The third strategy explored by the ExComm was the negotiation strategy. Its supporters, Adlai Stevenson and, to a lesser extent, Thompson and Bohlen, thought that the United States ought to present its case for the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba to the United Nations. First, the United States should propose the demilitarization and neutralization of Cuba. Castro's army would disband, Soviet military advisors would return to the USSR, and U.S. forces would withdraw from the Guantanamo naval base. Second, U.S. negotiators should be ready to close down the Jupiter bases in Italy and Turkey, if the Soviets were willing to remove their missiles from Cuba. Third, Soviet and U.S. leaders should meet in a series of disarmament conferences to prepare treaties to prevent future nuclear confrontations. Stevenson felt that a negotiated solution to the crisis would give the Soviets in-

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. (National Archives)

centive to fully comply with U.S. wishes for removal of the missiles from Cuba. Moreover, the proposed neutralization of Cuba would reinforce U.S. policy to prevent Cuban subversion of Latin America. United Nations inspection teams could make sure that the Soviets and Cubans kept their promises. The consequence of such U.S. flexibility might be a general relaxation of tensions with the USSR and a possible "build down" of nuclear arms. Moreover, United States alliances, such as the Organization of American States, could possibly break up if more aggressive U.S. actions led to an invasion of Cuba. Finally, solving the crisis by negotiation could create peaceful precedents for lawful resolution of international conflict. The United States would gain widespread support at little cost because of its apparent fairness. At Stevenson underlined, "To world opinion, Soviet missile bases in Cuba seemed no more reprehensible (wrong) than American missile bases in Turkey and Italy, and the latter in any case were now obsolescent."[7]

The President Decides

On Saturday, October 20, President Kennedy sat in on the afternoon ExComm meeting. Advocates of the three strategies had prepared their cases for the president. Moreover, they criticized the options put forth by their colleagues. It was left to the president to decide which option offered the best U.S. response to the Soviet missile base construction in Cuba. Which strategy – air strike/invasion, quarantine, or negotiation – should President Kennedy select in order to remove the missiles and avoid nuclear war while maintaining U.S. alliances and good standing in world opion. Why should he *not* select the other two options?

Chapter Questions:

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - McGeorge Bundy
    - three options
    - 80 nuclear missiles
    - SAMs
    - two U-2 missions
    - ExComm
    - San Cristobal
    - three topic areas
    - fast track
    - compelling message
    - slow track
    - unity of the alliance
    - Adlai Stevenson
    - peaceful precedent
    - Saturday, October 20
2. Write an analysis of one of the three strategies:
    - Bomb the Soviet missile installations and invade Cuba if necessary.
    - Blockade/quarantine Cuba
    - Negotiate the removal of the missiles from Cuba

Examine the strategy you are analyzing in three ways:

a. How effectively and promptly it might bring about the removal of the missiles from Cuba.

b. How it might prevent the crisis from escalating into a world war.

c. How it would affect U.S. allies and world opinion, as expressed by the United Nations.

3. Write a paper persuading the president to adopt the strategy you have decided upon. Be sure you read the appropriate document at the end of the chapter to do a better job stating your argument. You should not only state strong reasons for following your option of choice, but also good reasons not to follow another one; (e.g., why you favor an air strike and oppose negotiations). Be prepared to argue your position in class.

Sources

1. Douglas Dillon, *Memorandum for the President* (National Security Files, Cuba, General, 10/26/62-10/27/62), p. 2.

2. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: New American Library, 1969), p. 37.

3. Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1966), p. 95.

4. David F. Larson, *The Cuban Crisis of 1962* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 43.

5. Douglas Dillon, *Memorandum for the President*, p. 3.

6. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990), p. 188.

7. Kenneth S. Davis, *The Politics of Honor* (New York: Putnam, 1967), p. 480.

Aftermath of the Missile Crisis

President Kennedy selected the blockade/quarantine option, largely because it afforded Premier Khrushchev time to think soberly about how he wanted to respond to the U.S. ultimatum and it would enable the United States to selectively escalate pressure on the Soviets to withdraw the missiles. After a tense showdown on the high seas with the blockading U.S. Navy, Soviet missile transport ships reversed course and returned to the USSR. Moreover, on October 28, 1962, Premier Khrushchev promised to withdraw all Soviet nuclear missiles and bombers from Cuba. In return, the United States pledged not to invade the island, and the Jupiter missiles were quietly pulled out of Italy and Turkey six months later.

Securely in power in Cuba, Castro was free to carry through with his socialist revolution: as of this writing (1991), he is still prime minister of Cuba and refuses to waver in his commitment to a centralized state-run economy, despite the restructuring taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In addition, he has sent troops to such countries as Angola, Ethiopia, and Grenada to aid communist regimes engaged in civil wars with insurgents who are frequently backed by the United States.

In part as a consequence of the missile crisis defeat, Khrushchev was overthorwn by a group of Soviet hardliners who committed the USSR to an arms race with the United States that was to last for the next 25 years. The ruinous cost of this competition to the USSR has recently contributed to an economic and political restructuring in the communist world. Lastly, the United States has run up great budget deficits while conducting this arms race and is presently negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. The United States still denies diplomatic recognition to Cuba, a policy it encourages allies to follow as well. The United States also maintains an embargo on trade with Cuba, which effectively isolates Castro's economy in the Western hemisphere. Since the missile crisis, the United States has been the recipient of several waves of refugees from that island, and exile groups, without the official backing of the United States, continue to launch attempts to undermine the Castro government.

In view of the history of the intervening 30 years, do you think President Kennedy selected the correct course in responding to the missile crisis? Why or why not?

Document 34

Douglas Dillon: We Meant Business

In this interview with scholar James Blight, former Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon reviewed his arguments in favor of the air strike/invasion strategy. Tell three reasons he gave for supporting the air strike/invasion option.

* * * * *

One of the things I felt powerfully was that the longer our deliberations took, the more advanced the Soviet defenses became, as the SAM missiles became operational, and finally, as the MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles) and the IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) became operational, it would become necessary to do something much bigger and potentially more costly than would have been initially necessary. And that was something I didn't particularly relish, because it would have involved fighting the Cubans in a full-scale invasion of the island. And I didn't think that they would cave in right away. I thought they would put up fairly good resistance. Of course, they were not as well trained then as they are now, but they were trained well enough to cause us alot of trouble....

What the doves failed to realize was that we could have sent a signal, if you will, by a strong surgical first strike at the missile bases in Cuba. The signal would be this: We know what you are up to and it won't work. Now get the damn missiles out of Cuba or else face the consequences. Let them draw their own conclusions about what the consequences would have been. They could have put two and two together, I think. I think the surgical strike would have conveyed the message that we meant business....Of course, even a surgical air strike would have killed a lot of Cubans. I know this bothered the doves. But they failed to appreciate my point: that this very act of bombing the missiles sites, knowing that collateral damage would occur, would have conveyed exactly the message we should be sending: that we meant business: that they were not going to get away with this....

I believe we not only understood the Soviet position before they put the missiles into Cuba, but also during the crisis. I never had any doubt that, if we chose to attack the bases and invade the island, they wouldn't have done anything drastic. They couldn't and they knew it. Don't you see—they put the missiles in Cuba in order to beef up their strategic position, which was grossly inferior to ours. This meant that if we caught them in the act, that is, in their inferior position, and we took action to insure that they stayed inferior, they would have withdrawn. I mean, they acted rationally, in a way, by putting them in. If we'd struck at the bases, they'd have acted rationally and stayed put, I think, around Berlin and elsewhere.

Excerpt from *On the Brink* by James G. Blight and David A. Welch. Copyright © 1989, 1990 by James G. Blight and David A. Welch. Reprinted by permission of Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, Inc.

Theodore Sorenson: A Limited, Low-Level Action

Theodore Sorenson, the president's main speechwriter, summed up his reasons for advocating the blockade/quarantine alternative in his biography of President Kennedy. State at least three of Sorenson's reasons.

* * * * *

The blockade route gained strength on Thursday as the other choices faded. It was a more limited, low key military action than the air strike. It offered Khrushchev the choice of avoiding a direct military clash by keeping his ships away. It could at least be initiated without a shot being fired or a single Soviet or Cuban citizen being killed. Thus, it seemed slightly less likely to precipitate as immediate military riposte [retaliatory action]. Moreover a naval engagement in the Caribbean, just off our shores, was the most advantageous military confrontation the United States could have, if one were necessary. Whatever the balance of strategic and ground forces may have been, the superiority was worldwide, should Soviet submarines retaliate elsewhere. To avoid a military defeat, Khrushchev might well turn his ships back, causing U.S. allies to have increased confidence in our credibility and Cuba's Communists to feel they were being abandoned. Precisely because it was a limited, low-level action, the argument ran, the blockade had the advantage of permitting a more controlled escalation on our part, gradual or rapid as the situation required. It also could serve as an unmistakable but not sudden or humiliating warning to Khrushchev of what we expected from him. Its prudence, its avoidance of casualties and its avoidance of attacking Cuban soil would make it more appealing to other nations than an air strike, permitting OAS and Allied support for our initial position, and making that support more likely for whatever air-strike or other action was later necessary.

Excerpt from *Kennedy*, by Theodore Sorenson, p. 688. Copyright © 1965 by Theodore Sorenson. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers.

Adlai Stevenson: Negotiation and Sanity Always

In this memo given President Kennedy during the ExComm debates, U.N. Ambassador Stevenson put forth a rationale for negotiating with the Soviets for removal of the missiles in Cuba. Give three justifications Stevenson mentioned for a negotiated solution to this crisis.

* * * * *

We must be prepared for the widespread reaction that if we have a missile base in Turkey and other places around the Soviet Union surely they have the right to one in Cuba. If we attack Cuba, an ally of the Soviet Union, isn't an attack on NATO bases equally justified? Moreover, if war is the consequence, the Latin American republics may well divide and some say the U.S. is not acting with their approval and consent. Likewise, unless the issue is very clear there may be sharp differences with our Western allies...

The means adopted [to protect national security] have such incalculable consequences that I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything. Our position, then, is that we can't negotiate with a gun at our head...and that if they won't remove the missiles and restore the status quo ante [the situation before] we will have to do it ourselves – and then we will discuss bases....In short, it is they, not the U.S. that have upset the balance and created this situation of such peril...We have no choice except to restore that balance, i.e., blackmail and intimidation never, negotiation and sanity always.

Porter McKeever, *Adlai Stevenson* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989), p. 519.

CHAPTER 9:
SHOULD THE UNITED STATES INTERVENE IN LATIN AMERICA?

Our only hope is to proclaim victory as our aim and then to press boldly and unremittingly on all fronts – always prepared to fight and make sure that the communists always know we are prepared to fight.[1]

Senator Barry Goldwater

I am convinced that we can help the Latin Americans render their soil sterile for Communist machinations. With one-tenth the expenditure of manpower, talent, and expense that military invasion would entail, we can launch a program of hemisphere development...We must provide visible rays of hope to exasperated millions. Democracy must do the job that communism promises to do.[2]

Senator Hubert Humphrey

The idea behind restraining oneself toward such revolutions does not even imply breaking off diplomatic relations, let alone ignoring the nation in question. It simply means allowing the society to have its revolution and then working out an appropriate relationship with the new society and its government.[3]

Professor William Appleman Williams

Introduction

The Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis renewed a debate concerning when and how the United States ought to intervene in Latin America. Three policy perspectives emerged: political-military interventionism, social interventionism, and non-interventionism. Political-military interventionists cited the Monroe Doctrine in support of their theory. President Monroe declared this doctrine, it will be recalled, to prevent recolonization of Latin America by European powers in the 1820s. The same principle, Goldwater argued, obliged the United States to oppose Soviet communist infiltration of Latin America with whatever political and/or military means the struggle required. Social interventionist Hubert Humphrey, however, thought that revolutions were caused not by communist subversion, but rather by poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy. In order to combat these root causes of social instability, he felt, the United States should intervene in Latin America through foreign aid programs to raise the standard of living of poor people. As a non-interventionist, William Appleman Williams observed that U.S. assistance programs – political, military, or social – had to enlist the cooperation of wealthy and powerful Latin Americans. By thus reinforcing the forces in favor of the status quo, U.S. intervention actually prevented Latin American countries from truly achieving responsible self-government and enacting necessary reforms. Therefore, he advocated that the United States not interfere in the political affairs of Latin American countries, thereby permitting local people to determine their own futures.

Spokesmen for each of these three perspectives attempted to influence U.S. policy concerning intervention in Latin America in the years following the Cuban missile crisis. In 1965 a new U.S. president confronted a revolution in a Latin American island nation neighboring Cuba, the Dominican Republic. Like Cuba, the Dominican Republic was heavily dependent on cash crop exports, with inequitable land distribution and a lagging industrial sector. And, as in Cuba, an elite supported by the army controlled much of the country's wealth. As in Cuba as well, a strong-willed opposition leader, Juan Bosch, had rallied a movement that contained both liberals and communists. The assassination of a tyrannical dictator had set off a chain of events leading up to a civil war between Bosch's coalition of left-wing political parties and the army.

U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson had to decide whether, and in what manner, the United States should intervene in this struggle. President Johnson's military advisors told him to send U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic to help the army defeat these Castro-like revolutionaries. Others, like Humphrey, argued that the president should send food, teachers, and technical assistance to create a more prosperous, and more peaceful, Dominican society. Still others thought that the United States should not interfere in the conflict, letting Dominicans settle their own dispute. Which policy perspective should President Johnson adopt in responding to the Dominican civil war—political/military intervention, social intervention, or non-intervention?

The Dominican Republic in 1965

The Dominican Republic, located in the Caribbean Sea between Cuba and Puerto Rico, shares half of the island of Hispaniola with its neighbor, Haiti. It is smaller than Cuba and has a population of 3.5 million. Crossed by mountain ranges, the Dominican Republic possesses a variety of climate zones, including rainforests, grasslands, pine forests, and deserts. In the 1960s most Dominicans lived in rural regions, but 30 percent inhabited two cities, Santo Domingo and Santiago and a number of smaller towns. Despite possession of some oil wells and iron deposits, owned largely by U.S. investors, the Republic was not exactly rich in natural resources. Its wealth came from its rich agricultural land where livestock and such crops as sugar cane, tobacco, rice, and bananas flourished. With only a little light industry, the Dominican Republic depended on the United States for its manufactured goods as well as a market for its cash crops.

The social system in the Dominican Republic in the mid-1960s was typical for a Latin American country. About 100 families owned the plantations that farmed most of the productive land. This property served as the basis for their considerable economic and political power. The small middle class, about 15 percent of the population, was neither united, wealthy, nor politically powerful. The vast majority of Dominicans lived in poverty as landless day laborers (*campesinos*) in the countryside, where as few as 1 in 10 could read and write. As in Cuba, more than half the rural population was unemployed, lacked medical care, and lived on near-starvation rations. Those who fled to the large towns and cities often ended up in slums without jobs, sanitation, electricity, or running water. However, some workers in new industries enjoyed an improving standard of living, largely because of the growing power of their labor unions.

United States and Rafael Trujillo

After driving out their Spanish colonial masters in 1865, Dominican nationalistic politicians fought among themselves for more than a decade. Ultimately, Ulises Heureaux, a huge soldier known both for his courage and ruthlessness, made himself dictator. Like many subsequent rulers, Heureaux launched a reign of terror against his enemies. After his assassination in 1899, the Republic was torn by six years of civil war. The seizure of power by Ramon Caceres in 1906 brought only a temporary end to this chronic instability. When Caceres was assassinated in 1911, this murder initiated yet another period of anarchy.

Government by dictatorship punctuated by periods of civil war had a disastrous effect on the treasury of the Dominican Republic. In fact, the country was unable to pay off the loans its presidents had taken out from foreign bankers. This concerned the United States, which feared that European nations might invade the Dominican Republic, using its failure to pay its debts as an excuse. Starting in 1907, the United States took control of Dominican ports and collected their customs duties in order to pay off the Republic's debts to European creditors. Five years later, U.S. representatives ordered the new Dominican president to make financial and political reforms. This policy of U.S.-forced stabilization of Dominican affairs ended in United States occupation of the Republic from 1916 to 1924. During this period, anti-U.S. rebels were crushed, schools and roads were built, the national debt was reduced, and scientific farming was introduced. Furthermore, U.S. advisors set up a national police force to maintain law and order. In 1924, the United States turned over a reformed civil government to newly elected President Horacio Vasquez and withdrew its troops. But this police force, later expanded into

Rafael Trujillo as a young military officer. (National Archives)

the Dominican Republic Army, became the favorite instrument of yet another Dominican dictator who used it to gain and remain in power.

Born in 1891 to a middle class family of 13, Rafael Trujillo ultimately achieved a position of lifelong dictator of the Dominican Republic. Through a series of promotions, the wily Trujillo worked his way up from the lowly position of guard on a plantation to military administrator of the northern sector of the country. When the U.S.-organized police force became the national army in 1927, Trujillo was placed in command. This position gave him the leverage to lead a coup against President Vasquez. In 1930 he put himself forward as the leading candidate in upcoming elections. Trujillo's election was assured when his soldiers so terrorized the other candidates that they withdrew from the campaign. For the next 31 years, Trujillo ruled the Dominican Republic with cunning and cruelty. He appointed relatives and loyal supporters to key army and government posts, persecuted his opponents with seven secret police forces, and organized a political party to mobilize support for his policies. Moreover, he used fraud, as well as legal manipulations, threats, and outright theft, to take possession of more than half the country's wealth. Until 1961, Trujillo managed to retain the active sponsorship or at least tolerant acceptance of the United States because of his support for U.S. foreign policy, which included opposition to communism.

Prelude to Civil War

On May 30, 1961 Trujillo was shot to death as he drove to one of his rural hideaways. The weapons used in the assassination were supplied by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Trujillo's recent bomb attack against his enemy, the president of Venezuela, had led to sanctions by the Or-

ganization of American States and withdrawal of U.S. aid. The United States, under President Kennedy, even sent weapons to a broad anti-Trujillo conspiracy composed of opposition military officers and politicians, as well as doctors and lawyers. Immediately following the dictator's assassination, Trujillo's son and brothers launched a counterattack against the conspirators. But even ferocious torture and mass murder could not overcome a combination of U.S. pressure, popular opposition, and lack of military support. In November 1961 the Trujillos finally fled the island.

The end of the Trujillo regime left a power vacuum in the Dominican Republic, which four different groups hoped to fill:

- The officers of the 30,000-man armed forces, which consumed 40 percent of the annual national budget, expected to maintain their traditional kingmaker role. Graft-ridden and self-serving, the military justified its position in national life as necessary to protect the country from becoming a "second Cuba" in a Castro-inspired revolution. A minority within the military, however, led by Air Force General Elías Wessín y Wessín, hated this corruption and wanted the military to play a constructive role in Dominican life (for example, by building roads).
- A "good government" party, called the National Civic Union (UCN), was led by Viriato Fiallo, who had spent years in prison for advocating democracy. These anti-Trujillo politicians, backed by the elite and much of the middle class, demanded the firing of all corrupt Trujillo cronies from the army and the government. Their economic plan was to sell all the unprofitable government-run industries to private investors. This group was strongly anti-communist, proposed democratic as opposed to social welfare reforms, and believed in free enterprise promoted by foreign investment.
- The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) headed by a socialist, university professor Juan Bosch, appealed to peasants and urban workers. Bosch favored continued state ownership of the Trujillo family industries and redistribution of large estates to landless farmers. Mildly anti-American, Bosch favored renegotiating unfair contracts of U.S.-owned sugar and oil companies, tolerated communist political organizing, and hoped to get U.S. aid for ambitious regional development programs to improve his countrymen's standard of living.
- The pro-Castro revolutionary left, led by Manuel Tavares Justo, advocated outright nationalization of all means of production and opposed foreign investment. Tavares urged the Dominican people to rise up against the elite, who, he argued, were their true oppressors because of their domination of the Dominican economy and government. Tavares's party, the 14th of June Movement, was named after the date in 1961 when a group of Cubans and Dominicans invaded the Dominican Republic to overthrow Trujillo; they were hunted down and killed by Trujillo's police. Though he had not participated in the June 14th attack, Tavares had been imprisoned and tortured, and his wife murdered, for anti-Trujillo agitation.

The Crisis Begins

On December 20, 1962, Juan Bosch and his Democratic Revolutionary Party won the first truly free election in Dominican history. Despite the initial euphoria (general joy), Bosch soon ran into serious difficulties. His plans for redistribution of land were unrealized because much of the property seized from the Trujillos was unsuitable for cultivation. Bosch was reluctant to antagonize the rich by taking over their estates; nor could he raise the money to employ the urban poor in public works projects without cutting the army's budget. Finally, President Kennedy refused to finance Bosch's development projects as long as the Dominican president criticized U.S. aid programs and broke contracts with U.S. companies. Moreover, Bosch antagonized the United States, the middle and upper class, and the army by refusing to crack down on Dominican Communists because, he claimed, he did not want to violate their civil rights. On September 25, 1963, the military, under General Wessín with the support of the National Civic Union, overthrew the Bosch government and put pro-Fiallo politicians into power.

The Dominican Revolutionary Party, however, did not accept the military's dismissal and began to plot a return to power. Bosch communicated with officers in the army who believed themselves constitutionally obliged to obey the head of the elected government. After Manuel Tavares died resisting the new regime, the revolutionary left parties agreed to join forces with the PRD to bring about Bosch's return. On Saturday, April 24, 1965, Bosch's supporters began an uprising against the army-backed government. Thousands of Dominicans in Santo Domingo received rifles from pro-Bosch officers. Communist radicals from the revolutionary left took leadership roles in organizing people's militias to occupy the capital's bridges, government centers, and radio and television stations. As the rebels inaugurated a temporary government in anticipation of Bosch's arrival, Dominican air force planes strafed them at the presidential palace. Within 48 hours, pitched battles between army tanks and rebels with bazookas and gasoline bombs were raging throughout the city and hundreds lay dead in its streets. To journalists on the scene, it seemed as if the army might indeed be defeated.

U.S. Intervention?

By April 28, 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson was receiving a variety of messages from the Dominican Republic. The military establishment and the National Civic Union called upon the United States to send the Marines to prevent a Castro-inspired revolution. Bosch and his supporters thought the United States ought to recognize him as the legally elected president and aid him in carrying out the social reforms he had promised to make. Other politicians simply wanted the United States to stay out of their civil war and permit the Dominicans to resolve their own dispute without foreign interference.

Which policy do you think President Johnson should follow:

- Send in U.S. troops to help the military and UCN put down the communist-infiltrated revolution (political/military intervention).
- Provide diplomatic support and foreign aid to the democratically elected Bosch government to insure the success of the revolution (social intervention).
- Allow Dominicans to solve their own problems without foreign interference and recognize whatever government emerged from this struggle (non-intervention).

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationship to the rest of this chapter of each of the following:
   - three policy perspectives
   - cash crops
   - 100 families
   - *campesinos*
   - Ramón Cáceres
   - customs duties
   - national police force
   - Rafael Trujillo
   - Central Intelligence Agency
   - General Elías Wessín y Wessín
   - Dominican military forces
   - Viriato Fiallo

- National Civic Union
- Juan Bosch
- Dominican Revolutionary Party
- Manuel Tavares Justo
- 14th of June Movement
- first free election
- September 25, 1963
- uprising in Santo Domingo

2. Describe the events that took place in the Dominican Republic between Juan Bosch's December 1962 election and the April 1965 civil war.

3. Should President Johnson follow the recommendations of the political/military, social, or non-interventionists in the Dominican Republic in April 1965? Please explain.

4. Read the views of political/military, social, and non-interventionists, and design a policy you believe the president should follow in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. Please include:
   - Your analysis of the problem.
   - The reason(s) for your choice of intervention perspective.
   - At least two actions the president should take.
   - What you hope your policy will achieve and why this is a realistic possibility.

Sources

1. Barry Goldwater, *Why Not Victory?* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 161.

2. Hubert Humphrey, *Congressional Record* (May 9, 1961), S7637.

3. William Appleman Williams, *The United States, Cuba, and Castro* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), p. 167.

Senator Barry Goldwater: Removal of Communists from Power

Senator Barry Goldwater was a candidate for the Republican Party nomination for the presidency when he wrote this book. (He was defeated by President Johnson in 1964.) What specific means did Senator Goldwater recommend, and not recommend, for United States intervention in neighboring countries?

* * * * *

Strategically, our program must be directed towards the removal of communists from power whether they hold it 90 miles off our southern coast or in distant Laos and Vietnam.... We must mount an intellectual counterattack against the enemies' ideology, and this must combine legal and organizational methods designed both to hold disputed areas of society and advance into enemy held positions.... Our armaments, thus, should include the tools for pin-point action as well as nuclear power...

When we do adopt the idea that the only way effectively to halt the spread of communism is to terminate social and economic conditions that do not make for universal ease and comfort, we are adopting defeat. For we will never even make a dent in these conditions in the immediate future no matter how much foreign aid and technical help we spread around the world.

Barry Goldwater, *Why Not Victory?* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 161.

Hubert Humphrey: The Ancient Enemy of Poverty

Senator Hubert Humphrey was an important sponsor of the Alliance for Progress in Congress and visited the Dominican Republic for Bosch's inauguration in 1963. A leading liberal Democrat, he was elected Johnson's vice president in 1964. What did Humphrey see as the main threat to U.S. security in the Western hemisphere? How did he imply the United States should deal with this threat?

* * * * *

Next, we must admit to ourselves that shouting "Monroe Doctrine" will not stop Communist maneuvers in the hemisphere. The principle of the Monroe Doctrine – that the Western hemisphere is not a happy hunting ground for alien doctrines – is as valid to our security as ever. But we are still faced with how to make it stick. Aiming the Monroe Doctrine at Communist infiltration and subversion is like shooting a cannon at an invisible enemy.

I believe continued outcries to invoke the Monroe Doctrine merely confuse public opinion and delay the rechartering of urgent modern techniques to combat a wholly new threat to the hemisphere.

The despair of change coming through evolutionary, peaceful means is what is driving Latin Americans into the arms of false prophets. If we have not the ingenuity or desire or determination to help tackle Latin America's basic problems of poverty, hunger, and illiteracy, then we deserve to lose.

I wish my position to be clear. The major enemies facing freedom today are the ancient enemy of poverty, which we can defeat; of illiteracy, which we can do away with; and of disease, which we can cure. If the United States and other nations will recognize that the enemy is not merely a man or an institution, but, rather, pestilence, illiteracy, ignorance, fear, and frustration, I believe we will be on the road to victory.

Hubert Humphrey, *Congressional Record*, May 9, 1961, S7637.

William Appleman Williams: Internationalism Has Become Intermeddling

William Appleman Williams was a professor at the University of Wisconsin when he wrote this essay. He became the foremost scholar-critic of U.S. foreign policy of his day. According to Williams, why did the United States intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, and why was this a mistake?

* * * * *

This policy of restraint is the most demanding of all the possible approaches toward revolutions. This is true even in the cases where revolutions do not impinge upon the vital national interests of the United States. We are caught up in a pattern of thinking which externalizes good as well as evil. Hence we assume we have to control everything – events that do not threaten our welfare and safety just as well as those that do have a negative impact on our national interests.

The result is an inability to leave anything alone anywhere in the world. Internationalism has become intermeddling. We have defined our business as coterminous with every crossroad in the world. By that definition, minding one's own business becomes a process of minding the world. We are more than a little bit like the parent who cannot let go of the child as it approaches the threshold into adulthood. Such parents have lived vicariously through their children to the extent that letting the child go means giving up a major part of the meaning of their own adult life. We have defined so much of America in terms of the world that we are afraid to allow the world to develop in a pluralistic [diverse] manner. yet this is precisely what we must do if we are to retain any of our own self respect, and even any of our opportunity to build an America we are capable of creating. Indeed, we have been so busy thinking about the world that we have done very little thinking about the United States. And it shows in the state of the nation – and the society.

William Appleman Williams, *The United States, Cuba, and Castro* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), p. 167. Copyright © 1962 by Monthly Review Press. Reprinted by permission of Monthly Review Foundation.

CHAPTER 10:
WHAT WAS THE UNDERLYING REASON FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA?

The Good Neighbor Policy...stemmed from...the inherent idealism and traditional anti-imperialist sentiment of the people of the United States.[1]

Samuel Flagg Bemis

The most important United States objectives in Latin America, it has been suggested, are defense of the Americas from hostile attack or internal subversion.[2]

Joseph W. Reidy

American business interests and the State Department were closely connected in matters of Cuban-American relations. There were some disagreements over specific methods, but in general there was agreement concerning the basic goals of the policy.[3]

Robert F. Smith

Introduction

Although the day-to-day annoyances of having Fidel Castro in power 90 miles from Florida continue to trouble United States policy makers, the resolution of the missile crisis marked a watershed in U.S.-Cuban relations. The compromise formalized by Khrushchev on October 28, 1962, when he began to withdraw the Soviet missiles form Cuba, has more or less remained in place until the present. In apparent compliance with one of Khrushchev's conditions for missile removal, U.S. strategic planners have virtually given up their attempts to overthrow Fidel Castro. In turn, the Soviet Union has refrained from trying to alter the balance of power in the Western hemisphere by once again installing offensive weapons in Cuba. Free from outside pressure, Castro has transformed Cuba into a collectivized socialist society, administered by a Communist Party bureaucracy. The price of his revolution has been 30 years of diplomatic isolation and economic boycott by the United States and most of the members of the Organization of American States. One might say, then, that U.S.-Cuban relations have been stalemated since 1962. Perhaps now is a good time to reflect on this stalemate in order to better understand both its causes and its remedies. A starting point might be to better comprehend the underlying reason for U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Over the last half century, diplomatic historians at universities around the country have examined the record of the relations between the United States and Cuba. These scholars have attempted to discover major trends in U.S.-Cuban relations over the 70 years between the 1890s and the 1960s. They hope that their investigations will reveal fundamental motivations which, if recognized, could eventually help to create more effective and successful U.S. policy toward both Cuba and Latin America. These analysts essentially take three different positions on the underlying reason for the U.S. policies that have contributed to the present situation – ideological, strategic, and economic. The ideologically-oriented nationalist historians believe that U.S. policy toward Cuba was inspired by U.S. political beliefs, in particular, the desire to spread democratic ideals and practices. So-called realist historians think that strategic concerns, such as the need to defend the United States from potential foes, was the primary motivation of U.S. policy makers. New Left historians argue that U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba was basically driven by the economic need to protect and extend opportunities for worldwide U.S. investments, sources of raw materials, and sales of manufactured products.

All three schools of historical analysis are united, however, in their belief that knowing the underlying reason for past U.S. Cuban policy could improve future decision-making. Keep this motivation in mind as you read about these three perspectives on the following pages and look back on the material

you have studied to begin to decide which of the perspectives best explains the history of U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Nationalist or Idealist School

Since the turn of the century, several schools of thought have developed among U.S. diplomatic historians. The first diplomatic historians believed they had a responsibility to provide the United States, as it emerged as a new power in the early 1900s, with the knowledge to compete with foreign countries. They were therefore particularly interested in writing about specific political and military conflicts from the point of view of policy makers. Based on the accounts of specific alliances, negotiations, and treaties that they wrote, later nationalist historians pieced together larger regional studies of U.S. foreign policy. These studies were carefully researched, based on many different sources, and intended to point out the appropriate direction for future U.S. policy in regions such as East Asia or Latin America. In general, nationalist historians praised the growth of U.S. influence in the world because U.S. values, such as democracy and individual rights, would be of benefit for all people.

Nationalist historians, like Samuel Flagg Bemis, believed that the main motivation underlying U.S. policy toward Cuba was the United States' urge to spread the ideology of democracy and the rule of law. As the world's oldest republic, the United States, according to Bemis, had long pursued the ideal of extending the doctrines of liberty and majority rule to Latin America. Moreover, the United States wished to promote the welfare of neighboring peoples by fostering economic development and private enterprise, thereby insuring prosperity, social stability, and peace. The United States only reluctantly intervened in the affairs of Latin American countries like Cuba for two main purposes: U.S. officials either wanted to prevent the intrusion into the Western hemisphere of imperialistic countries such as Germany or the Soviet Union, or to restore law and order. Thus in the succession of policy decisions from the Spanish-American War to the Cuban missile crisis, nationalist historians, like Bemis, perceive a pattern of U.S. attempts to help the Cuban people develop democratic institutions (such as the Cuban constitution), as well as achieve peace, freedom, and prosperity through, for instance, subsidizing road construction.

The Realist or Strategic Defense School

After World War II, some historians began to dispute the idealism of the nationalists. These realist historians thought that belief in such ideals as the spread of democracy led the nationalists to assume that power politics was somehow unworthy of the United States. Realists contended that nations basically pursued, not ideals, but rather their own self-interest. Given the inevitable threats from aggressive powers, such as the Soviet Union, the United States had to be realistic in its foreign policy goals. In the estimation of realist historians, countries should make policy that protects them from potentially aggressive rivals. A strong defense of a great nation's sphere of influence, moreover, maintains the balance of power and prevents aggressor nations from risking wars of conquest. Realist historians thus felt that the actual foreign policy priority of the United States had long been to maintain peace by strategically maneuvering to counter possible rivals in the Western hemisphere. U.S. diplomats achieved this goal by securing bases and preventing encroachment in its "sphere of influence" by powerful and potentially hostile countries such as the Soviet Union.

Realist historians, such as Joseph W. Reidy, contended that protection of U.S. strategic interests in the Western hemisphere against other world powers was the motivating factor in its relations with Cuba. Reidy alleged that the U.S. policy toward Cuba was primarily directed at maintaining friendly governments in Havana in order to preserve the Guantánamo base and secure the naval approaches to the U.S. southern coastline and the Panama Canal. In addition, the United States needed to control the northern Caribbean so as to protect shipping routes to South America and Europe. This defense-mindedness was the source of U.S. efforts to rid Latin America of extra-hemispheric intruders from the Holy Alliance in 1823 to communism and the Soviet Union in 1962. Reidy therefore viewed U.S. policy toward Cuba in particular, from the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine to the anti-Soviet missile quarantine, as basically strategic in nature.

The New Left or Economic Interest School

At the beginning of the 1960s, New Left historians rose to challenge both the nationalists and the realists as to the true motivation for U.S. foreign policy. New Left historians felt that the United States' worldwide Cold War competition with the Soviet Union caused neglect of reform at home. Writing at the time of the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam, these historians devoted much time to researching the causes of U.S. racial, social, and international problems. As they became aware of mistakes the United States had made in the past, they concluded that their government often did not practice the values its officials claimed to believe in. In fact, they deduced that U.S. foreign policy makers were more influenced by wealthy businessmen and bankers than by either democratic ideals or national defense. New Left historians concluded that the driving wheel of U.S. foreign policy was actually the need to maintain foreign markets for U.S. goods and investment in order to relieve the pressures of domestic overproduction that could lead to unemployment and even depression. Thus U.S. foreign policy, according to New Left critics, essentially aimed at making the world safe for U.S. business interests.

New Left historians like Robert F. Smith believed that U.S. policy toward Cuba was dictated neither by democracy nor defense of the United States, but by economic considerations. The United States fundamentally owed its prosperity, according to Smith, to international expansion of U.S. business. U.S. policy toward Cuba was consequently aimed at creating a favorable climate in Cuba for the sales and investments of U.S. citizens. North American businessmen, Smith argued, wanted Cuba as a market for manufactured goods, a source of cheap raw materials such as sugar, and a zone for profitable investments in land and industry. Unlike either of his counterparts, Smith did not believe U.S. business interests created wealth in Cuba that actually trickled down to benefit ordinary people. Rather, from the time of McKinley to that of Kennedy, he asserted, the U.S. government was ready to protect the economic interests of U.S. citizens, often at the expense of needed social reform (such as Grau's program) and national self-determination for the Cuban people (by such means as the Platt Amendment).

Which Perspective?

Contemporary planners of U.S.-Cuban policy need to understand the origin of the current impasse between the United States and Cuba. To this end they are investigating U.S.-Cuban diplomatic history, attempting to find patterns that might indicate the basic motivation for past policy. Three schools of thought on U.S. policy toward Cuba – nationalist, realist, and New Left – have emerged. Each perspective can be supported by the historical record of 1898-1962. Which of these motivations – spread of democratic ideals, pursuit of national defense, or promotion of the interests of U.S. business – best explains the history of U.S. decision-making about Cuba? In short, what was the underlying reason for U.S. policy toward Cuba?

Chapter Questions

1. Define or identify and briefly show the relationships to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - stalemate in relations
    - underlying reason
    - advantages of knowing underlying reason
    - nationalist school
    - origin of nationalist school
    - Samuel Flagg Bemis
    - reluctant intervention
    - realist school

- origin of realist school
- Joseph W. Reidy
- southern approaches
- New Left school
- origin of New Left school
- Robert F. Smith
- markets and sources of raw materials

2. After reading the documents that accompany this lesson, select one of the three schools and use it to explain topics A and D and *at least* B or C, and E or F:

   A. The Spanish-American War, the imposition of the Platt Amendment, and the use of that amendment during the period 1901-09.

   B. U.S. support for Machado and non-recognition of the Grau government.

   C. U.S. behavior toward Batista, 1933-59.

   D. The break in relations between the U.S. and Cuba, 1959-61.

   E. The CIA exile invasion plan and President Kennedy's decision to carry it out.

   F. President Kennedy's response to the USSR's building of offensive missile bases in Cuba in 1962.

3. Expand your outline and notes into an essay of not less than 1200 words. Be sure that you write a clearly stated thesis (main idea) and foreshadowing (mention of the arguments you will use to back up your thesis) in the introduction. Develop these arguments with supporting evidence in the main body. Conclude by summing up your viewpoint, reviewing your main arguments, and stating in general why your thesis most clearly represents the underlying reason for U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Sources

1. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 389.

2. Joseph W. Reidy, *Strategy for the Americas* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 161.

3. Robert F. Smith, *The United States and Cuba* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1960), p. 137.

Samuel Flagg Bemis: The Good Neighbor to the North

Samuel Flagg Bemis was a professor of diplomatic history and inter-American relations at Yale University. He pioneered area study diplomatic history and for many years was regarded as the foremost historian in that field. What does Bemis identify as the two driving forces in U.S. policy toward Cuba? Give several examples of U.S. actions cited by Bemis to support his contentions.

* * * * *

Although national and continental (in the hemispheric sense of the word) security is the real watchword of the Latin American policy of the United States today, there is more to it than that. From the beginning it has had an ideological and missionary background, originally derived from Protestant Christianity, now resting also on the gospel of progress. The political reflection of this was popular sovereignty and republican government as opposed to monarchy and totalitarianism. It has received a missionary impulse to save peoples not only from political tyranny, but also from political instability, from ignorance, from disease, from poverty, all of which the Latin American countries have possessed in varying measure. In the past missionary endeavor has not served to curb imperialism or political intervention; on the contrary. Today it has inspired the Good Neighbor of the North, working loyally within the diplomatic framework of Pan American collaboration, to fortify the political independence and territorial integrity of the nations of the New World by increasing their economic and sociological well-being in order to further the general advance of civilization.

Excerpt from *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, copyright 1943 and renewed 1971 by Samuel Flagg Bemis. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace and Company.

Joseph Reidy: Direct Military Threat to the United States

Joseph Reidy is a foreign affairs expert who has served in the U.S. Army as well as the State Department. He observed affairs in Latin America in the 1950s as an officer in U.S. embassies in Argentina and Brazil. In Reidy's estimation, why has the United States traditionally opposed extra-hemispheric interference in Latin America? What areas are particularly important to the U.S. strategically and why?

* * * * *

The United States has traditionally opposed the establishment of a hostile power within the Western Hemisphere....The United States has based this policy upon the plausible assumption that the military presence of a hostile power in Latin America could provide avenues of approach for launching offensive attacks upon other countries in the Western Hemisphere and could restrict or inhibit United States access to essential strategic materials, limit command and control of important sea lanes, and divert United States military power from crisis points elsewhere in the world.

These military-strategic considerations remain valid today....Some areas of Latin America obviously have greater military significance than others. The positioning of hostile forces in Mexico or Cuba has always been considered a direct military threat to the United States. Central America, together with Colombia and Venezuela, has long been considered of special importance to the security of the United States because of its strategic location with respect to the defense of the Caribbean and the approaches to the Panama Canal. Consequently, United States military interests in Latin America remain strongly Caribbean-oriented.

Joseph W. Reidy, *Strategy for the Americas* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 161.

Robert F. Smith: The Protection of American Interests

A native of Arkansas, Robert Smith earned a doctoral degree at the University of Wisconsin, where he began researching The United States and Cuba. *This award-winning study was the first of seven works by Smith on Latin American affairs. What is Smith's basic criticism of U.S. foreign policy? In what ways, according to Smith, has U.S. business influenced U.S. policy toward other countries?*

* * * * *

In the long-range perspective of United States policy the emphasis has been placed on order, stability, and the protection of American interests. This has meant that the United States has generally opposed sweeping economic reforms, and Cuban nationalism...From the 1890s to the present the United States has supported the conservative upper classes and their American allies.

The United States stress on order and the protection of American interests has been part of a larger world-view held by statesmen in the 20th century. This world-view – while opposing large, closed empires – has often insisted that the nations of the world protect American interests. We have particularly stressed this view in our dealings with the so-called "backward" countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa....Their attempts to solve their own peculiar problems have often conflicted with our definition of current economic and political practices. Thus, the United States has tended to oppose change when it seemed to threaten some alteration in American economic interests. Stability has meant the status quo, even if we have had to include a few dictators in our definition of "freedom-loving peoples."

Robert F. Smith, *The United States and Cuba* (Schenectady, NY: New College and University Press, 1960), p. 137.